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Abstract 
This thesis considers how best to achieve access to sufficient water for everyone in South 
Africa. It encompasses international law, national (including constitutional) law and policy, and 
finally community organisation, and the ‘vernacular law’1 of the commons. 
The task of achieving sustainable access to sufficient water for everyone in South Africa is long-
standing and considerable, culminating in the inclusion of a right of access to sufficient water in 
the 1996 Constitution.
2
 This right has simultaneously provided an overarching moral 
framework (through the elaboration of relevant human rights norms), while remaining 
decidedly remote from the experience of many people, for whom insufficient water remains a 
daily reality.  
Here, the ability of a right to water to effectively ensure access to sufficient water for everyone is 
critiqued. In so doing, the practical and conceptual limits of ‘rights-talk’ are considered, in two 
contexts in particular: International human rights law; and the jurisprudence of the South 
African Constitutional Court. 
Crucial to this thesis is a methodology of narrative inquiry, which analyses the stories of people 
who suffer from access to insufficient water, revealing the disconnection between people’s right 
to water, and their experience of living without the water they need. Flowing from this narrative 
is an attempt to reconceive water governance from outside the structural and conceptual 
closures of the dominant paradigm (characterised by individual rights and commodification) 
and to explore the potential for alternative practical modes of governance to deliver greater 
sustainability and equity, for communities living with water poverty. 
In this thesis, through a blend of contemporary perspectives on vernacular law and multi-level 
governance, postmodern theories on stories and subjectivity, and empirical observation, a fresh 
contribution is made to the debate on access to water in South Africa. 
 
Key words: Water, South Africa, (Human) Rights, Sustainable Development, Anthropocene, 
Narrative inquiry, Constitutional Court, Constitutionalism, Commodification, Reasonableness 
                                                          
1
 D Bollier & BH Weston ‘Green Governance: Ecological Survival, Human Rights, and the Law of the Commons’ 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013) 104. 
2
 Section 27 (1) (b) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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Prologue 
I first visited South Africa in 2003. But my sense of connection with the country began much 
earlier. As a child in the ‘80s watching Channel 4 News with my parents, images of violent 
clashes, bombs and police clampdowns – which with hindsight were the death throes of 
apartheid - formed part of my regular diet. As a ten-year-old I watched Nelson Mandela walk 
free from Victor Verster Prison, and on my fourteenth birthday, April 27
th
 1994, I followed as 
the ANC won victory in the country’s first all-party general election. The anticipation and 
excitement around the rebirth of South Africa as the ‘rainbow nation’ was palpable and 
intoxicating to the teenage me, and, it now seems, left me with an unarticulated, but significant 
emotional bond with this brave new world 9000 miles away. 
So when I arrived in Cape Town in March 2003, with my wife of one day, to start our 
honeymoon, it felt like the culmination of years of fascination with South Africa. What I didn’t 
know then was that this would also be the beginning of a new and more complicated chapter in 
my connection with the country. During the trip we visited family friends working as 
missionaries in Worcester, a farming town in the Western Cape. They showed us their work: 
feeding children at the beginning and end of the day, in order to encourage them to attend 
school; helping women to start small businesses, selling crafts. They introduced us to people 
living in townships, government flats, and informal settlements. People who, over the coming 
years, we would get to know as friends, and whose experiences of poverty would become part 
of our own understanding of the world.  
For the next three years we visited this work in Worcester, and then moved there to live. Our 
jobs, managing a micro-enterprise called People’s Crafts, and leading a youth group, allowed us 
to see, at first hand, how people living in some communities faced daily struggles of inadequate 
housing; unemployment and exploitative employment; insufficient income with which to buy 
food, fuel and clothing; exclusion from education because they couldn’t afford to buy school 
uniforms; prohibitively expensive clean water, and recourse to unsafe water sources. 
Upon returning to the UK, I became determined to explore why these socio-economic 
challenges exist, and to contribute, in some small way, to addressing them. As a lawyer, law was 
my natural milieu, and so, finding myself back at my alma mater, I began to research rights and 
obligations around access to sufficient water; a study which has eventually become this thesis. 
Why share this personal story? Ultimately this thesis is a human story; the story of my enquiry 
into the stories of others.
3
 Explored through the lens of law, and consequently focusing on 
structures, institutions and mechanisms at the international and national level, it nevertheless 
remains grounded in the realities around people’s access to water, and the practical and 
personal consequences of not having enough water. So I endeavour to remember that realising 
the goal of access to sufficient water in South Africa is essential for people: For Martinus; for 
Cynthia; for Sabelo; for Quinton; for Leonie, and for millions of others. 
                                                          
3
 See generally S Pinnegar & J G Daynes ‘Locating Narrative Inquiry Historically: Thematics in the Turn to 
Narrative’ in D J Clandinin (ed) Handbook of Narrative Inquiry: Mapping a Methodology (Sage Publications, 
2007); K Plummer Telling Sexual Stories (Taylor & Francis, 2004,). 
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1 
Introduction 
‘There is water within us, let there be water with us. Water never rests. When flowing above, it 
causes rain and dew. When flowing below it forms streams and rivers. If a way is made for it, it 
flows along that path. And we want to make that path. We want the water of this country to flow 
out into a network - reaching every individual - saying: here is this water, for you. Take it; 
cherish it as affirming your human dignity; nourish your humanity. With water we will wash 
away the past, we will from now on ever be bounded by the blessing of water. 
Water has many forms and many voices. Unhonoured, keeping its seasons and rages, its 
rhythms and trickles, water is there in the nursery bedroom; water is there in the apricot tree 
shading the backyard, water is in the smell of grapes on an autumn plate, water is there in the 
small white intimacy of washing underwear. Water - gathered and stored since the beginning of 
time in layers of granite and rock, in the embrace of dams, the ribbons of rivers - will one day, 
unheralded, modestly, easily, simply flow out to every South African who turns a tap. That is my 
dream.’ 
Antjie Krog
4
 
‘When it rains we collect the water from the roof. It’s better than carrying it from the river [200 
metres away]. The rainwater can be rusty from the roof, but we put extra Jik [bleach] in it. So 
it’s ok. It doesn’t taste nice when I make tea… 
If it hasn’t rained, I get one of the children to go to the river for us. We still have to put Flash in 
the water, because the cows shit in it. If not, I get the runs.’ 
‘Gremmah’ Mbongwa5 
 
The first quotation is from one of South Africa’s most famous poets. Published in the preamble 
to the National White Paper on Water Policy, at the beginning of the democratic era, it 
declares a new understanding of water; for dignity, for healing, for everyone. For Gremmah 
Mbongwa, and many others, this remains a dream.  
                                                          
4
 Preamble to the National White Paper on Water Policy, 1997: 
<https://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Policies/nwpwp.htm> (Last accessed 27 July 2016). 
5
 Interview # 1. See appendices. 
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The task of achieving sustainable access to sufficient water for everyone in South Africa is 
considerable. Water resource regulation during apartheid formalized and entrenched a 
profoundly unequal system, where white South Africans enjoyed an abundance of relatively 
cheap water, while water supply for black and non-white South Africans was impeded by poor 
infrastructure and lack of essential investment
6
. Indeed access to sufficient water became an 
avatar of the inequality and illegitimacy at the heart of the apartheid state, and a powerful trope 
to focus civil and political protest. The culmination of civil and political efforts to counter the 
systemic inequality of water-access can be seen in the articulation of a specific right of access to 
water (alongside other essentials) in Section 27 of the 1996 Constitution: ‘Everyone has the 
right to have access to sufficient food and water’ 7 
However, access to sufficient water is still not a reality for many, and multiple challenges 
continue to impede the fulfillment of this most basic human need. 
1.1  A right to water – definitions and clarifications 
Exploring international, constitutional and community responses to achieving access to 
sufficient water for people in South Africa requires research that goes beyond consideration of 
a right to water (however that is understood). But inevitably a legal thesis with this focus must 
place the right to water in a prominent position. Whether conceived of as an internationally 
recognised human right, or as a constitutional right, or as a ‘right-claim’ that transcends the legal 
sphere (preferring to emphasise its alleged inherent moral imperative)
8
, discourse around access 
to water expressed as a right remains a crucial motif throughout the thesis, as it does throughout 
the wider literature. 
Consequently I am particularly interested in the legal form(s) and content of a right to water, 
how such a right has been, and could be interpreted, and how effective it may be in realising the 
goal of achieving access to sufficient water for everyone in South Africa. Therefore it comes as 
no surprise that rights-based approaches to addressing access to water issues appear within the 
research questions posed. But, as explained below, there are a host of dimensions, which 
variously complement/co-exist with, contradict, or transcend rights-based approaches to the task 
of advancing access to sufficient water. Indeed, alongside discussion of a right to water, there is 
a growing discourse around access to water as a ‘development goal’, most famously expressed in 
                                                          
6
 P Bond ‘Water rights, commons and advocacy narratives’ (2013) 29 South African Journal of Human Rights 125, 
128. 
7
 Section 27 (1) (b) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
8
 M Dembour ‘What are human rights? Four Schools of Thought’ (2010) 32/1 Human Rights Quarterly 1, 2. 
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the Millennium Development Goals
9
 and Sustainable Development Goals
10
. So it is important 
at the very beginning to clarify that this thesis is not limited to exploring a right to water. Rather, 
in seeking to address the challenge of achieving access to sufficient water, rights-based 
approaches are given considerable, but not exclusive attention. Consequently, access to 
sufficient water is described as a right and/or a goal, depending on the particular governance 
framework under analysis. When neither of these terms directly apply (where measures 
towards achieving access to sufficient water are not described in relation to rights, nor are they 
employed formally towards realising a specific goal), access to sufficient water is referred to as 
an ‘aim’ or an ‘ambition’. 
  Water and sanitation 
Expressed variously through the language of rights and goals, access to water is also often (but 
not always) linked to sanitation. For example, the recent United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution on the right to water is entitled the ‘human right to water and sanitation’.11 Similarly, 
Sustainable Development Goal six aims to ‘ensure the availability and sustainable management 
of water and sanitation for all’.12 The World Health Organization defines sanitation as follows: 
‘Sanitation generally refers to the provision of facilities and services for the safe disposal of 
human urine and faeces […] The word 'sanitation' also refers to the maintenance of hygienic 
conditions, through services such as garbage collection and wastewater disposal.’13 
This definition illustrates the natural overlap between water and sanitation. General Comment 
15 on the Right to Water, from the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
describes the right to water as entitling everyone to ‘sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically 
accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses’.14 For many people, ‘personal 
and domestic uses’ will include sanitation: namely using water to flush or sluice toilets. But 
                                                          
9
 Target 7.C available at: <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals> (Last accessed 27 July 2016). 
10
 Sustainable Development Goals available at: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300> (Last 
accessed 27 July 2016). 
11
 United Nations General Assembly resolution 64/292 “The human right to water and sanitation”, UN Doc. 
A/RES/64/292 (3 August 2010). Hereafter UN GA resolution 64/292. 
12
 Goal 6: Sustainable Development Goals available at: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300> (Last 
accessed 27 July 2016). 
13
 World Health Organization, Health Topics: Sanitation <http://www.who.int/topics/sanitation/en/> (Last accessed 
27 July 2016). 
14
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15, The Right to Water (Articles 
11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), U.N. DOC. E/C.12/2002/11, 
26 November 2002.  Available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/a5458d1d1bbd713fc1256cc400389e94> 
(last accessed 9 July 2015).  Hereinafter General Comment 15. 
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while the tasks of improving access to water, and access to sanitation often overlap, the focus of 
this thesis is specifically on (access to) water, and not sanitation.   
In part, this is in order to delimit the scope of the thesis for the sake of practicality. But it also 
acknowledges the growing divergence between access to water and emerging best practice on 
sanitation, in areas of relative water scarcity (which includes South Africa). In such areas, 
waterless sanitation methods are being pursued, and with some success: reducing the demand 
for water, as well as minimizing the potential for boreholes (that provide drinking water) to be 
contaminated by sluiced fecal matter.
15
 
Consequently this thesis focuses specifically on water for domestic use, acknowledging the 
connection to sanitation where applicable. This follows the approach taken by notable authors 
in the field, including Stephen McCaffrey, Inga Winkler and Pierre Theilborger.
16
 For instance 
in relation to the right of access to sufficient water, in the context of South Africa, and regarding 
issues raised by the case of Mazibuko
17
 (where the claimants relied on water-borne sanitation), 
some discussion around access to water and a right to water inevitably includes reference to 
sanitation. 
Also, returning briefly to the definition of the right to water in General Comment 15 (above) 
when the word ‘water’ is used throughout the thesis it can be assumed (unless otherwise stated) 
that what this refers to is clean water for personal and domestic uses. 
  Governance 
The term ‘governance’ (including ‘water governance’) as used in the thesis, has two distinct 
meanings. The first is a broad description of the full range of regulation (relating to water) in a 
particular jurisdiction. For instance, Chapter Two: ‘Water governance at the international level’, 
refers collectively to the various international human rights and environmental law instruments 
relating to water, both binding and non-binding; and to international development goals and 
targets relating to water. Similarly water governance in South Africa encompasses the full 
national framework for water, including constitutional law, legislation and legislative 
instruments, policies and case decisions. The second use of the term governance is as in 
                                                          
15
 See for example: A Hendriksen et al ‘Participatory decision making for sanitation improvements in unplanned 
urban settlements in East Africa’ (2012) 21/1 Journal of Environment and Development 98-119, 103-4. 
16
 See S McCaffrey & E Brown et al (eds), Fresh Water and International Economic Law (Oxford University Press 
2005); I T Winkler The Human Right to Water: Significance, Legal Status and Implications for Water Allocation 
(2014, Hart); P Thielbörger The right (s) to water (European University Institute, 2010). 
17 Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC). This case is discussed at 
length in Chapter Four and throughout the thesis. 
16 
 
contrast to government. As such, discussion particularly in Chapters Five and Six around moves 
away from government and towards governance, reflect this second meaning: Here government 
refers to traditional, hierarchical, state-centric modes of regulation, which are variously 
complemented/challenged/marginalised by emerging modes of governance, characterised as 
informal, flexible and multi-layered. Use of this government/governance distinction may be in 
relation to specific examples. But it also relates to a broader trend, and consequence of 
globalisation.
18
 
 
1.2  Aim and research questions 
The title of this thesis is ‘Covenants, Constitution and Commons: International, constitutional, 
and community responses to achieve access to sufficient water for everyone’. The thesis focuses 
on legal measures to achieve access to sufficient water. Therefore, the following research 
question is designed in order to explore the thesis theme: 
 To what extent can a right to water achieve access to sufficient water in the context of 
South Africa? 
Five sub-questions aim to guide the research further: 
 How is the goal of achieving access to sufficient water understood, facilitated, and 
implemented at the level of international law
19
? 
 How is the right of access to sufficient water understood, facilitated, and implemented 
in South African domestic law? 
 What impact does relevant international law have on South Africa’s regulatory 
framework for access to water? 
 To what extent can the current international and domestic regulatory frameworks 
achieve access to sufficient water for everyone in South Africa? 
 What role can commons/community organisations play in creating effective water 
governance
20
 to help achieve access to water for all? 
                                                          
18
 P Jon ‘Introduction: Understanding governance’ in P Jon (ed) Debating Governance: Authority, Steering and 
Democracy (OUP, 2000) 2. 
19
 For the purpose of this question ‘international law’ is understood to encompass not only the authorities as set out 
in the Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 15 
UNCIO 355, Arts 38 (1) (a)-(c)), but also the relevant United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, despite not 
being binding on Member States, and other ‘soft law’, or non-legally binding instruments including for instance the 
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.  See A Boyle ‘Soft law in international law-making’ in M 
Evans (ed) International Law (4
th
 ed, Oxford, 2014) 118, 119-120. 
17 
 
1.3  Methodological approach 
This research uses a combination of doctrinal, theoretical, and empirical research methods in 
order to address the research questions above. Traditional doctrinal methodology is employed 
by identifying and analysing the relevant legal instruments, cases and secondary legal material. 
This methodological approach is designed primarily to establish ‘what is’, in relation to a 
particular area of enquiry.  
For this thesis it is necessary to identify and analyse the national and international law relating to 
the goal and/or the right of access to sufficient water. Most notably this includes the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights
21
, the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR),
22
 UN General Assembly resolution 64/292 on the right to water and 
sanitation,
23
 the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, as well as several seminal cases, 
domestic promulgating legislation, and secondary legal material including General Comment 15 
from the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) of the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
24
.   Alone, such a doctrinal approach lends itself to a 
positivist understanding of law, summarised by Bentham’s Command Theory of law25. Here, 
law is no more and no less than the rules that have been commanded by a sovereign, supported 
by a sanction for failing to comply
26
 (or translated to the level of international law; ‘no more or 
less than the rules that states have agreed to’27).  
In order to develop this thesis towards a more critical and contextualised position, it is 
necessary to reconceptualise law as a ‘dynamic set of processes’ rather than ‘primarily as a body 
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of rules’28: A move which replaces the ontological question ‘what is the law?’ with the more 
purposive question ‘what is the law for?’29 Such a development has been pursued in a number 
of ways. First, relevant literature is critically discussed in order to develop a ‘qualitative’ 
approach to this research
30
; identifying the focus of the enquiry (access to sufficient water) as a 
legal issue with socio-economic and ecological consequences, and developing arguments aimed 
at influencing law and policy accordingly. Second, further qualitative research in the form of 
semi-structured interviews were undertaken (the purpose of these interviews and the 
methodology and method employed, are discussed below).  
Because this thesis has been designed to evaluate the extent to which conferral of a right to 
water can achieve access to sufficient water, this necessarily involves consideration of how the 
right to water (and indeed other approaches to water governance) is interpreted, applied and 
experienced by people ‘on the ground’, particularly those whose access to sufficient water is 
problematic.  Such qualitative research like interviewing has been described as ‘a situated 
activity that locates the observer in the world’31. This allows the researcher to ‘study things in 
their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the 
meanings people bring to them’32. Therefore in the context of this research, interviews are a 
crucial way to discover the ‘gap’ between the law and the reality for many.   
Third, theoretical insights, both from legal scholarship and beyond, are employed in order to 
better challenge assumptions, and to clarify the purpose, structure and methods of this 
research. Of particular note are those insights drawn from narrative inquiry, which assisted in 
the design and use of interview data, but also offer an important justification for the connection 
(made explicitly in Chapter Five) between narrative approaches
33
 to this type of research, and 
commons approaches to effective water allocation. Similarly ‘constitutionalism’ and 
‘governance’ are influential to the argument and discussion in various places. 
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Together the doctrinal, qualitative/empirical and theoretical research methods combine to form 
what may be best described as a socio-legal research methodology, which Abrams characterises 
as ‘forcing us to think concretely but to remember socially’.34 Legal research does pertain to the 
study of tangible laws and legal materials. But such study always, necessarily happens within a 
social context. This allows the law to be understood from a constructivist perspective; as being 
part of the wider social, economic and political structures in which it operates.
35
 
1.3.1 Interviews: Purpose, methodology and method  
During research for this thesis I have conducted interviews with people in marginalised 
communities in South Africa and Malawi, as well as with academics, legal practitioners, and 
NGO workers. The interviews were conducted during various research trips between 2010 and 
2015. This relatively long time span has allowed interview data to be collected both from a 
variety of people and areas, but also at different points in time, which has given some insights 
around the pace of change regarding access to sufficient water, as well as people’s experience of 
access to water at any one instant. The purpose of these interviews was mainly to hear first-hand 
accounts of people’s experience of access to water, including the implications for them of  living 
with insufficient water. Therefore when interviewing community members I was particularly 
interested in locating communities where people’s access to sufficient water was likely to be 
problematic.  
The interviews are used to complement and humanise the evidence put forward that many 
people in South Africa currently suffer from access to insufficient water. They also supplement 
the arguments made regarding the efficacy and limitations of rights-based approaches to water, 
as well as anchoring discussion of community/commons approaches to water allocation within 
the realities of people’s experiences. The interviews therefore primarily capture the ‘voices’ and 
the ‘stories’ of water-poor people living in South Africa at various points in time and space. By 
including these voices and stories, the intention is not to claim to provide data that can be 
generalised and extrapolated to map nation-wide trends. Rather, the interviews are used to 
animate the legal and theoretical analysis in the thesis, adding perspectives from those who 
would normally be considered as other
36
 in a developing economy - the urban and rural poor.  
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This approach is methodologically important as it seeks to incarnate the value of engaging 
multiple and multifarious voices within the discourse, in order to legitimise and humanise the 
research. It also aims to forge a strong link between this empirical work and a theoretical 
understanding of how the ambition of access to sufficient water might be made manifest. Such a 
combination of a unique mixture of voices with legal and theoretical analysis is intended to 
produce research, which makes an original and meaningful contribution to the state of the art. 
Having previously worked in South Africa for an NGO called Youth With A Mission – 
YWAM
37
 (originally a Christian missionary organisation, but more recently also involved in 
community development, poverty reduction projects and health and social education 
campaigns) my point of departure for finding interviewees was to contact this NGO, which has 
bases throughout Africa. I chose not to interview in the communities where I had previously 
worked, in order to avoid interviewing people whom I knew personally, or at least people who 
recognised me in my previous employment. While interviewing acquaintances may have been 
the easier option, the personal nature of my enquiry, coupled with our familiarity, had the 
potential to create embarrassment for both parties and discomfort for the interviewees. 
Therefore I chose to exclude these people from my sampling frame. However, any resulting 
sampling bias was offset by the fact that my sample was extremely small, compared to the 
population of the communities, and by the fact that those interviews that were conducted 
included people in very similar material conditions, and from similar socio-economic 
backgrounds as those in the communities I excluded.
38
 I arranged to visit two bases, one in 
Winterton, in rural Kwa-Zulu Natal, the other in the city of Durban. At each base a member of 
staff kindly acted as a guide (and where necessary a translator) and we travelled together to the 
various communities where the NGO worked. Once in each community, I was introduced to 
local people, given the opportunity to explain the purpose of my research and of my visit, and 
to ask for volunteers to be interviewed. Prospective interviewees were given an information 
sheet (which was also explained by my guide, because a sufficient level of literacy among 
prospective participants could not be assumed), and it was clearly stated first that there was no 
remuneration for taking part in interviews, and second, that there was no likelihood of 
immediate improvement in people’s access to water as a result of my research (in particular 
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here it was made clear that I was not working for national or provincial government). 
Volunteers were asked to give informed consent to interviews being recorded, were offered the 
option of giving their names or of remaining anonymous (most people gave their names, 
although some gave first names, or nicknames only), and were informed that they could stop 
the interview at any time.  
Each interview was semi-structured, using an interview schedule,
39
 with questions being asked in 
the most appropriate order given in relation to each conversation. Particular attention was given 
to allowing interviewees to speak at some length about their experiences around access to water, 
without unnecessary interruption, in order to best capture each person’s story. This 
combination of having a set of guiding questions, while also encouraging open conversation 
allowed me to ask broadly similar questions to each participant, while not stifling each person’s 
responses. The information sheet and interview guide are included in the Appendix to this 
thesis. 
During interviews it was important to remember that my position as a stranger, a foreigner, and 
a perceived ‘expert’ would affect the power dynamics present in any interview. These factors 
were mitigated against as far as possible by deliberately selecting an informal and semi-
structured interview style, and by interviewing two or three community members together at 
one time (allowing the interviewees to ‘outnumber’ the interviewer). 
After each set of interviews the recorded audio files were downloaded, saved on to a secure 
computer (initially a laptop which was locked in a safe during this fieldwork, when not in use; 
then a desktop personal computer at the University of Sheffield Law School postgraduate 
facility). Files were organised using the interviewee’s name, location and date of interview, and 
password protected. Copies of annotated interview schedules, as well as hand-written notes in a 
notebook were also kept securely and seen only by me. Preparation for the interviews, their 
execution, and subsequent use of the data collected have all met the University of Sheffield, 
School of Law ethics committee requirements as stated when ethics approval was given for this 
work.  
In addition to the interviews conducted with community members, I also interviewed the base 
leader at YWAM Winterton, as well as several academics working in fields related to this 
research, at North West University (NWU), Potchefstroom, and the University of Kwa-Zulu 
Natal (UKZN), Durban. Finding interviewees in these institutions followed a ‘snowball 
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sampling’ method.40 An initial contact was made with a Professor of Environmental Law at 
NWU, who kindly recommended colleagues in his institution and at UKZN. These contacts 
were then pursued, and in some instances, resulted in subsequent recommendations also. 
Interviews with these participants constituted what Gillham describes as ‘elite interviewing’41: 
Interviewing experts or other authoritative people in your field of research
42
. Consequently, the 
structure of these interviews was different to those conducted through YWAM, as Dexter 
explains: 
‘In standardized interviewing… the investigator defines the questions and the problem; he is 
only looking for answers within the bounds set by his presuppositions. In elite interviewing… the 
investigator is willing, and often eager to let the interviewee teach him what the problem, the 
question, the situation is.’43 
Yet despite these legitimate differences, there remained a continuity of emphasis on hearing 
people’s voices and stories. Because of this I was willing and eager to be taught more about the 
problem(s) faced, as well as about what questions to ask, when interviewing both community 
members and conducting ‘elite’ interviews. The interviews with academics are not explicitly 
quoted from in this thesis. Rather, they have contributed to my understanding of the legal, 
social and cultural context within which the right to water, and water governance operates in 
South Africa.  
A subsequent research trip to communities partnering with the NGO Water for People, in 
Malawi in 2014, and a return visit to communities working with YWAM in Durban in 2015 
utilized the same interviewing methods as already explained, and followed the same ethics 
requirements.  
Together this empirical work includes 12 interviews with ‘water-poor’44 community members in 
South Africa, three in Malawi, one interview with a retired Constitutional Court Judge, and 
three with NGO workers. This constitutes a considerable number of hours of interview footage, 
which, as already stated, is not intended to underpin generalised claims. Instead, interviews 
were transcribed and analysed in order to identify themes. Quotations were then used which 
best encapsulated these themes in order to help meet the challenges already identified of 
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bridging the gap between the law and reality.  Despite best efforts it is important to acknowledge 
that this part of the empirical research conducted is the most vulnerable to unconscious bias on 
my part; selecting quotes that reinforce my argument or preconceptions. In order to address 
this, where possible, assertions of fact were ‘triangulated’45 with information provided by other 
interviewees, or checked with other sources.  
Quotations from interviews appear in several chapters, are indented, and referenced with a 
footnote. In Chapter Five the interviews are incorporated and analysed in more detail. A full list 
of interviewees, along with their locations and/or organisations is given in the appendix. 
 
1.4  Contribution to relevant academic debates  
This thesis is located within the discipline of law. Consequently areas of legal enquiry relevant 
to the research questions posed necessarily include human rights law (in particular social and 
economic rights) law and development; sustainable development; and wider concerns of 
environmental law (each at the national/domestic and international level), as well as 
constitutional (public and administrative) law and legal theory, and water regulation within the 
specific context of South Africa. But identifying the thesis as socio-legal research requires that 
themes including poverty; gender; power relations; social impacts of new water technology; and 
water governance more generally feature to greater or lesser degrees.  
This thesis makes an original contribution to the existing knowledge on how best to pursue 
access to sufficient water for people in South Africa by equitable, sustainable and efficient 
legal/regulatory/governance means. More specifically the thesis contributes to three key 
academic debates: the appropriate developmental role of the South African Constitution, and 
Constitutional Court; the role of rights in achieving eco-socio-sustainable access to water; and 
the potential of ‘commons thinking’ for water governance, and the extent to which such 
thinking could contribute to more sustainable, equitable access to water for everyone.  
In so doing, the thesis builds on wider debates around judicial restraint and judicial activism, 
applying them here to South Africa’s unique socio-legal context; including its expansive and 
decidedly transformative Bill of Rights, its on-going battle with significant impoverishment (in 
the aftermath of centuries of systemic discrimination), and its evolution towards liberal 
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democracy. Similarly, the reappraisal of the role of socio-economic rights takes places primarily 
in the context of the South African Constitution (which, regarding the right to water in 
particular, has been so heavily influenced by the international human right to water). Also, the 
recent resurgence of interest in the commons, as well as in local and ‘glocal’ dimensions to 
debates on (climate) justice are focused upon the South African context, and upon commons 
struggles in the country. Most importantly, ideas around water rights and commons thinking are 
considered in relation to the ‘on the ground’ experiences and actions of people in communities 
where access to water is problematic.  
 
1.5 Understanding water paradigms 
Water, and access to water can be understood in different ways, and through different 
paradigms. A paradigm can be defined as ‘the basic belief system or worldview that guides the 
investigator… in ontologically and epistemologically fundamental ways”. 46 These paradigms may 
be socially constructed, and may have direct or indirect legal implications. Some may only be 
unconsciously experienced; assumed without being thought. For many of us, especially those of 
us living in ‘developed countries’ the ubiquity of safe, clean water is an ordinary part of daily 
life. If familiarity really does breed contempt, then it is likely we do not give water the respect it 
deserves. Clean water, in abundance, available directly and cheaply, is considered an 
entitlement. Consequently it is difficult to reconceive of water as a precious, finite, nay scarce 
resource, a gift, a relief, and not as a foregone conclusion. Such associations with water are 
largely alien to my experience. But it is important at the beginning of this research to consider 
the most prevalent paradigms that frame people’s thinking about water and access to water, and 
consequently which help shape different approaches to water governance; no matter how 
interconnected or (un)conscious or (in)formal these paradigms may be.  
1.5.1 Water as life 
Water is a necessary constituent of every cell of every plant and animal on Earth.
47
 Present on 
the planet long before the evolution of life, water is a prerequisite for all living organisms.
48
 
Water also forms a significant proportion of the mass of many organisms, including around 
70% of adult humans. Most of this water acts to distribute nutrients throughout the body, and to 
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remove waste products. Additionally the water content of all biological fluids, including saliva, 
gastric juices and plasma, is between 90 and 99%.
49
 
Consequently, not only is water essential for the beginning of life, but also for its continued 
survival. Adult humans take in around 2.5 litres of water per day, in the form of liquid water, 
and from solid food. Much less than this volume results in dehydration, which impedes 
physical and mental functions. Severe dehydration leads to morbidity and ultimately death.
50
 
While clean water is essential for life, water contaminated with diseases is a leading cause of 
death in the developing world, especially among children.
51
 Cholera, typhoid, and diarrhoea are 
all caused by drinking ‘dirty’ water, which leads to the death of nearly 4000 children every day.52  
In short, life and clean water are inseparable. It is not surprising then that across cultures, 
philosophies and religions, as well as in science, life and water are inextricably linked.  
1.5.2 Water as element(al) 
‘Water is H2O, hydrogen two parts, oxygen one, but there is also a third thing that makes it 
water and nobody knows what it is.’  
DH Lawrence – Pansies53 
Water appears to play a profoundly significant role both in biological life, and in creating 
spiritual/existential understandings of life. Such an ‘elemental’ dimension to water has been 
reflected in literature and philosophy since antiquity. Ovid’s Metamorphoses uses water to 
symbolize fundamental truth as constantly moving, and changing.
54
 Thales – widely regarded as 
the first Greek philosopher – declared water as the source of all things.55 Mazisi Kunene relates 
the Zulu belief that ‘from water is born all peoples of the earth.’56 
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The biblical creation poem in Genesis describes how water was present before life was made: 
‘And the earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the 
Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.’57 
The Qur’an, how life came from water: 
‘And God hath created every animal of water: of them there are some that creep on their 
bellies; some that walk on two legs; and some that walk on four.’58 
The elusive third element in DH Lawrence’s poem is perhaps that which the traditions above 
intuitively experience and seek to articulate. But what is important to an understanding of water 
paradigms is to acknowledge that the necessity of water for life as a scientific fact is echoed 
across philosophical and religious traditions. Together these lead to a paradigmatic 
understanding of water as a necessity in the fullest sense. 
1.5.3 Water as necessity 
Water (or more accurately, access to clean water) is necessary for existence. Therefore it must 
be understood as a necessity if existence is to continue. But a paradigm of ‘water as necessity’ 
goes further than existence, affirming that water is necessary for dignified life. Regarding 
humanity’s need for water, General Comment 15 describes access to water as ‘indispensable for 
leading a life in human dignity’.59 This paradigm has been, and continues to be, hugely 
influential in shaping attitudes towards water access, and water governance that effectively meets 
this necessity.
60
 The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights makes clear the 
link between human dignity and human rights.
61
 Human rights flow from the ‘inherent dignity’ 
of the ‘human family’.62 Therefore the concept of a human right to water (as to anything else) 
rests on an acknowledgment of human dignity, and aims to affirm and to protect people’s 
dignified existence, not simply their existence. Consequently the ensuing discussion on the 
human right to water in this thesis, and the implications of such a right for water governance, 
may be understood as predicated upon a paradigm of water-as-necessity. Similarly, the explicit 
connection between human dignity and the Millennium Development Goals, articulated in the 
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United Nations Millennium Declaration,
63
 suggests that the goal of halving the number of 
people without sustainable access to water
64
 may also be understood as flowing from a water-as-
necessity paradigm.  
Water is also a necessity for all non-human animals, and for all ecosystems. Recent work on 
planetary boundary theory, pioneered at the Stockholm Resilience Centre at Stockholm 
University, proposes a framework for human interaction with the Earth’s systems, in order to 
define a safe operating space for humanity.
65
 Nine planetary boundaries are identified, including 
ocean acidification, climate change, biochemical flows, and freshwater use. The theory states 
that crossing any of the nine boundaries may lead to ‘irreversible and abrupt environmental 
change’,66 which will be compounded by multiple breaches. It is estimated that three boundaries 
have already been breached (biodiversity loss, climate change, and the atmospheric nitrogen 
cycle), and that the remaining boundaries may also be crossed by 2050.
67
 Overexploitation of 
freshwater sources (including lakes and aquifers) is increasing (whereby water is extracted at a 
rate that exceeds the recharge rate of the source), leading some hydrologists to call for ‘a global 
limit on water consumption’.68 More positively though, there is huge potential to improve the 
efficiency of human’s water-use, thereby reducing the risk of crossing the freshwater boundary.69 
What is certain though, is that water is a necessity for everyone and everything that shares this 
planet. 
1.5.4 Global water 
Echoing the call for a global limit on water consumption, approaches that conceptualise water 
(and water governance) from global perspectives, are rising in prominence. Earth Systems 
Governance (ESG) is one such perspective, defined as:  
‘the interrelated and increasingly integrated system of formal and informal rules, rule-making 
systems, and actor-networks at all levels of human society (from local to global) that are set up to 
steer societies towards preventing, mitigating, and adapting to global and local environmental 
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change and, in particular, earth system transformation, within the normative context of 
sustainable development.’70 
In the specific context of water governance, ESG seeks to acknowledge all actors involved in the 
regulation of societal activities and behaviours with regards to earth system dynamics, and to 
analyse the myriad layers and interconnections between public and private actors and actor 
networks at all levels of policy and decision-making. To this end, such a conceptual approach 
complements the international, national and local/community layers of water governance 
considered in this thesis. Contemporary ESG research also links to ideas of the anthropocene, 
and of socio-ecological security, which are examined below. 
Integrated Water Resources Management IWRM is a more formally constructed approach to 
water governance than ESG. Longer established, and more technically focused, it should be 
considered less as a water paradigm, and more as a tool with which to pursue a global 
(international, interconnected, and integrated) paradigm of water governance. The central 
conceptual theme of IWRM is that water resources are finite and interdependent.
71
 The Dublin 
Statement on Water and Sustainable Development (known as the Dublin Principles) was 
agreed at the International Conference on Water and the Environment in Dublin in 1992. It 
contains four guiding principles, which summarise and promote IWRM as a holistic approach 
to hydrological management, emphasising its ecological, economic and social implications. 
IWRM also recognises the right of all people to clean water and sanitation at an affordable 
price (Principle No. 4). It has been criticised for lacking specific objectives, and the question 
has been asked whether its emphasis on all relevant factors should remain procedural, or 
extend towards a more substantive agenda.
72
  Nevertheless IWRM as a water paradigm has 
provided a common basis for water sector reform across the world, including shaping legislation 
in South Africa.
73
 It is considered in greater detail in Chapter Three. But it is the first statement 
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of Principle No. 4 - ‘Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be 
recognised as an economic good’ - that connects to the next water paradigm to be introduced. 
1.5.5 Water as commodity 
A commodity is a marketable item produced to satisfy wants or needs.
74
 In light of the fact that 
sufficient clean water is imperative to sustaining dignified existence, it is easy to understand why 
water may be considered Earth’s most precious commodity.75 Basic market economy principles 
of supply and demand, applied to water, provide further impetus towards a paradigm where 
water is treated as a commodity. On the supply side the inconvenient reality is that the volume 
of water on this planet remains fixed.
76
 Of this volume, less than three per cent is fresh water.
77
 
Meanwhile, demand, particularly since the 1990s has been growing, led in large part by a 
significant and sustained increase in the global population: In 1987 the world’s total population 
was five billion. By 1999 this had reached six billion. In 2011 it reached seven billion, and is 
estimated to reach eight billion by 2024.
78
 Indeed, rising human demand for water significantly 
outweighs the predicted effects of greenhouse gas global warming in terms of the consequences 
for global water systems in the near future.
79
 Such a combination of static supply and growing 
demand for a commodity inevitably leads to an increase in unit price (or market value).
80
  
The need to meet increasing demand for this necessity called water, coupled with the promise 
of increased returns, has opened up huge economic opportunities for investment in water and 
sanitation services for myriad international financial institutions and multinational 
corporations.
81
 Also, during the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s economic orthodoxy 
coalesced around the so-called Washington Consensus, which Stiglitz defines as: 
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‘development strategies focusing on privatization, liberalization and macro-stability (meaning mostly price 
stability); a set of policies predicated upon a strong faith – stronger than warranted – in unfettered markets 
and aimed at reducing, or even minimizing, the role of government’.82   
Applied to water services, many such policies prioritised using privatisation contracts to 
facilitate and achieve much-needed investment in water and sanitation infrastructure and 
facilities. Consequently by 2013 ten per cent of the global population received their water from 
private companies.
83
 This has led to the emergence of a closer association between providing 
access to water and operating such provision on the basis of generating profit. Indeed this is not 
limited to those areas of water services provided by private companies. The commercial, or 
private-sector mind-set that water services can, and should be profitable is also now a common 
feature across State-owned and provincial water providers.
84
  
Such a ‘privatesque’ approach to water provision is sufficiently prevalent and imbedded to 
warrant the identification of a water-as-commodity paradigm here. Indeed, it is asserted here 
that this is the dominant paradigm within which assumptions are made around water 
governance.
85
 The implications of operating water services according to this paradigm are not 
easy to determine, and it is important to state that such a paradigm is not automatically 
antithetical to other paradigms discussed. Nor is it necessarily in conflict with the concept of a 
(human) right to water. But, as will be explored later in this thesis, such a paradigmatic 
approach to water has raised tensions with an understanding of water as necessity; tensions first 
felt in some of South America’s water privatization experiments. These experiments have had 
global ramifications for water governance, and have helped to clarify and restate the last 
important water paradigm to be introduced.   
1.5.6 Water as commons 
In December 1999 in the Bolivian city of Cochabamba, the previously State-owned water 
supply company Semapa was privatized. The privatization contract went to Aguas del Tunari, a 
joint venture with the US multinational construction company Bechtel. Immediately water rates 
were raised by 35%. Consequently many residents could not afford to pay for their water, 
becoming disenfranchised from what they considered their right (affordable access to sufficient 
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water).
 86
 This led to large scale, sustained public protest, between January and April 2000, 
organised mainly by the community coalition Coordinadora in Defense of Water and Life. On 
the 10
th
 April 2000, less than five months after the privatization contract had been signed, the 
Bolivian government reversed the privatization and returned Cochabamba water to State 
ownership.
87 
 
The legacy of the so-called ‘Cochabamba water war’, along with similar events in Argentina, is 
considered in more detail in Chapter Two, particularly in relation to their influence on the 
2010 General Assembly resolution on the right to water and sanitation. But it is introduced 
here because, with the benefit of hindsight, it was these events in Cochabamba that first located 
issues of water rights (articulated since Cochabamba as ‘water justice’), and community-based 
resistance to the commodification and privatization of water, within broader struggles for global 
justice, including global environmental justice.
88
  It is also important to note that the 
Cochabamba water war was influenced by non-Western, indigenous worldviews and communal 
ways of life that emphasised the importance of keeping access to water available for all, through 
an understanding of water as part of the ‘commons’. The concept of commons (discussed at 
length in Chapter Five, and elsewhere) encompasses notions of communality, manifested 
through structures of community deliberation and decision-making regarding resources 
conceived of as collective, corporately held, or common; including water.
89
 Together, resistance 
to an approach to water commodification that results in disenfranchisement, coupled with a 
restatement of water as part of the (global) commons, is introduced here as a paradigm of ‘water 
as commons’.  
1.6 Outline of thesis 
The thesis follows a three level approach, moving from consideration of the research question 
(and relevant sub-questions) at the international level (the level of the Covenants), then to the 
national, domestic jurisdiction of South Africa (the level of the Constitution), before moving to 
consider the actual and potential role that commons and community-focused governance can 
play in achieving access to sufficient water for everyone (the level of the Commons). 
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Chapter two: ‘Water governance at the international level’, outlines the (hard and soft) law and 
legal instruments relevant to identifying the nature and scope of an internationally 
acknowledged human right to water. The history around acceptance of the right is considered, 
including the important interpretative role played by the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, as well as the effects that water reform in South America had in driving 
acknowledgment of the right to water at the international level. The chapter also critiques the 
structural and practical limitations of an international human right to water, and to a rights-
based approach to water governance, before comparing the 
alternative/complementary/competing concept of water as a development goal. The 
interconnections between social, economic and cultural rights, civil and political rights, and 
environmental exigencies are considered. In particular, the question of sustainable access to 
sufficient water is framed within the challenges and limitations not just of economic resources, 
but also of emerging ecological capacities. Such a consideration of water in relation to social-
ecological security (drawing particularly on the work of Crutzen & Stoermer,
90
 Ebbesson,
91
 
Grear
92
 and Kotze
93
) emphasises not only the existence of, and implications for an international 
human right to water, but also the present and future global context for any meaningful claim to 
such a human right.  
 
Chapter Three: ‘Water in South Africa’, moves the thesis from the international level, to a 
single national context in order to explore both the connection between the international and 
national levels regarding water governance, and to chart the current shape of water access and 
water governance in South Africa. This begins by exploring the unique legal/historical/political 
factors surrounding South Africa’s current water topography, as well identifying more general 
regional and paradigmatic changes, which together have influenced the country’s current water 
settlement. Emerging from a historically informed study of the legal/regulatory regime for water, 
is a focus on the centrality of the 1996 Constitution. This central role is considered from both a 
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theoretical perspective (using the work of Ackerman
94
 on constitutional moments, and Barendt
95
 
and Ridley
96
 on constitutionalism) and a more practical, nationally-specific perspective (using in 
particular Currie & de Waal’s analysis of the Bill of Rights97) in order to accurately describe, 
then critique the legal architecture for water governance in South Africa. This supports the 
ensuing analysis (in Chapter Four) of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. 
 
Chapter Four: ‘Socio-economic rights in the Constitutional Court’, analyses decisions of the 
Court, and the relationship between the Court and government (including interpretation of 
legislation and policy), both generally, and specifically regarding economic, social and cultural 
rights (including the so called environmental right
98) in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights. It is 
argued that understanding the relationship between South Africa’s highest court, and the socio-
economic rights in the Constitution is crucial to identifying what potential there is for achieving 
access to sufficient water (one such socio-economic right) through traditional legal and 
regulatory means (and by implication, what are the limits of this potential?).
99
 In particular this 
raises questions about the impact that conferring a right to water on people has on their 
achieving concomitant access to water (a central question in this thesis, expressed succinctly by 
Bond, and others, as reaching the limits of ‘rights talk’100). It is argued that there are limitations 
to the Constitutional Court’s ability to pursue significant social transformation, and that many of 
these limitations can be considered legitimate, by recourse to entrenched constitutional values 
(including the rule of law, and separation of powers): A position typically acknowledged as 
judicial restraint, but when taken to its extreme, is labelled by the author as ‘judicial 
managerialism’.101  But an alternative interpretation of the Court’s interaction with socio-
economic rights, is also postulated, emphasising the developmental importance of a dynamic, 
evolutionary understanding of the Court’s role in relation to these rights. Rather than asking 
what is the legitimate role of the Constitutional Court? (a question that expects a static answer), 
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instead the question ‘what is currently the legitimate role of the Constitutional Court?’ is asked: 
an idea referred to by the author as ‘liminal constitutionalism’.  The chapter concludes by 
considering the consequences of reaching the limits of ‘rights talk’ (particularly regarding 
achieving access to sufficient water), and the epistemic spaces that may open up as a result. 
 
Chapter Five: ‘Water Stories, Community organisation and ‘commons thinking’ ’, begins by 
considering whether there are sufficiently similar characteristics across myriad 
community/communal/co-operative/commons organisational modes to warrant discussion of 
these within a single (albeit broad) paradigm; concluding that there is a discernible set of 
characteristics with which to explore water governance through commons thinking. To this end, 
the work of Ostrom
102
 and Harvey
103
 are particularly important.  The history of commoning in 
various parts of the world is traced, in order to locate commons thinking within a rich and 
complex mixture of ancient traditions, indigenous knowledge systems and postmodern theory. 
As such, it is argued that commons thinking, applied to helping achieve access to sufficient 
water, is capable of reimagining water governance to effectively respond to old and new 
problems causing insufficient water access. Of particular note here is the emerging shift from 
government to governance, and consequently the growing importance of multi-level governance 
and grass roots organisations, both of which prioritise stakeholder participation and 
enfranchisement.
104
  
 
Also, acknowledgment of so-called vernacular law, which governs the commons in more or less 
formal ways, presents an important opportunity to reimagine legal structures for more equitable 
and effective water governance. Such a reimagination is started in this chapter. It is argued that 
such emphasis on participation and enfranchisement supports the inclusion within this thesis, of 
the voices of water-poor people, and their stories. To this end the chapter considers the 
enfranchising potential of narrative, before reporting on, and analysing the interviews 
conducted, and their connection to the arguments in the current and preceding chapters.  
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In Chapter Six ‘Conclusion: Achieving access to sufficient water for everyone, for ever’, the 
central assertions of the thesis (including its originality) are summarized, before ‘zooming out’ 
again to consider the wider regional and global challenges to achieving access to sustainable, 
equitable and efficient access to water; reconnecting analysis at the international level with 
discussion of the commons. The chapter acknowledges that there are multiple dimensions to 
the challenge of achieving access to sufficient water, which lie outside the legal/regulatory space, 
and consequently (at least partially) outside the purview of this thesis. However, two such 
dimensions are briefly included at this point, in order to locate this research within arguably the 
two most important emerging areas of water- related scholarship; new water technology, and 
water security in the context of the Anthropocene.  
 
1.7 Main argument and originality of thesis 
As the ensuing analysis of international and national water governance will reveal and support, 
the central argument of this thesis is that a (human/constitutional) rights-based approach to 
water access, operationalized within the current, dominant, ‘water-as-commodity’ paradigm, will 
not achieve the goal of universal access to sufficient water. At least part of the solution to this 
failure of a rights-based approach (referred to throughout as ‘rights talk’) lies in commons 
thinking, and the adoption and advancement of a ‘water-as-commons’ paradigm for water 
governance.  
This two-part (diagnosis/prognosis) argument is premised on four crucial assertions. First, 
notwithstanding the declarative importance of international water governance (encompassing 
international human rights law, and international development goals-based initiatives) people’s 
rights claims to water, are better made at national (or even local) level. Second, the current 
configuration of a right to water - as an individual right, to be progressively fulfilled within the 
limitations of the available resources of the State – is ill-suited to achieving universal access to 
water. Third, the interpretation and application by the Courts, of such a right is severely limited 
by judicial restraint. The consequence of this is that the transformative potential of the right is 
further constrained. Fourth, the thoroughly different conception of water that ‘commons 
thinking’ supports, presents an important opportunity to reimagine water governance in ways 
that are more sustainable, more equitable, and more enfranchising than is the status quo. 
Much of the originality of this thesis comes from its methodological design, which combines 
more traditional legal scholarship with narrative inquiry, explicitly calibrated to give voice to 
water-poor people, in order to reflect upon the implications of their stories, and crucially, to 
36 
 
learn from their praxis. If we listen carefully to these stories, whispers of vernacular law and law-
like expressions begin to be heard, and these should be heeded by anyone serious about 
realizing the goal of access to sufficient water for everyone, forever. 
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2 
Water governance at the 
international level 
‘On July 28th 2010 the United Nations General Assembly adopted an historic resolution 
recognizing the human right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as “essential for the 
enjoyment of the right to life”. For those of us in the balcony of the General Assembly that day, 
the air was tense with suspense… Bolivian UN Ambassador Pablo Solon introduced the 
resolution… “Water is life,” he said.  
But then he laid out the tragic and growing number of people around the world dying from lack 
of access to clean water… every three-and-a-half seconds in the developing world, a child dies of 
water-borne disease. Ambassador Solon then quietly snapped his fingers three times and held 
his small finger up for a half second. The Generally Assembly fell silent. Moments later, it voted 
overwhelmingly to recognize the human right to water and sanitation. People on the floor 
erupted in cheers.’ 
Maude Barlow
105
 
 
‘A man looking at reality brings his own limitations to the world. If he has strength and energy 
of mind the tide pool stretches both ways, digs back to electrons and leaps space into the 
universe and fights out of the moment into non-conceptual time. Then ecology has a synonym 
which is ALL’ 
John Steinbeck
106
 
2.1 Introduction 
General Assembly Resolution number 64/292
107
, witnessed by Barlow, recognizing the right to 
water and sanitation was adopted with 122 votes in favour, none against, and 41 abstentions. It 
represents for the first time, recognition of the right to clean water and sanitation at the 
international level, and acknowledges that both are essential for realising all human rights. 
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Affirmed and supported by the corresponding Human Rights Council Resolution
108
 two months 
later, the human rights to water and sanitation are now explicitly confirmed as being part of 
international law, although not legally binding on States.
109
 Together these two resolutions mark 
the culmination of decades of efforts to acknowledge water as a human right at the international 
level. 
This chapter begins by charting the development of a internationally acknowledged right of 
access to water, and by examining the relevant international legal instruments through which 
this right has been declared, affirmed and promulgated. Consideration is given to the nature, 
substance and procedural requirements of this right and ultimately to its justiciability.  
 
The legal basis, binding obligations, and normative status of the right of access to water, are 
analysed, before considering the degree to which the emerging rights-based approach to water 
access connects with global (sustainable) development approaches to improving people’s access 
to water; addressing the relationship between rights-based and development-based approaches 
to water governance.  Finally both of these are considered in the context of global 
environmental constraints and exigencies, in order to better understand the interconnected 
challenges facing any meaningful international approach to ensuring access to sufficient water in 
the present and future global contexts.  
 
2.2 History of a contested right 
Since access to sufficient clean water is undoubtedly necessary for dignified life, it may be 
expected that a human right to water has long been acknowledged. Indeed it is most surprising, 
initially at least, to discover that water is not mentioned, much less explicitly protected as a 
human right in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
110
 or the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights
111
. This is perhaps even more surprising given that rights to 
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food, clothing, housing, medical care and social security, amongst other economic and social 
rights, are explicitly listed in the UDHR
112
 and ICESCR.
113
  
2.2.1 Conspicuous absence 
There are several interpretations of the reasons for the absence of any mention of water.  
Perhaps particularly relevant to the absence of water from the UDHR is the era in which it was 
adopted.
114
 The UDHR was approved by the UN General Assembly in December 1948, in the 
aftermath of World War II and in the wake of the United Nations’ Charter, the main emphasis 
of which was international security (with brief mention of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms)
115
. As such one role of the UDHR can be understood as seeking to provide a more 
expansive interpretation of the UN Charter’s human rights provisions. As the full horror of 
atrocities committed during the war began to impact on the collective psyche, including the 
international community, the UDHR’s chief concern in declaring human rights standards, may 
have been to emphasise those rights most obviously violated or disregarded during the war 
period. Such rights include for example Articles 2 and 7 prohibiting discrimination; Article 3 
regarding life, liberty and security of person; Article 4 prohibiting slavery and servitude; Article 
5 prohibiting torture; and, Article 9 prohibiting arbitrary arrest, detention and exile.
116
    
Therefore, while it is the case that rights to food, clothing and other social and economic 
rights
117
, are present in the UDHR, there is at least an apparent prioritisation of civil and 
political rights
118
 (including the right to life, and rights protecting individuals from slavery, 
torture, arbitrary arrest and the like) above social and economic rights. Of the 30 Articles within 
the UDHR, the first 20 can be more accurately categorised as civil and political, than as social 
and economic rights. Indeed, not only are social and economic rights outnumbered two to one, 
but they are also relegated to the final third of the declaration.  Such an analysis of the relative 
balance within the UDHR of civil and political, and social and economic rights, and the 
consequent absence of water from explicit mention (because civil and political rights received 
priority over social and economic rights), may link to a second interpretation.   
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Article 25 (1) of the UDHR states: 
 
‘Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself 
and his family, including food clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, 
and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age 
or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control’.119  
 
The use of the word ‘including’ at the beginning of the list of material requirements for an 
adequate standard of living suggests that this list is not intended to be exhaustive. Such an 
analysis allows the fact of the absence of water from this list to be understood in a way that does 
not exclude assertion of a right to water. If the list is simply indicative of the requisite conditions 
for an adequate standard of living (which, with reference to the preamble, must be a standard of 
living in keeping with dignified existence
120
) then there is scope to add other material 
requirements necessary for such a standard of living. Determining whether a particular 
condition should be considered, by implication to be part of this list then depends on whether 
such a condition is essential for a standard of living commensurate with dignified existence. It is 
precisely this interpretation that leads McCaffrey to conclude as follows: 
 
‘It is obvious that water, even more than food, is essential to “health and well-being”; it should 
therefore be taken to be included by necessary implication’.121   
 
This argument, that water can (or should) be included ‘by necessary implication’ is supported 
by General Comment 15 which asserts a right to water based on the intrinsic connection 
between access to water and the right to food
122
 as declared in Article 11 (1) of the ICESCR
123
 
(closely echoing the right to food in Article 25 (1) of the UDHR
124
).  
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So the historical context of the UDHR may have influenced the prioritisation of civil and 
political rights within the document. This in turn may help explain why those social and 
economic rights listed, particularly in Article 25 do not include the essential requirement of 
water: More attention was perhaps given to ensuring the comprehensive nature of those rights 
set out in the earlier articles. Alternatively it may be that including a less than exhaustive list was 
a deliberate technique to allow for appropriate interpretation. And it may of course be that 
neither of these interpretations is correct. Indeed the inclusion of both civil and political rights 
and social and economic rights within the same declaration, rather than separating them, as the 
ICCPR
125
 and ICESCR subsequently did, may suggest that both groups of rights were 
considered equally important, and inextricably linked.
126
 But whatever the case, the absence 
from the UDHR of such a crucial component of life as water, should not be read as a criticism 
of the document. The rights contained within the UDHR push far beyond those notions of 
individual rights (such as equality before the law, and freedom of religion, expression and 
participation in government) expressed in the seminal declarations that preceded it.
127
 Rather 
the scope of the UDHR extends to declare amongst other things: equal universal suffrage;
128
 the 
right to a nationality;
129
 the right to marry;
130
 and the right to work for a living wage.
131
 As such it 
represents a progressive and expansive, if not exhaustive declaration. 
 
Being adopted by the UN General Assembly, the legal status of the UDHR is the same as other 
General Assembly resolutions; it is not binding. However, as already alluded to, the UDHR 
significantly elaborates on the sparse reference to human rights in the UN Charter. It is now 
generally accepted that the UDHR constitutes authoritative (and expansive) interpretations of 
the human rights provisions in the UN Charter.
132
 As such, the UDHR is perhaps binding on 
States by virtue of the binding nature of the Charter
133
, rather than of the UDHR per se. It has 
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also been asserted that the UDHR should be considered as customary international law.
134
 But a 
more realistic appraisal of its status, in light of the onerous requirements of identifiable state 
practice and opinio juris sive necessitatis,
135
 is that only the civil and political rights within the 
UDHR have attained the status of customary international law. Since Article 25 of the UDHR, 
declaring the right to an adequate standard of living, clearly constitutes a social and economic 
right, it would be difficult to derive a justiciable human right to water from the UDHR, even if it 
is accepted that water is part, by implication, of the list of material requirements necessary for 
an adequate standard of living.  
 
Despite any subsequent developments towards becoming customary international law, the 
UDHR at its inception, was never intended to be legally binding. Eleanor Roosevelt, chair of 
the declaration’s drafting committee described the character and purpose of the UDHR as 
follows: 
‘It is not a treaty; it is not an international agreement. It is not and does not purport to be a 
statement of law or legal obligation. It is a declaration of basic principles of human rights and 
freedoms… to serve as a common standard of achievement for all peoples of all nations.’136 
It is worth noting at this point that, as Higgins observes, ‘the passing of binding decisions is not 
the only way in which law development occurs’.137 Bearing in mind the non-binding status of 
General Assembly resolutions like the UDHR, Higgins’ insight is particularly relevant when the 
impact of resolution 64/292 on the human right to water and sanitation is considered below, as 
well as where discussion moves away from rights-based approaches, towards development goals. 
But it is to the relevant legally binding treaties that attention now turns. 
In contrast to the UDHR, the ICESCR and ICCPR (together referred to as the Covenants) 
were explicitly adopted by the UN General Assembly as legally binding treaties; open to states 
for accession and ratification. While the legal status of the Covenants is clearly different from 
that of the UDHR, all three (along with the first optional protocol to the ICCPR) together form 
the International Bill of Human Rights.
138
 Each Covenant acts as the implementing instrument 
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for civil and political rights, and for economic, social and cultural rights respectively.
139
 
Therefore while it is difficult to see how the UDHR can directly yield justiciable rights, this is 
not the case for the Covenants. 
2.2.2 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966                      
Considering the two Covenants in the International Bill of Human Rights, the ICESCR would 
appear to be the most natural home for a human right to water. Access to water can perhaps be 
expressed more easily as a social or socio-economic right, than a civil and political right (this is 
not to ignore the political dimensions surrounding water rights and water justice
140
). It is also a 
right, which if it is to be fulfilled, requires considerable action and efforts on the part of States, 
since more than 780 million people live without access to clean water, and 2.5 billion people do 
not have access to adequate sanitation.
141
 The considerable size of this problem means that 
immediate remedies are unlikely. Consequently any treaty obligation that imposes immediate 
fulfilment of a human right to water would be impracticable. The concept of ‘progressive 
realisation’142 at the heart of the ICESCR is therefore particularly appropriate in framing a 
meaningful human right to water.  
Articles 11 and 12 of the ICESCR both offer clear opportunities to assert that a human right to 
water is an essential component part, respectively, of achieving an adequate standard of living
143
 
and of enjoying the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.
144
 In 2002 the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), issued General Comment No. 
15 on the right to water. This has since become a seminal statement on the existence and 
legality of a human right to water, and a talisman for water-rights activists and scholars. The 
main focus of General Comment 15 is an analysis of Articles 11 and 12, concluding that a 
human right to water exists in international law. Because of its relevance to this thesis, and the 
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importance which has been placed on it, analysis of General Comment 15 will form the basis of 
the ensuing discussion.  
Three discreet arguments are made to justify finding legal bases for a human right to water. First 
in relation to Article 11, and to the list of material requirements therein, which are necessary for 
an adequate standard of living, the interpretation of the CESCR is clear: this list should be 
considered to be indicative, rather than exhaustive.
145
 Essentially the same argument is made 
here as above in relation to Article 25 of the UDHR: Namely that using the word ‘including’ at 
the beginning of the list of material requirements for an adequate standard of living allows for 
the addition to this list of a human right to water, since water is undoubtedly an additional, 
essential requirement for an adequate standard of living. 
A second argument is that a right to water is necessary in order to protect rights already 
(explicitly) given in Articles 11 and 12. In Article 11 adequate food, clothing and housing are all 
listed as requirements for an adequate standard of living. It is asserted that a right to adequate 
food and to adequate housing are not capable of fulfilment without a right to water also.
146
 
Paragraph 2 of the General Comment makes a further connection between a right to food and 
a right to water by including cooking in the list of necessary uses of water. The link between 
adequate housing and water has previously been made at length by the CESCR.
147
  
Regarding Article 12: ‘the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard 
of physical and mental health’, the Article includes steps to be taken to achieve fulfilment of 
this right. These steps include provision for the reduction of infant mortality and for the healthy 
development of the child; and the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, 
occupational and other diseases.
148
 Access to safe, clean water is stated generally as a 
prerequisite for the pursuance of these steps towards the fulfilment of the right to health.
149
 
Paragraph 8 of General Comment 15 specifically addresses the requirement of water for the 
improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene: 
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‘Environmental hygiene, as an aspect of the right to health under article 12, paragraph 2 (b), of 
the Covenant, encompasses taking steps on a non-discriminatory basis to prevent threats to 
health from unsafe and toxic water conditions.’150 
Such unsafe and toxic water conditions also relate to the availability and accessibility of the right 
to adequate food (listed in Article 11).
151
 Therefore, with the exception of the right to adequate 
clothing (in Article 11), General Comment 15 states that access to sufficient water is essential to 
the protection of those rights explicitly recognised in Articles 11 and 12. For this reason it is 
asserted that a human right to water should be acknowledged. 
A third argument is that a human right to water should be recognised as existing within the 
ICESCR because such a right ‘has been recognized in a wide range of international documents, 
including treaties, declarations and other standards’.152 These international documents will be 
discussed in more detail below at 2.2.4. But the relevance of recognition of a right to water in 
such documents is that they inform the interpretation and clarification by the CESCR of 
provisions in the ICESCR.
153
  
Together, the three arguments presented in General Comment 15 for interpreting a human 
right to water within the ICESCR, are compelling. But in order to assess the legal ramifications 
of General Comment 15, it is necessary first to consider the implementation apparatus of the 
ICESCR, including the status and function of the CESCR. 
Part IV
154
 of the ICESCR outlines the duties of States parties to report on the progress made in 
achieving observance of the Covenant rights. It also outlines the duties and competencies of the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) regarding consideration of these 
reports, and communication with other UN specialised agencies on matters arising from these 
reports, in order to contribute to the ‘effective progressive implementation’155 of the Covenant. 
In 1978 ECOSOC adopted a sessional working group on the implementation of the ICESCR, 
in order to support ECOSOC in consideration of the reports submitted by States Parties.
156
 The 
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composition and organisation of this working group were gradually formalised, and in 1982 the 
group was re-named as the ‘Sessional Working Group of Government Experts on the 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, which 
became known as the ‘Group of Experts’.157  
In 1985 this group changed its name again, to become the ‘Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights’ (CESCR).158 The size of the Group (now Committee) increased from 15 to 
18 members, all of whom were required to be human rights experts, each serving in their 
individual capacities, rather than as representatives of their respective national governments.
159
 
The composition of members was also formally required to give due consideration to 
geographical distribution, as well as to the representation of different social and legal systems.
160
 
Nine years after the ICESCR entered into force
161
 these changes brought the Committee to what 
remains its current structure. They also brought it towards a position of equivalence with the 
Human Rights Committee (HRC); the corresponding body for the ICCPR, if not total parity 
(discussed below at 2.2.3).
162
  
The role of the CESCR has continued to mature. Its original task; to support ECOSOC in 
consideration of the reports submitted by States Parties, has been supplemented by a growing 
investigative role regarding Covenant implementation. Equally its advisory role has become 
more developed and more formalised, evinced by its preparation, since 1989 of General 
Comments
163
, in the same fashion as the HRC.
164
 This expanded portfolio of activities places the 
CESCR as ‘the central “quasi-judicial” authority of the ICESCR.’165 
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The implications of this for determining the status of General Comment 15 (which was issued 
in 2002, over a decade after the CESCR had begun to adopt its more formal, neutral,
166
 
investigative and quasi-judicial roles), are that all CESCR General Comments, including 
General Comment 15 on the right to water, should be considered to be authoritative and 
legitimate interpretations of the ICESCR. Therefore the Committee’s articulation of a human 
right to water; as a derivative right,
167
 necessary to meet the explicit rights set out in Articles 11 
and 12, should be considered to be an authoritative and legitimate one.
168
 Taken as such, 
General Comment 15 affirms a human right to water, with corresponding obligations on States 
party to the Covenant. However, all CESCR General Comments stop short of being legally 
binding on States parties. Because the CESCR was originally established by ECOSOC, 
appreciation of the mandate of ECOSOC is crucial here. Established under Article 62 of the 
UN Charter, ECOSOC is empowered only to make recommendations to the General 
Assembly, UN members and relevant specialised agencies.
169
 
But even if General Comment 15 established that a legally binding human right to water existed 
within the ICESCR, such a right would not require immediate fulfilment. Consequently there is 
no corresponding mechanism for immediate enforceability. Rather, as set out in Article 2, the 
relevant obligations of each State party are to ‘take steps… to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant by all appropriate means…’170 It would seem therefore that while General 
Comment 15 articulates an authoritative human right to water, what States are practically 
obliged to do is to take steps, to the maximum of their resources to progressively realise this 
right. No doubt, such an obligation, if taken seriously, would result in improvements to water 
access globally. What it would not do is to immediately, or indeed swiftly, realise this right, 
given the size of the task. Indeed the limitations of available resources and the acceptability of 
progressive realisation (as opposed to immediate realisation or realisation within in a set time 
frame for instance) coupled, with water scarcity, means that in some States enjoyment of a 
human right to water may never be achieved. 
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However, even within the general parameters of progressive realisation, the obligation on States 
parties in Article 2 (2) ‘to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be 
exercised without discrimination of any kind’, could be interpreted as requiring immediate, 
rather than progressive interpretation (based on the ‘negative’ quality of this obligation, rather 
than its ‘positive’ counterparts). In the same way the so-called ‘core obligations’ in General 
Comment 15 (paragraph 37) are stated as being of immediate effect. These include: 
(a) To ensure access to the minimum essential amount of water, that is 
sufficient and safe for personal and domestic uses to prevent disease;  
 
(b) To ensure the right of access to water and water facilities and services on a non-
discriminatory basis, especially for disadvantaged or marginalized groups;  
 
(c) To ensure physical access to water facilities or services that provide sufficient, safe and 
regular water; that have a sufficient number of water outlets to avoid prohibitive waiting times; 
and that are at a reasonable distance from the household;  
 
(d) To ensure personal security is not threatened when having to physically access to water;  
 
(e) To ensure equitable distribution of all available water facilities and services;  
 
(f) To adopt and implement a national water strategy and plan of action addressing the whole 
population; the strategy and plan of action should be devised, and periodically reviewed, on the 
basis of a participatory and transparent process; it should include methods, such as right to 
water indicators and benchmarks, by which progress can be closely monitored; the process by 
which the strategy and plan of action are devised, as well as their content, shall give particular 
attention to all disadvantaged or marginalized groups;  
 
(g) To monitor the extent of the realization, or the non-realization, of the right to water;  
 
(h) To adopt relatively low-cost targeted water programmes to protect vulnerable and 
marginalized groups;  
 
(i) To take measures to prevent, treat and control diseases linked to water, in particular ensuring 
access to adequate sanitation.’ 
 
 
The basis for asserting core obligations which are to be immediately fulfilled, comes from 
General Comment No. 3 (1990), in which the CESCR confirms that ‘States parties have a core 
obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the 
rights enunciated in the Covenant.’171 However, it is difficult to see how some of these could be 
expected to be realised immediately. For instance, obligation (c), which requires ensuring access 
to water facilities or services which have a sufficient number of water outlets to avoid prohibitive 
waiting times, is likely to require planning and construction, with both time and financial 
resource implications. But other stated obligations, including non-discrimination and 
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monitoring the extent to which the human right to water is being realised, can more realistically 
be deemed appropriate for immediate implementation. With these few exceptions, it seems 
that the practical justicability
172
 of a human right to water based on the ICESCR is limited, 
principally due to the provision within the Covenant, for progressive realisation. But it is also 
due to the non-binding status of General Comment 15, as well as to the absence within the 
ICESCR of facility to bring individual petitions regarding rights violations. Because of these 
limitations, the potential use of the ICCPR in identifying a justiciable human right to water is 
now considered. 
 
 2.2.3 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 
Unlike the ICESCR, States party to the ICCPR accept an immediate obligation to ensure that 
the rights recognised in the Covenant are available to everyone within the territory of the 
State.
173
 Such an obligation is relevant to any discussion of the scope of these Covenant rights, 
and to interpreting States’ corresponding specific obligations. Also relevant here is the 
particular design of the implementation mechanisms for the ICCPR, in contrast to that of the 
ICESCR discussed above, and the consequences of such differences for State parties. 
Under Article 28 of the ICCPR the Human Rights Committee was established in 1976. The 
Committee is comprised of 18 human rights experts, elected by secret ballot by the States 
parties, to serve a four-year term.
174
 Their principal functions are to conduct dialogue with the 
States parties, hear inter-state complaints, and to ‘consider’ and ‘study’ the mandatory national 
compliance reports of each State party.
175
  Additionally, the Committee issues general 
comments (for example General Comment No. 6 on the right to life, discussed below). Under 
the first Optional Protocol to the Covenant, the Committee also has competence to ‘receive 
and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be 
victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.’176 
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In short, the implementation mechanisms for the ICCPR are considerably more robust, than 
their counterparts for the ICESCR. Furthermore, the effect of the first Optional Protocol 
(although only applying to individuals in States that are party to it) presents a direct line of 
justicability between individual rights-holders and their relevant State. Consequently not only do 
the obligations within the ICCPR require immediate fulfilment, but measures to monitor this 
are well developed, and there is recourse available for individuals who suffer from States’ 
failures to meet these obligations. 
Focusing again on the challenge of inferring a human right to water, the specific content of the 
ICCPR must be considered, in particular, Article 6.  This states that: 
‘[E]very human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.’177  
Since water is essential for life, it may be asserted that the right to life stated above must include 
access to at least a quantum of water sufficient for maintaining existence (even if this falls short 
of that deemed sufficient for a dignified existence), in order that no one is arbitrarily deprived 
of their life. However, it must be noted first that this right to life is expressed within the ICCPR, 
and not the ICESCR. As such, taking a traditional view of the distinction between these two 
groups of rights, the right to life, along with the other rights in the ICCPR imposes only a 
negative obligation on the states party, requiring them to refrain from interfering with an 
individual’s right (to life, in this case).178 This is in contrast to the nature of state obligations 
regarding social and economic rights, as stated in the ICESCR. Here, there is a positive 
obligation on states, requiring action in order to fulfil such rights.
179
 Interpreted in this way, the 
right to life, in relation to access to water, requires nothing more than that those states parties 
refrain from removing or otherwise interfering with individual’s water supply in a way that 
would cause their deaths. It would not impose any obligation to provide water for individuals 
currently without, in order to avoid their deaths.  
This distinction of state obligations is based on a perceived hierarchy between civil and political 
rights, as over social and economic rights, which in turn is based on a combination of theory 
and pragmatism. Liberal theories of democracy assert that civil and political rights must be 
robustly protected (at the national level usually by constitutional entrenchment) in order to 
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ensure a functioning democratic state.
180
 Such a state is then able to address social and economic 
challenges as they deem appropriate, and in relation to their available resources.
181
 Practically, 
such a situation also avoids states from being obliged to meet positive rights obligations, which 
they are not able to afford, or indeed, that as a democratically elected executive, have chosen 
not to prioritise. Examples abound of the influence of such liberal thought on national 
constitutional settlements (and the consequent absence of social and economic rights in 
national constitutions, until recently
182
). But the archetype is the United States Constitution
183
, 
throughout which the clear emphasis is on the protection of the civil rights (or liberties) of 
individuals from the state, and which consequently contains numerous negative obligations 
upon the state.
184
 No social and economic rights are entrenched in the US Constitution, despite 
attempts in 1944 by the then President Franklin Roosevelt, to support a ‘second Bill of Rights’, 
guaranteeing a panoply of social and economic rights. While this endeavour failed, some of 
these rights found expression in the UDHR shortly afterwards.
185
 
For the foregoing reasons then, the right to life within the ICCPR, as traditionally interpreted, 
does not support a human right to water. However, an alternative and more recent 
interpretation of states’ rights obligations emphasises a ‘tripartite’ approach to realisation of 
human rights generally, regardless of whether they are classed as civil and political or social and 
economic. Instead, obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights are emphasised, each 
of which is relevant to all of the rights in the ICCPR and ICESCR, albeit to different degrees.
186
  
Such an approach is complemented by the Human Rights Committee interpretation of the 
right to life in Article 6 ICCPR. Beginning with a warning that the right to life should not be 
interpreted narrowly,
187
 it asserts that the protection of the inherent right to life ‘requires that 
States adopt positive measures’.188 By way of illustration of such positive measures, the comment 
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goes on to implore States parties ‘to take all possible measures to reduce infant mortality and to 
increase life expectancy, especially in adopting measures to eliminate malnutrition and 
epidemics.’189 Clearly these measures, if implemented, would constitute significant positive 
action and investment on the part of States, despite the corresponding right being found in the 
ICCPR. Furthermore such problems as infant mortality, malnutrition and epidemics are all 
connected to inadequate and/or unsafe water.
190
 This application of positive obligations to a civil 
and political right represents a significant shift away from the traditional diametric view of civil 
and political versus social and economic rights; negative versus positive obligations. It also 
seems to raise possibilities regarding realising a justiciable right to water through an inherent 
right to life.  
But here again, consideration must be given to the status of General Comments, made this time 
by the HRC. Under Article 40 (4) of the ICCPR the HRC is empowered to ‘transmit… such 
general comments as it may consider appropriate, to the States parties’. These comments are to 
be non-country specific.
191
 Ghandhi clarifies the purpose of such comments, as follows: 
‘[to] make the Committee’s experience available for the benefit of all States Parties, so as to 
promote more effective implementation of the Covenant; to draw the attention of States parties 
to insufficiencies disclosed by a large number of reports; to suggest improvements in the 
reporting procedure; to clarify the requirements of the Covenant; and to stimulate the activities 
of States Parties and International Organisations in the promotion and protection of human 
rights…’192 
Despite having a longer history than the General Comments made by the CESCR, and despite 
being mandated directly by the ICCPR from the inception of the Covenant, in contrast to the 
CESCR, the HRC General Comments also are not legally binding on States parties. They are 
however, considered as invaluable guides to the interpretation of particular Articles, and as 
such, contribute to the jurisprudence on civil and political rights.
193
 Therefore General 
Comment 6 on the right to life, while authoritative, does not impose a binding positive 
obligation on States parties to immediately provide access to water. 
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Indeed, the obligation of immediate fulfilment for ICCPR rights generally seems to lead away 
from the conclusion that any of these Covenant rights (expansively interpreted so as to confer 
positive obligations on States) can be used effectively to imply a legally-binding right to water. 
Such a human right of access to sufficient water undoubtedly requires positive action by States 
towards its fulfilment. Despite the willingness of the Human Rights Committee to urge States to 
adopt positive measures relating to traditionally ‘negative’ rights, it nevertheless seems to remain 
more appropriate that rights which require significant positive State action (including 
commitments of time and financial resources) to fulfil should arise from within the ICESCR. 
Therefore regarding a human right to water, there seems to be more potential for this to flow 
from Articles 11 and 12 of the ICESCR (as discussed at 2.2.2) where consideration of 
progressive realisation and available resources would apply. The alternative route of connecting 
a human right to water with Article 6 of the ICCPR would involve conferring an obligation on 
States parties to provide access to sufficient water for every individual immediately; an 
obligation that many States would struggle to fulfil.  
2.2.4 Emerging consensus and acceptance of a human right to water 
Whatever the reasons may be for such conspicuous absence of a right to water from the 
International Bill of Human Rights,
194
 and whatever the merits and limitations of deriving a 
human right to water from the ICESCR or the ICCPR respectively, such a right has been 
explicitly recognised in a range of international legal instruments (binding and non-binding) 
since the 1977 UN Water Conference in Mar del Plata
195
. Resolution II of that conference 
declared that: 
‘All peoples, whatever their stage of development and their social and economic conditions, 
have the right to have access to drinking water in quantities and of a quality equal to their basic 
needs.’196  
Similarly the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW)
197
, a specialised binding legal instrument setting out an agenda to end 
discrimination against women, provided the following in relation to a human right to water:  
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‘States parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in 
rural areas… in order to ensure to such women the right… to enjoy adequate living conditions, 
particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, electricity and water supply…’  
The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
198
 also provides binding obligations on 
States parties, to combat disease and malnutrition ‘through the provision of adequate nutritious 
foods and clean drinking water’. Therefore States parties to these Conventions have assumed 
international legal obligations to ensure that respectively, women in rural areas, and children, 
have access to water. Implementation of these obligations is monitored by the CEDAW 
Committee and by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, to which States parties must 
submit regular reports.
199
 However, it must be noted that neither CEDAW nor the CRC 
articulates a general human right to water. 
 Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s a series of non-binding instruments reiterated a human 
right to water in various forms, evincing its wide-ranging acceptance, and helping to keep the 
right to water at the forefront of the international human rights and development agendas 
during this period. By way of example, Principle 4 of the 1992 Dublin Statement on Water and 
Sustainable Development
200
 (already discussed above at 1.5.4) affirmed the importance of 
recognising ‘the basic right of all human beings to have access to clean water and sanitation at an 
affordable price.’201 The 1994 Programme of Action of the UN International Conference on 
Population and Development
202
 declared that all individuals ‘have the right to an adequate 
standard of living for themselves and their families, including adequate food, clothing, housing, 
water and sanitation. Of particular note here is that this list of the material conditions necessary 
for an adequate standard of living is identical to that set out in Article 11 of the ICESCR, with 
the addition of water and sanitation. The argument made in General Comment 15 and 
elsewhere that the Article 11 list is non-exhaustive is supported by this ‘updated’ list, which adds 
essential material conditions, explicitly, rather than implicitly as the CESCR has subsequently 
done.  
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The 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development resolved ‘to speedily increase access to 
basic requirements such as clean water, sanitation, energy, healthcare, food security and the 
protection of biodiversity.’203 Perhaps unsurprisingly for a sustainable development declaration, 
this list connects provision of essential material requirements alongside protection of the 
environment. Such an example of locating the human right to water within an integrated 
context, which emphasises social, economic and environmental concerns simultaneously, hints 
at the ensuing discussion towards the end of this chapter around social-ecological security; in 
particular the need to frame questions of sustainable access to sufficient water within the 
limitations of emerging ecological capacities. 
The CESCR General Comment 15 was also published in 2002. As discussed above, this 
authoritative interpretation of the ICESCR as including a human right to water is not legally 
binding on States parties, and is therefore justiciably problematic. But the importance of its 
substantive content, and its normative status should not be underestimated.
204
   
During the same period, such activity around recognition and definition of the right to water at 
the international level was mirrored by equally important domestic events, which while 
nationally-specific, have had international ramifications in relation to achieving acknowledgment 
of a human right to water. 
 2.2.5 The Cochabamba movement 
The events that catalysed the Cochabamba water war have been introduced above at 1.5.6. The 
legacy of these events will be considered here. But first an earlier case from Argentina, 
regarding similar contractual arrangements, serves as a useful point of departure for 
understanding the Cochabamba movement.   
The case of Compania de Aguas de Aconquija (AdA) v Argentine Republic,
205
 involved a 30-
year water service contract signed in 1993 between AdA (Vivendi Universal) a French 
multinational water services company, and Tucuman province, Argentina.
206
 The water service 
contract contained no provisions to ensure stability of water prices and water quality. Prices 
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subsequently rose, and there were two specific incidents that gave rise to allegations of poor 
water quality. As a result, in 1996 the Provincial government attempted to renegotiate the 
contract with the intention of securing reduced water prices and more acceptable water quality 
for its residents. The renegotiation failed, resulting in repudiation of the contract by AdA along 
with a claim for US$300 million in damages. 
The contract stipulated that litigation was subject to the jurisdiction of the local Tucuman 
Court. However, the relevant French-Argentinian Bilateral Investment Treaty directed that 
jurisdiction lay with the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID). This was confirmed by ICSID arbitrators, and the case was duly heard at the ICSID. 
AdA’s claim for damages was awarded. 
Despite the obvious due diligence failings of Tucuman Province regarding securing minimum 
safeguards during contractual negotiations, the case decision was seen as a victory for corporate 
capital and a reassurance to private water service providers that their interests were well 
protected. Considering this case in relation to the water paradigms introduced in Chapter One, 
this is one of the earliest examples of contemporary large-scale water privatization within a 
‘water as commodity’ paradigm. Not only does the case exemplify the growing interest and 
involvement of the private sector in providing water services during the 1990s, the jurisdictional 
question raised in the case is also illustrative of a systemic shift in power during this time, from 
the State (most obviously from the sovereignty of developing States) to the Corporation; a well 
documented characteristic of neo-liberal globalisation.
207
   
So when a similar privatization contract was signed in Cochabamba, Bolivia in 1999, and 
subsequently cancelled, the water service provider Aguas del Tunari also sought to enforce the 
contract through the ICSID, claiming between US$25 and US$100 million in damages. But 
unlike in the previous case, the Bolivian government withdrew from the ICSID in response to 
overwhelming domestic pressure, including civil unrest, which claimed two lives. As a result of 
withdrawal from the ICSID, local jurisdiction over the dispute was reasserted. Eventually Aguas 
del Tunari was forced to agree to an out of court settlement for a symbolic payment of 2 
bolivianos (Bolivia’s national currency).208  
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It would be a mistake to assume that this second case simply represents an isolated reversal of 
the State-Corporation power shift, and a return to the status quo of publically-owned water 
services. The Bolivian State (at civic and national levels) had facilitated and supported the 
privatization of Cochabamba water, and had defended the privatization contract throughout 
months of public protest: only making legislative changes to rescind the contract when local, 
national and international pressure threatened to topple the government.
209
 Rather, the 
sustained and organized opposition to the Aguas del Tunari contract came primarily from a 
broad, grass-roots coalition, which transcended, and to a large extent marginalized, the trade 
unions movement as the traditional site of protest. This coalition, the Coordinadora in Defence 
of Water and Life, proved able to mobilize quickly and to sustain its protest presence for a long 
period of time, while articulating a coherent and extremely popular message, ‘the right to water 
for life’; that water must be available for everyone, and that governance of water services must 
be such that this is fulfilled.
210
 Furthermore, as this ‘local’ conflict around water drew popular 
and intellectual attention, it began to be framed within narratives of inequality and 
disenfranchisement, environmental (in)justice and sustainability, at both the local and the global 
scale.
211
  
Indeed, the influence and leadership of the Coodinadora proved to be so strong that when 
control of water services was finally returned to the State-owned company Semapa, several 
Coodinadora representatives were appointed to its Board, charged with seeking to ensure that 
there would be no return to either the corruption and inefficiencies of the original Semapa, or 
of privatesque modes of water service delivery that ‘would prioritize profitability over the needs 
of the population’.212     
Returning again to the water paradigms introduced in Chapter One, the Coodinadora’s mantra 
‘the right to water for life’ clearly resonates with a water-as-necessity paradigm. But the events of 
Cochabamba and the strategies employed in removing and replacing Aguas del Tunari have 
followed the imperative that water is a necessity, and sought to realize this through a water-as-
commons paradigm, which forges strong practical and epistemological links between water and 
the wider environment, and between the local and the global contexts. Consequently the 
particular call for water justice in Cochabamba, became a common call, echoing wider calls for 
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global justice (including global environmental justice
213
). Indeed this connection between the 
events in Cochabamba and global environmental justice was symbolically cemented when the 
city of Cochabamba was chosen to host the World People’s Conference on Climate Change in 
April 2010
214
, three months before General Assembly resolution 64/292 was adopted. This 
conference attracted global attention as a showcase for the role of civil society in pursuing 
environmental justice. It was also seen as a response to what many saw as the failures of the 
COP15 climate meetings in Copenhagen the previous year.
215
 
In July 2010 General Assembly resolution 64/292 on the right to water and sanitation was 
sponsored by Bolivia and introduced by the Pablo Solon, Bolivian Ambassador to the UN, 
who directly connected the proposed resolution to the legacy and lessons of the Cochabamba 
water war in 2000. Referencing the Coodinadora’s rallying cry, he declared ‘water is life’.216 The 
corresponding Human Rights Council resolution 15/9 was also introduced by the Bolivian 
Ambassador. 
Of course it is not claimed that the historical origins of the recognition of water rights began at 
Cochabamba. Indeed water rights have been recognized in various forms for millennia.
217
 Water 
governance at the international level has long since acknowledged an interconnected 
relationship between water rights and broader social, economic and environmental issues, as 
shown in the foregoing attempt to identify a human right to water in international law. But any 
attempt to understand the evolution and crystallisation of a human right to water in 
international law must acknowledge the part that the Cochabamba movement has played in 
helping to focus attention and support for an explicitly stated general human right to water, 
declared at the international level. No less important a part of the legacy of Cochabamba may 
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be its role in galvanising ‘water-as-commons’ global and local movements. The ramifications of 
this paradigm in relation to a right to water are considered in more detail in Chapter Five. 
 
2.3 The content of the human right to water 
In charting the development of the human right to water it is clear that there is considerable 
international consensus around the existence of the right, despite the fact that it lacks some of 
the attributes typically expected of internationally recognised human rights (including explicit 
enunciation in a legally binding and general convention). The absence from the International 
Bill of Human Rights of a legally-binding human right to water has meant that General 
Comment 15 has come to play a particularly important part in stating the nature and scope of 
this right. As McCaffrey observes, General Comment 15 ‘is the first recognition by a United 
Nations human rights body of an independent and generally applicable human right to water’.218  
In addition to its normative importance, and its role in focusing international opinion towards 
the issue of water as a human right, General Comment 15 provides the most authoritative and 
detailed commentary to-date on the substantive content of the right to water, and the 
corresponding standards of action and response that States Party to the ICESCR are expected 
to meet.
219
 Consequently, since it was published in 2002, General Comment 15 has had clear 
potential to effect national law in respective States. Such an effect on South African water law is 
explored further in Chapter Three. The substantive content that General Comment 15 
provides is now considered in detail, followed by the corresponding obligations of States 
parties. 
 2.3.1 Constitutive elements of the human right to water 
As discussed above, the primary basis on which a human right to water is asserted in General 
Comment 15, is that such a right is derived from, and is required for the rights to an adequate 
standard of living (that is for dignified life), and to the highest attainable standard of health 
(Articles 11 and 12 ICESCR). Therefore the elements that constitute the human right to water 
must be sufficient to meet these requirements of dignified life and health.
220
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describes the human right to water as entitling, ‘everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, 
physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses.’221 This identifies five 
elements of the right to water. These are further elaborated on in Paragraph 12 under three 
sub-headings of availability, quality, and accessibility: 
‘(a) Availability. The water supply for each person must be sufficient and 
continuous for personal and domestic uses. These uses ordinarily include drinking, 
personal sanitation, washing of clothes, food preparation, personal and household 
hygiene…’ 
 
Furthermore, the quantity of water available for each person should take into account different 
conditions relating to health, climate, and work. But availability should correspond to World 
Health Organization (WHO) guidelines, which state between 20 and 40 litres per person per 
day (lpd).
222
 
 
(b) Quality. The water required for each personal or domestic use must be safe, therefore free 
from micro-organisms, chemical substances and radiological hazards that constitute a threat to a 
person’s health. Furthermore, water should be of an acceptable colour, odour and taste for each 
personal or domestic use. 
 
Arguably the requirements around acceptability (one of the five elements identified above at 
paragraph 2) transcend minimal considerations around health and life, to reflect the need for 
water to support dignified life. A water supply of dubious colour, odour or taste, may 
nevertheless pose no harm to health. Here, the General Comment can be seen as pushing 
beyond a de minimus definition of adequate water, as that which sustains existence; towards a 
fuller definition, as that which sustains dignified life. As discussed in Chapter One, the high 
standard that this definition requires affirms a paradigmatic understanding of water as being 
necessary for dignified life, beyond mere existence. It is also of importance in determining 
States’ obligations.  
(c) Accessibility. Water and water facilities and services have to be accessible to everyone 
without discrimination, within the jurisdiction of the State party. 
 
Accessibility is further defined as relating to four overlapping dimensions. Physical accessibility 
requires amongst other things, that adequate water facilities ‘are within safe physical reach for all 
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sections of the population… within, or in the immediate vicinity, of each household, educational 
institution and workplace’223. Water is also required to be economically accessible for everyone, 
meaning that the ‘direct and indirect costs and charges associated with securing water must be 
affordable, and must not compromise or threaten the realization of other Covenant rights’.224 
Additionally, water access must be non-discriminatory; accessible to all including the most 
marginalised.
225
 This requirement of non-discrimination extends to access to information about 
water issues.
226
 
 
Requiring that water is physically and economically accessible is crucial to addressing some of 
the most pressing challenges to adequate water that people in the developing world face; 
particularly regarding affordability (and, often contingent to this, private sector involvement).
227
  
My own empirical work in Malawi and South Africa illustrates some people’s experience of 
economically inaccessible water, including the particular sadness when improvements in 
physical accessibility are undone by economic constraints. The following is an extract from an 
interview I conducted (NC) with ‘Jennifer’ (J), an assistant at the Soche Water Users’ 
Association, and ‘Andrew’ (A) a representative from the NGO Water for People, in Blantyre, 
Malawi:
228
 
 
NC: So what do you charge for water, how much is the water per litre or 20 litres? 
J: The tariff? 20 litres is 12 kwacha [£0.015]
229
, 40 litres is 24, and 60 litres is 36 kwacha, and 
that’s our tariff 
NC: Do you ever have any problems with people not being able to pay? 
J: Yeah, we do have problems like when people steal the pipes. 
A: In terms of payment, do you have households that fail to pay the 12 kwacha? And if you 
have, what do you do? 
J: I feel like our tariff is better for everyone, 12 kwacha. 
NC: It’s low enough, it’s a small enough amount? 
J: Yeah, compared to other private owners, our tariffs work the same, but they have higher 
tariffs than us, so we feel we are giving them better. 
A: Do you have people that collect water from the kiosks but they don’t have money? 
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J: We can’t manage to - the other people, they do - run away from our kiosks and go to bore 
holes, there are bore holes in some regions - they pay 100 kwacha and draw out for the whole 
month.  
NC: Sorry what do they do, they pay at the bore hole?  
J: Yeah. 
A: They bore holes with hand pumps, they pay once for a month, they go to that side and pay a 
hundred kwacha, so they can draw the whole month, go to a kiosk where they pay per fetch. 
NC: The water quality, is it different? 
A: Very different. 
NC: What are the problems with the water from the bore hole? 
J: The problem, they are not treating it.  
NC: Do you actually see people in the community getting sick? 
J: Yeah, they do get sick because this borehole water is from - here it’s an urban area and they 
[word indecipherable on Dictaphone].  So it’s easier to use the water in the ground, so they can 
easily contract diseases because it’s not treated. 
 
Clearly, despite the unit price for water from the Water Users’ Association being less than that 
charged elsewhere by private providers, even this cost proves sufficiently prohibitive for some 
people, who instead risk their health for cheaper, untreated water. This link between 
inadequate water and health is particularly important to note. Not only does it affirm the 
rationale offered in General Comment 15 for recognising a right to water as derived from 
ICESCR Article 12, but the lack of (economically) accessible water also compromises the 
realization of other Covenant rights.
230
  This supports an understanding of the right to water as 
both deriving from, and necessary for, fulfilling ICESCR Articles 11 and 12.  
 
A second, brief extract relates the experience of ‘Nombuso Khumalo’ in Burlington on the 
outskirts of Durban, South Africa, whose piped water supply was forcibly disconnected due to 
several months of arrears. Since 1994 Nombuso had witnessed the arrival of piped water to 
every dwelling in her part of the settlement, including a tap installed to her wall, representing a 
significant improvement in her experience of access to water, until the disconnection:  
 
‘We get water from a standpipe here. I used to get it to my house, but they [Durban 
Municipality] sawed it off… [now] I have to make two journeys if I want two buckets [20 litres 
each] and there are others waiting.’231 
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In relation to the ICESCR and General Comment 15, Nombuso’s experience can be 
interpreted as a regression in the realisation of her right to water, as required to be 
(economically) accessible. Although it is not certain whether Nombuso’s access to water after 
disconnection would still fulfil the requirements in Paragraph 12 above, it nevertheless 
represents one small example of a movement in the opposite direction to the clear obligation of 
States parties to achieve ‘progressively the full realization of the rights’ in the Covenant.232  It 
would also seem contrary to the obligation of States parties in the General Comment, to ‘move 
as expediously and effectively as possible towards the full realization of the right to water’. A 
forward (progressive) movement is clearly implied in both Article 2 and the General Comment. 
This is supported by the ‘strong presumption that retrogressive measures taken in relation to 
the right to water are prohibited under the Covenant’.233 States parties’ obligations are now 
considered in the context of the right as a whole. 
 
2.3.2 States Parties’ obligations 
 
Part II of General Comment 15 begins as follows: 
‘The right to water contains both freedoms and entitlements. The freedoms include the right to 
maintain access to existing water supplies necessary for the right to water, and the right to be 
free from interference, such as the right to be free from arbitrary disconnections or the 
contamination of water supplies. By contrast, the entitlements include the right to a system of 
water supply and management that provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the right 
to water.’234   
Such freedoms and entitlements reflect the negative and positive obligations on States within a 
tripartite approach to human rights; to respect, protect and fulfil (as introduced above at 2.2.3). 
Here the freedoms defined above require States to respect this aspect of the right to water, 
imposing a mainly negative obligation on the State. If the maintenance of these freedoms 
requires active protection, then there would also be a positive element to the States’ obligation. 
While the above entitlements correspond to the obligation to fulfil, this can be characterised as 
a positive obligation. Indeed this tripartite approach is explicitly adopted in the General 
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Comment where States parties’ obligations are listed respectively as, obligations to respect, 
obligations to protect, and obligations to fulfil.
235
  
Of particular note here, not least because of the largely positive responses that they entail, are 
the obligations to fulfil in paragraphs 25 to 29. These include taking steps to ensure appropriate 
education around hygienic and sustainable water use;
236
 according sufficient recognition of the 
human right to water ‘within the national political and legal systems’;237 adopting a national water 
strategy; and ensuring that water is affordable for everyone.
238
 This obligation of affordability 
requires that ‘payment for water services has to be based on the principle of equity, ensuring 
that these services, whether privately or publically provided, are affordable for all, including 
socially deprived groups.’239 
A clear imperative towards ensuring sustainable access to water is required in paragraph 28. 
This sets out obligations to fulfil, including the adoption of ‘comprehensive and integrated 
strategies and programmes to ensure sufficient and safe water for present and future 
generations.’240 Such obligations are explicitly connected to the Agenda 21241 non-binding action 
plan for sustainable development, and the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
implementation plan.
242
 In making these connections, General Comment 15 has located the 
right to water within the broader contexts of sustainable development
243
 and environmental 
protection. Doubtless, access to sufficient water is essential for human development; as is an 
understanding of water as an integral part of an interconnected biosphere.
244
 Therefore both of 
these connections are natural. They are also crucial to situating the human right to water within 
an integrated ecology. Both of these connections are considered in more detail below.   
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International obligations within General Comment 15 reiterate States parties’ obligations under 
the ICESCR regarding international co-operation and assistance towards the full realisation of 
the right to water.  Examples of this include the ‘provision of water resources, financial and 
technical assistance… disaster relief and emergency assistance’.245 So-called ‘core obligations’, 
which require immediate fulfilment, have been considered previously at 2.2.2 in relation to the 
exception that these obligations represent, compared to the general Covenant requirements of 
progressive realisation.    
Part IV of the General Comment sets out actions and omissions which amount to a violation of 
the right to water. This identification of violations is a consequence of applying the normative 
content of the right, to the obligations of States parties (as paragraph 39 explains). Consequently 
violations can occur through acts of omission, corresponding to a failure to realise ‘positive’ 
obligations to protect and/or fulfil. Violations can also occur through acts of commission, which 
are contrary to the ‘negative’ obligation to respect. For instance, adoption of retrogressive 
measures incompatible with the right to water, arbitrary or unjustified disconnection, pollution 
or diminution of water resources may also count as violations by commission.
246
 Distinction is 
made between violations caused by a State party’s inability to act, as opposed to unwillingness. 
A State unwilling to take the necessary steps, to the maximum of its resources, in relation to the 
right to water will be in violation.  
Regarding implementation at the national level, Part V of General Comment 15 requires that 
‘[e]xisting legislation, strategies and policies should be reviewed to ensure that they are 
compatible with obligations arising from the right to water, and should be repealed, amended 
or changed if inconsistent with Covenant requirements’,247 before providing detailed guidance 
on what a national strategy or plan of action should contain,
248
 including indicators and 
benchmarks to assist in monitoring of the realization of the right to water.
249
  Of particular note 
in relation to this thesis is the requirement for individuals ‘to participate in decision-making 
processes that may affect their exercise of the right to water’250 and to ‘be given full and equal 
access to information’.251  
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The emphasis on equity, inclusion, access to information, and international co-operation, along 
with overt connections with environmental and developmental discourses, serves to locate 
General Comment 15 as operating within the mode of (global) governance, as opposed to as a 
hierarchical, binding, discrete instrument of regulation.
252
 Its authoritative, but non-binding 
status complements such a reading. Indeed it has been suggested that the human right to water 
itself can be best understood as an expression of universally accepted standards of global 
governance.
253
 While this may detract to some extent from the bold normative claims of the 
human right to water (potentially diminishing its quasi legally binding status as a derivative right 
of the ICESCR) it may also address some of the difficulties which such an atypical right must 
confront, regarding its precise legal status under international law. It may also encourage 
enforcement of the right to be pursued by additional or alternative means than the traditional 
enforcement mechanisms which currently exist under human rights law, for which the right to 
water is not a good fit.
254
 Certainly, approaching the right to water from the viewpoint of 
governance encourages wider consideration of water in relation to development,
255
 and as a 
development goal at the international level. 
2.4 The right to water at a regional level 
Focusing on the geographical and geo-political region in which South Africa is located, several 
regional human rights instruments are relevant to a rights-based approach to achieving access to 
sufficient water. However, echoing the international situation, there is no single, universal, 
binding right to water in the African Human Rights canon. The African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights (ACHPR)256reiterates States Parties’ obligations under the UN Charter and 
UDHR, but goes further, to state that satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is an 
essential prerequisite for the enjoyment of civil and political rights.
257
 
Article 1 states that parties shall undertake to adopt legislation or other measures to give effect 
to the duties and freedoms enshrined in the Charter. This has been interpreted to include an 
obligation to protect against violations, even if the State or its agents are not the immediate 
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cause of the violation.
258
 Here again the combination of negative and positive obligations is 
present: The State is charged not to interfere with Convention rights, as well as being required 
to positively protect rights through relevant and robust national law (or other measures). Failure 
to fulfill positive obligations can arise in two ways: Firstly where the State fails to take action to 
ensure respect for the relevant rights: Secondly where the State fails to protect an individual 
from interference by other individuals, groups or corporations. 
For example, in the case of SERAC v Nigeria
259
 the complainants brought an action against the 
Nigerian government regarding the violation of various economic and social rights committed 
by the National Nigerian Petroleum Company in partnership with Shell Petroleum 
Development Corporation. The African Commission found the Nigerian government guilty of 
violations of amongst others, the right to health and to a clean environment, due to its role in 
facilitating and condoning the oil corporations’ operations, finding that the Nigerian State was 
obliged ‘to protect right-holders against other subjects by legislation and provision of effective 
remedies’.260 
This position echoes General Comment No.31 of the Human Rights Committee, on Article 2 
of the ICCPR, which makes clear States’ obligations to protect individuals ‘not just against 
violations of Covenant rights by [state] actors, but also against acts committed by private persons 
or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to 
application between private persons or entities’261. It should be noted however, that the 
Committee has not gone so far as to say that, in the absence of effective action by the State, a 
direct obligation is imposed on private actors to abide by Covenant rights.
262
 Indeed, such a 
move would represent a major change to international human rights law in general. But the 
relevance of this to realising access to sufficient water as a human right is that the onus to 
respect, protect and (progressively) fulfil such a right is placed principally and explicitly on the 
State. Furthermore, whether water services are administered by the public sector, private 
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companies, charities or co-operatives, States are required to do their utmost to ensure against 
human rights violations.
263
 
Article 16(2) of the ACHPR proclaims that State parties to the Charter must take the necessary 
measures to protect the health of their people. Access to water is not explicitly mentioned. But 
following the jurisprudence of the CESCR, in their interpretation of ICESCR Article 12, it 
would be a compelling argument that such an obligation to protect the health and environment 
of its citizens would require States parties to ensure their citizens enjoy basic water and 
sanitation services.  
Indeed, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has previously found that 
rights to food, housing, water, electricity and medicine can be derived from the right to health 
and other ACHPR rights.
264
 In Free Legal Assistance Group, Lawyers’ Committee for Human 
Rights, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme, Les Témoins de Jehova v Zaïre,265 the 
commission held that 
‘the failure of the government to provide basic services such as safe drinking water and electricity, 
and the shortage of medicine constitutes a violation of Article 16.’ 
While a welcome and predictable interpretation, determining the human right to water as 
derivative, in the same way as General Comment 15, this does little for the justicability of the 
right. Also, it must be noted that the decisions of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights are non-binding. For this reason the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights was established, giving its first judgment in 2009. However, most of the cases heard so far 
have been administrative, and it remains beset by problems. 
In the same way as CEDAW and CRC discussed above, the following group-specific 
instruments acknowledge a right to water for children and women respectively. Article 14(1) of 
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
266
 provides that every child has the 
right ‘to enjoy the best attainable state of physical, mental and spiritual health’. Article 14(2)(c) 
explicitly stipulates that: 
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State parties… shall undertake to pursue the full implementation of this right and in particular 
shall take measures to ensure the provision of adequate nutrition and safe drinking water.  
Article 15 of the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa
267
 states that 
State parties shall ensure that women have the right to nutritious and adequate food. In this 
regard, they shall take appropriate measures to ‘provide women with access to clean drinking 
water, sources of domestic fuel, land, and the means of producing nutritious food’.268  
While the normative and declarative importance of these regional instruments regarding 
affirming access to water as a necessity (and to some extent a human right) should not be 
underestimated, the fact remains that at the regional level, as at the international level, a clear, 
binding human right to water remains elusive. 
2.5 Water as a development goal 
The foregoing discussion has concentrated on the nature, content and scope of the human right 
to water. Here the focus shifts to consider water in relation to development, both as a 
prerequisite for development, and as a specific development goal. Beneath the ‘umbrella’ term 
of water governance (defined above at 1.1) this analysis of the relationship between water and 
development, relates in the main, to non-binding, or soft-law instruments, in contrast to the 
ICESCR and ICCPR. Consequently, while law continues to play a part in understanding this 
area of water governance, there will be less discussion of ‘hard’ law.  But first a definition of 
development is required. The UN General Assembly Resolution on the Right to Development 
defined development as follows: 
‘Recognizing that development is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political 
process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and 
of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development 
and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom’.269 
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In light of this comprehensive,
270
 inclusive
271
 and equitable
272
 definition of what development 
means, the Resolution goes on to declare that a right to development is: 
‘an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled 
to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, 
in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.’273 
 
Furthermore, ‘States have the primary responsibility for the creation of national and 
international conditions favourable to the realization of the right to development.’274  
 
Despite being framed as a human right, the legal status of this right to development is the same 
as that of Resolution 64/292 on the human right to water. Both are General Assembly 
resolutions, which are not legally binding on States. However, what is more important regarding 
the relationship between water and development is the way in which the ‘right to development’ 
(or perhaps more accurately, the impetus for development) has been pursued through non-
binding, but extremely high profile development goals.  
2.5.1 Water and the Millennium Development Goals 
In September 2000, world leaders came together to adopt the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration, commiting their nations to a new global partnership for development; the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
275
. The MDGs are the most high profile initiative to 
promote development and reduce poverty internationally. Their timetable for completion was 
2015, and a final report, issued in July 2015, shows huge achievements in all target areas.
276
 Each 
of the eight goals overlaps with human rights principles and generally the MDGs share focus 
with the human rights agenda. However, connections or synergies with human rights are not 
made explicit in the MDGs; a situation now famously described by Alston as ‘ships passing in 
the night’.277 Consequently, analysis of the progress of the MDGs is not situated within a human 
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rights framework.
278
 For instance the Global Monitoring Report 2014
279
 does not mention 
human rights, instead focusing on specific MDGs targets. Lack of reference to human rights 
within the MDGs framework has drawn some criticism. The failure to link congruous aims and 
aspirations has perhaps denied the MDGs access to the vocabulary of rights with which to 
strengthen their imperative for States to act, instead risking a ‘technocratic input/output 
approach to development’.280 But despite lacking explicit connection to human rights (and to 
human rights vocabulary), the MDGs were announced from their conception using the 
language of human dignity and equality,
281
 which echoes that used in human rights 
instruments.
282
 Also in light of their relative success, such criticisms are perhaps difficult to 
sustain.  
Regarding water, target 7.C required global action to halve, by 2015, the proportion of the 
population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation. Of note here 
is that this target is part of Goal number seven; ‘ensuring environmental sustainability’. In 
contrast to much of the previous discussion around a human right to water at the international 
level, here access to water as a development goal has been approached from within a broader 
aim of environmental sustainability. Locating the challenge of access to water within this 
broader goal affirms the natural and necessary connections between water and wider discourses 
on environmental resilience and socio-ecological security (as discussed below).   
Target 7. C was met in 2012, three years ahead of schedule, signaling a vast improvement in the 
number of people accessing improved drinking water (from 2.3 billion in 1990 to 4.2 billion in 
2015),
283
 and accessing improved sanitation (2.1 billion more people by 2015).
284
 While the 
reality of these figures is that many millions of people still live without access to adequate water 
or sanitation facilities, it nonetheless represents considerable and sustained development, which 
to borrow from the human rights lexicon, could be described as an impressive global example 
of progressive realization of the right to development (and of so many of the myriad economic, 
social, cultural, civil and political rights that relate to the right to development, of which access 
to sufficient water is clearly one).  
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Such achievements should signal a note of cautious optimism regarding the potential of the 
newly agreed Sustainable Development Goals to help move the international community closer 
to eradicating poverty and to realizing at least a minimum level of development for everyone.  
As is discussed in Chapter Three, South Africa’s response to the MDGs has been positive, as 
have the responses of other developing countries.
285
 It seems that effective governance at the 
international level must not confine itself to the remit of human rights, but must also take 
seriously the significant potential of globally agreed, publicized and monitored development 
‘goals’. However, as Adelman reminds us, development discourse has been regarded with some 
suspicion by many in the Global South, for whom development has become a ‘dirty word’, 
synonymous with impoverishment, exploitation and pollution.
286
  
2.5.2 Water and the Sustainable Development Goals 
The recently adopted Global Goals for Sustainable Development (hereafter referred to as the 
Sustainable Development Goals, or SDGs) mark a significant new chapter in the work of the 
UN to eradicate poverty and champion development.
287
 Though broader in their scope, and 
with more ambitious aims, the SDGs continue the model chosen for the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). They avoid creating direct legal obligations in favour of a ‘report 
card’ approach to help monitor and improve the performance of the international community 
regarding the targets set.  While this approach aims to ensure the SDGs reach at least a similar 
level of success as their predecessors, the emphasis on voluntary commitments rather than legal 
obligations raises serious questions. Practical concerns regarding how to effectively implement 
non-legally binding commitments join more normative questions about how the SDGs should 
best be conceived of as a development framework.  What role should law play? Is there a 
sufficiently strong ethical imperative to ensure compliance? Does the ‘report card’ approach 
signal a significant shift within the international policy community towards pursuing politically 
ponderous but legally insubstantial ambitions? And with what consequences? Will human 
rights find themselves marginalised by the SDGs, or re-energised by their universal aims, and 
re-imagined beyond anthropocentricity by the Goals’ emphasis on interconnected 
understandings of human and non-human life (goals 11-15). Is there a coherent conceptual 
framework with which to understand and critique the SDGs? If not, what will hold the focus of 
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States and international organisations across 17 goals, 169 associated targets and 300 indicators 
over 15 years of serious work? Less than a year into the allotted time span for the SDGs, the 
answers to such questions cannot yet be clear. But, following on from the MDGs, the 
international community’s embrace of the SDGs also, represents a 30 year commitment to 
ambitious, measurable goals, which cannot be characterised as falling within the established 
sources of international law.
288
 The MDG/SDG development agenda has not been expressed 
through treaty-based, or customary law. Rather, it has taken the form of ‘soft’ standard setting, 
which is becoming increasingly popular in international environmental law, and beyond.
289
 This 
would seem to indicate a conscious shift in approach within the international community, 
certainly compared to the era of the Covenants, and the Right to Development.  But there is 
also considerable synergy between the older rights-based and newer goals-based approaches to 
development objectives (including access to sufficient water).  
Regarding water specifically, SDG goal six aims to ‘ensure the availability and sustainable 
management of water and sanitation for all’.290 Because of its universal aim, this goal is more 
easily compatible with the human right to water, articulated in GC 15, than was its precursor in 
the MDGs.
291
 As such, it points to the potential for greater complementarity between rights-
based and goals-based approaches to achieving access to sufficient water. Indeed it may be 
profitable to focus less on distinguishing ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law, or rights and goals, in favour of a 
more pragmatic emphasis on problem solving, including through alternative standard-setting 
modes and compliance mechanisms (as seen in the MDGs and SDGs).
292
 Seen from this 
perspective, whether a given approach comes from an established source of ‘law’ may be 
secondary. What matters is which approach is best suited to achieving the desired results in a 
given context. Such pragmatism is increasingly evident in international environmental law, and 
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also seems fitting in relation to the pursuit of essential development objectives.
293
  
 
2.5.3 Water and Sustainable Development 
As has already been illustrated by reference to the MDGs (and the place of water within the 
wider goal of ensuring environmental sustainability), and by the explicit connection drawn 
between water and protection of biodiversity in the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable 
Development,
294
 it is now broadly acknowledged that access to sufficient water must be achieved 
in ways that are sustainable. This includes consideration of continued access for present and 
future generations (intergenerational equity), as well as what is necessary to protect the 
environment (sustainable use). This concern to ensure sustainable access to water is reiterated 
in General Comment 15: 
‘The manner of the realization of the right to water must also be sustainable, ensuring that the 
right can be realized for present and future generations.’295 
 
In short, water governance and sustainable development should go hand in hand. The term 
‘sustainable development’ was first defined in the 1987 Brundtland Report as ‘development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs’296. But its origins in State practice date back much further, to at least 1893, 
when the arbitral tribunal in the Pacific Fur Seal arbitration incorporated elements of what 
would now be recognised as a sustainable development approach to natural resource use.
297
  
The Brundtland Report definition contains elements of equitable use, including 
intergenerational equity, and sustainable use; which expressed together integrates economic, 
social and environmental considerations. These three elements (equity, sustainable use, and 
integration) comprise the concept of sustainable development. Although its precise legal 
definition and status remains unclear, most commentators agree that sustainable development is 
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a non-binding political leitmotif, and not an enforceable norm with jus cogens or customary 
international law status.
298
  
 
But applying these elements to the challenge of achieving access to water offers the potential to 
integrate equitable social and economic development in environmentally sensitive and 
sustainable ways. Triangulating access to water within social, economic and environmental 
considerations offers a distinctive approach to water governance. But the lack of clarity 
regarding each of the elements of sustainable development has led some to question how such 
distinctiveness may provide a substantive means by which to progress the reform agenda which 
surrounds it.
299
 Without such substance, sustainable development risks becoming a hollow 
concept. Indeed, Fitzmaurice warns that ‘[t]he continuing reliance on clichéd and worn out 
definitions should be abandoned and the concept (or principle) of sustainable development 
must acquire a tangible and concrete content’.300  
 
As an over-arching goal of the international community and an increasingly recognised (non-
binding) principle of international law, sustainable development is likely to continue to feature 
in the rhetoric around transforming water governance towards greater equity and sustainability. 
However, as the brief consideration of the concept and application of sustainable development 
(above) suggests, too often aspirations towards sustainability are insufficiently developed or 
robust to be operationalized or fulfilled. Worst still, without a serious and sustained challenge 
to human behaviour, targeted at reducing consumption and ‘treading more lightly’, sustainable 
development risks being an ‘ideological palliative’ that helps us ‘rationalize our continuing 
encroachments upon the planet’.301 
 
Therefore a further concept is introduced below; social-ecological security. While it shares with 
sustainable development an emphasis on integrating economic, social and environmental 
considerations, it does so against an augmented awareness of the interconnections between all 
organisms and components in the (general or particular) ecosystem. It is to this heightened 
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perception of access to water for people, within the boundaries of a sustainable environment, 
that the chapter now turns. 
 
2.6 Effective international governance in the present and future global environmental contexts 
As has become apparent from the foregoing analysis of relevant human rights and development 
goals, progress in realizing access to sufficient water through either or both of these approaches 
must proceed in ways that are sustainable and environmentally aware. Therefore it is no longer 
possible (if it ever was) to pursue agendas of human rights and/or human development in 
isolation from the realities of local, national, regional and international environmental 
constraints. Effective water governance at the international level must include the integration 
and contextualization of access to water challenges within wider ecological imperatives. Applied 
to the specific focus of this thesis, access to sufficient water for everyone in South Africa can 
only be achieved within the environmental constraints that the country faces.
302
 
2.6.1 Social- ecological security and the exigencies of the Anthropocene 
Social-ecological security (SES) is emerging in the literature as a concept that attempts to better 
articulate the multifarious challenges to the security of the human (and non-human) 
environment. In particular it emphasises that social and human security cannot be separated 
from ecological security
303
. It thus reflects a changing notion of security, towards a broader, 
more interconnected and contingent understanding, better placed to problematize and address 
the changing nature of ecological and developmental threats faced. Such threats have been 
defined as: 
‘an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of 
time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of the Earth, or (2) threatens significantly to 
narrow the range of policy choices available to the international community, governments of 
states or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations).’
304
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Applied to water, this means that not only must water services be ‘socio-sustainable’ (sustainable 
from the perspective of human development). They must be ‘eco-socio-sustainable’ if such 
services are to withstand the exigencies of planetary degradation.
305
  
While traditionally threats to water, food, and energy security have been addressed in isolation, 
SES offers not only a more holistic framework for understanding and responding to these 
challenges, but also gains relevance when set against the backdrop of the Anthropocene. The 
Anthropocene has been unofficially proposed as a new geological epoch.
306
 Formally still, the 
Holocene remains the present epoch, as it has for 10-12000 years. It has been characterised in 
the main by stable environmental conditions, which have supported the enormous growth of 
the human population, and the development of modern societies.  But the global human 
imprint on the biosphere has become so significant that the Earth is moving into a critically 
unstable and inharmonious state.
307
 It is asserted that humankind has played a central role in 
moving the planet towards a critically unstable state, characterised by less predictable and less 
harmonious Earth systems.
308
 So central is this role, that humanity can be considered a discrete 
geological force capable of moving Earth systems outside their natural range of variability, and 
into a new and unstable epoch.  
The effects of the Anthropocene on water are not yet fully understood. But salination, drought 
and heavy rainfall are all consequences of the less predictable weather patterns experienced 
globally. Furthermore, so crucial is fresh water for life, that pressure on water supplies adversely 
affects aspects of human life ranging from food security, sanitation, health and economic 
development.
309
 
Unsurprisingly SES and the Anthropocene are becoming part of the discourse around 
environmental law and governance,
 310
 giving new impetus and urgency to principles including 
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sustainable development, while offering new perspectives with which to interrogate the juristic 
interventions that must ultimately be better able to respond to the exigencies of the 
Anthropocene, now and well into the future. Consequently discussion of water governance at 
the international level must consider not only the existence and utility variously of a rights-based 
approach, and a development-based approach to water; but also the emerging environmental 
realities which relate to water, and the consequences for law and governance of seeking to 
achieve sustainable, equitable, universal access to water on an unstable planet. 
 
2.7 Chapter summary and concluding comments 
As the forgoing discussion has shown, it is not easy to find a single independent, comprehensive 
and legally-binding human right to water in international law. But it would be a mistake to 
conclude from this that there is no human right to water. Instead, the human right to water 
should be considered a unique right, which Thielbörger describes as:  
‘a right of its very own kind that must be seen in connection with national guarantees… and with 
other recognized human rights…’311 
The human right to water can only be understood as a complex, multi-layered network of 
international, regional and national law, treaties, ‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’312. Such an analysis is 
capable of affirming the continuing relevance of this right in international law; especially 
regarding the setting of a substantive core to the right, including codifying minimum standards 
and violations, as well as the independent monitoring of States’ progress. Of particular 
importance on this point is the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to 
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Water and Sanitation (currently held by Leo Heller).
313
 The extent to which the mandate is able 
to effectively monitor and challenge rights violation remains to be seen.
314
  
Complementing this analysis of the human right to water as atypical is the notable success of the 
MDGs in delivering improved access to water. Despite the MDGs being a ‘non-legal’ vehicle 
(in the sense that not only are they non-binding on States, but that they eschew even the 
language of human rights), they have nevertheless driven efforts to make the content of the 
human right to water a new reality for millions of people. Seen within a wider context of global 
water governance, this is an important example of a human right finding (one) expression in a 
non-human rights, (development goals-based) form.    
There are doubtless important benefits for conceiving of access to water as a right within the 
framework of human rights. As Winkler reminds us, these benefits ‘can all be linked to the fact 
that human rights are legally-binding instruments’.315 It is for this reason that the human right to 
water can be described as ‘reaching beyond and beneath’316 the MDGs. But considering the 
challenge of access to water from the perspective of water governance at the international level, 
as opposed to just the perspective of (binding) international law, it must be conceded that ‘soft’ 
development approaches like the MDGs and SDGs have a significant role to play in achieving 
what should still be considered as the human right to water.   
Also, without conflict or contradiction, such a multi-layered conception of the right to water is 
able to acknowledge the crucial, central role of States in embodying the right through legislative 
and other means (including embracing non-legislative measures) to pursue development goals.  
Furthermore, such a multi-layered conception of the human right to water naturally leads to 
consideration of the role that other layers of governance may have. Particularly relevant to this 
thesis is the role of grass-roots, community or ‘commons’ expressions of governance, that, while 
likely to be more ‘messy’ and more difficult to identify, than traditional sites of governance, are 
replete with potential to close some of the gaps left by the transposition of a human right to 
water into the national level (as explored in Chapters Four and Five). Indeed, as the history of 
the emergence of an international human right to water clearly shows, such sub-national, 
commons expressions of water governance have proved significant in achieving the high level of 
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consensus that now exists around a meaningful human right to water, as well as in challenging 
inappropriate private sector involvement in water services.  
The need to achieve access to sufficient water, whether pursued as a human right or a 
development goal, has been clarified as the need to achieve sustainable access. The applicability 
of sustainable development, and more urgently SES, have reframed the challenges of water 
governance at the international level; requiring eco-socio-sustainability, against the backdrop of 
Anthropocene exigencies. The consequences of this for water governance are manifold: Law 
regulates our human interactions, as well as the interactions between humans and other 
organisms, and non-living components in our environment. As such, law plays a crucial role in 
setting the standards for these interactions. Historically these standards have allowed, and even 
facilitated human-to-human, and human-to-non-human interactions, which have resulted in 
profoundly inharmonious planetary consequences. As Robinson explains, law ‘is deeply 
implicated in the systems that have caused the end to the Holocene, and at once is central also 
to the reforms needed to cope with the emerging Anthropocene’.317  
In response to this there must be a willingness to reimagine law and governance in ways which 
allow for more appropriate, harmonious interactions and for realising effective ways to pursue 
equitable, sustainable and integrated modes of living within new ecological parameters.    The 
emergence of water governance approaches which complement and reflect the unique and 
multi-layered characteristics of the human right to water may be understood as manifestations 
of this ‘new thinking’318 that is so desperately needed if the consequences of the Anthropocene 
are to be mediated. Such approaches will be considered in more detail in Chapters Five and 
Six. 
Such new thinking also impacts on the analysis within this chapter. A legal analysis of any 
particular right almost inevitably includes the identification of the legal status of that right (as 
well as associated considerations around compliance). Here, this would make the primary 
operative question ‘what is the legal status of the human right to water in international law?’ 
While asking this may have some merit, perhaps the more pertinent question to ask, in light of 
an understanding of the right to water as unique and multi-layered, is whether the 
acknowledgement of a human right to water at the international level has created, or reinforced 
an imperative for States to act towards its realisation. Not seeking to define the precise legal 
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status of such an imperative leaves States able to respond to the urgent need to realise people’s 
right to water, without the added complications of determining legally binding obligations, 
which are anathema to many States, and for which there remains no effective mechanism for 
pursuing individual rights violations at the international level.
319
 Such an approach affirms the 
existence of a human right to water in international law, while acknowledging the significant 
limitations around status and enforcement.  
The normative importance of such an affirmation at the international level remains: access to 
sufficient water continues to be emphasised as a human right necessary for dignified existence, 
as well as a specific international development goal. But such a shift in emphasis may allow the 
reality to be acknowledged that, despite their international character, ‘[H]uman rights and the 
human rights movement depend on governments and on the state system’320 for their respect, 
protection and fulfilment. This inevitably leads this thesis to focus next on fulfilment of the right 
to water through water governance at the level of the nation-state, and to one State in particular; 
the Republic of South Africa. 
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3 
Water in South Africa 
 ‘Reconciliation means that those who have been on the underside of history must see that there 
is a qualitative difference between repression and freedom. And for them, freedom translates 
into having a supply of clean water, having electricity on tap; being able to live in a decent home 
and have a good job; to be able to send your children to school and to have accessible health 
care. I mean, what’s the point of having made this transition if the quality of life of these people 
is not enhanced and improved? If not, the vote is useless.’ 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu
321
 
‘[M]ost proponents of a Bill of Rights in South Africa see it as an instrument designed to block 
rather than promote any significant social change’. 
‘The battle for human rights in our country has essentially been a struggle for the vote and not 
for a Bill of Rights.’ 
Justice Albie Sachs
322 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins by charting the current shape of access to water in South Africa. In order to 
put into perspective the central research question of this thesis -the degree to which a right to 
water can achieve access to sufficient water – it is important to understand how close the 
country currently is to achieving universal, sufficient access. The chapter then considers South 
Africa’s unique legal/ political history, and how this has affected the country’s current water 
topography, and why an explicit right of access to sufficient water
323
 has been adopted.  The 
effects on South Africa of more general, regional and paradigmatic shifts in water governance 
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are also analysed, including in particular, moves towards greater use of private and privatesque 
modes of water service delivery, characterised through a ‘water as commodity’ paradigm. The 
extent to which such moves create conflict with the fulfilment of a right of access to sufficient 
water, is specifically considered. 
The legal framework for water governance in South Africa is analysed, including national water 
policies, and legislation, as well as the impact and influence that water governance at the 
international level has had and continues to have, on South African water governance. 
Particular focus is given to the right of access to sufficient water in the Bill of Rights in the 1996 
Constitution, and to how this has been interpreted and implemented. Focus on this key 
Constitutional provision allows the thesis to continue to examine how effective the right to water 
has been, and to consider how effective it could be in securing sustainable, sufficient access to 
water for everyone in South Africa.
324
  
 
3.2 Access to water in South Africa; resources, scarcity and inequality 
Any discussion of water governance is framed within the reality that water in South Africa is a 
scarce resource.
325
 Increasing demand from urban centres, for water for domestic use, jostle with 
demands from industry, mining and agricultural sectors.
326
 These demands are made in a 
country that has rainfall less than the global average, falling unevenly across the country.
327
 Over 
a decade ago the South African Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) warned of 
the unsustainable nature of water use: 
With just 1200Kl of available freshwater for each person each year… we are at the 
threshold of the internationally used definition of “water stress”. Within a few years, 
population growth will take us below this level. South Africa already has less water per 
person than countries widely considered to be much drier, such as Namibia and 
Botswana.
328
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A brief overview of the General Household Survey (2014)
329
, and the South African Human 
Rights Commission Report (2014)
330
 gives the most recent picture of the nation’s access to water 
for domestic use.  
The percentage of households in the Eastern Cape with access to water decreased from 80.5% 
in 2013 to 78.5% in 2014, making it the province in which households had the poorest access 
to water in 2014. Access in other provinces in 2014 was as follows:  KwaZulu-Natal 
86.5%, Mpumalanga 87.1%; Western Cape 98.9%; Free State 95.3%; Gauteng 96.4%; Northern 
Cape 95.8% and North West 87.2%. Average access nationally in 2014 was 90%. An estimated 
46,3% of households had access to piped water in their dwellings in 2014. A further 27% 
accessed water on site while 14% relied on communal taps and 2,7% relied on neighbours’ 
taps.
331
 With a total population of 52,980,000 in 2014
332
 this means that 5,298,000 people lacked 
access to on-site or off-site piped or tap water in 2014.
333
 Of those who received piped water 
from a municipality, almost 25% experienced interruptions to their piped water supply at least 
once a month
334
.  
It is important to acknowledge that since 1994, access to water has improved for many South 
Africans. In 1994 it was estimated that around one quarter of the total population (12 million 
people) did not have access to piped water.
335
 The household survey for 1995
336
 reported that 
33% of African households, 72% of coloured, and 97% of both Indian and white households, 
had accessed to water from an on-site tap. 28% of African households in non-urban areas 
obtained water from a river, stream, dam or well, and 16% obtained water from a borehole. 
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Among African households who had to fetch water from a source that is not on site, 17% 
travelled at least one kilometre to reach the source.  
Since 2000, South Africa has embraced MDG target 7C: To halve, by 2015, the proportion of 
people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation. Using 1994 as the 
baseline indicator, 23.4% of the population lacked sustainable access to water and sanitation at 
this standard. Target 7C required that this be reduced to 11.7%. By 2011/12 this had been 
achieved and exceeded, with 10% of the country’s people lacking safe drinking water and 
sanitation.
337
 But, despite improvements, access to sufficient water remains a daily struggle for 
many, and a significant stumbling block to both socio-economic development and political 
stability
338
. 
These statistics only present a picture of people’s access to water per se. They do not indicate 
the quantity of water people access and the reasons why some access less than is deemed 
sufficient
339
. Consequently the figure of 90% of the national population that has access to water 
does not indicate that the same percentage of people have access to sufficient water as Section 
27 of the Constitution stipulates. This issue has significant bearing not only on people’s general 
level of health and well-being
340
 but also has been a key feature of the legal disputes over the 
constitutional provisions on the right to water
341
. Internationally sufficient water has been 
quantified variously between 20 and 50 cubic litres per person per day (lpd)
342
. In South Africa 
the ANC’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)343 set sufficient water at a 
minimum quota of 25 lpd, available within 200 metres of a household.
344
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The World Health Organisation and World Bank both recommend between 20 and 40 lpd. 
Peter Gleick has calculated sufficient water to be 50 lpd (see Figure 1).
345
 These calculations 
were used by the South African High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal in the recent case of 
City of Johannesburg v L. Mazibuko.
346
 However, it is significant to note that the Constitutional 
Court’s judgment in the same case reduced the quota, as discussed in Chapter Four. 
Figure 1 
Purpose Recommended requirement (litres per 
person per day) 
Drinking water
a
 5 
Sanitation 20 
Bathing 15 
Food preparation
b
 10 
Total  50 
             
As discussion in Chapter Four of the case of Mazibuko shows, defining sufficient water is 
problematic.  But even using the RDP quota of sufficient water (25 lpd), a significant 
proportion of South Africans still do not have access to even this, 21 years after the formal end 
of apartheid. Fulfilment of the right of access to sufficient water therefore remains a crucial aim.  
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 Minimum required to sustain life in moderate climatic conditions and average activity levels. 
b
 Excluding water to grow food. 
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3.3 History of the development of water law in South Africa  
The history of water law and the water institutional reforms discussed below cannot be divorced 
from the political, economic, social and environmental changes experienced in the country.  
Fundamental political shifts have created significant new water legislation.
347
 For example, the 
Irrigation and Water Conservation Act 8 of 1912 followed the unification of South Africa in 
1910; the Water Act 54 of 1956 followed the election of the National Party in 1948 (and the 
formal entrenchment of apartheid policies); and the election of the ANC in 1994 led directly to 
the Water Services Act of 1997, and the National Water Act 36 of 1998, amongst other 
transformative legislation.  
The changing political economy of the country has catalysed processes of industrialisation and 
urbanisation at different times, including most notably during apartheid’s ‘heyday’348 in the 
1950s, and in the immediate aftermath of majority rule in 1994. These changes, with their 
consequent social and environmental implications, have shaped the ways in which water rights, 
and water law more generally, have developed. 
The development of water law is considered below in two periods: 1652 to 1994, and 1994 to 
2016. While the timespan covered by these two periods is uneven (342 years and 22 years 
respectively), the dividing line between them is important. The first represents the period of 
white, European, minority rule, while the second refers to the current chapter of majority rule. 
While such a stark distinction risks masking a more nuanced understanding of historical 
developments, it does offer a clear framework within which to chart the evolution of the law in 
this area, as well as providing scope to contextualise developments in water law within a broader 
(if necessarily inexhaustive) national narrative. 
Consequently, the ensuing discussion is not intended as a comprehensive history of South 
Africa, nor does it seek to offer an exhaustive account of relevant movements like the ANC. 
Rather its purpose is to provide an historical overview of the most significant events that, 
directly or indirectly, have shaped the law relating to water from the beginning of established 
European/colonial involvement in the country (1652),
349
 to the present day.  
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For thousands of years people have inhabited the territory that is now South Africa. As long ago 
as c.1000BC Khoikhoi herders moved into South Africa from northern Botswana. Therefore, 
human relations with water resources in the country predate the arrival of Europeans by many 
centuries. Regulation of water prior to the colonial period reflected African customary law, 
which stipulated that water and land were free.
 350
 Chiefs regulated land tenure, but private 
ownership of water and land was not permitted.
351
 This approach to water resources remained 
after the first European settlements were established, and a dual system of ‘water rights’ 
(regulating human use of water) existed until the expansion of the VOC’s352 activities in the Cape 
began to encroach on the native communities. This eventually resulted in the subjugation of 
these communities, and the imposition of European rule over water regulation, characterised by 
the concept of ownership over water, in contrast to indigenous approaches.
353
  
3.3.1 1652 to 1994 
Until the election of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1994 water law in South Africa 
evolved with little regard for water scarcity.
354
 Instead, principles derived from European 
countries, where water supply was plentiful, were applied in a country with perennial water 
shortages.
355
 From the period of the first Dutch colonisation of the Cape in 1652 to the Union 
of South Africa in 1910 the common law changed from a position of State allocation of water to 
what might be considered a more traditional model of ‘riparian rights’,356 namely ownership and 
use of water being linked principally to the ownership of the land through which the water 
flowed. This change was brought about primarily to serve the de facto apartheid system of white 
minority domination and colonisation of resources.
357
 During the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries a system 
of Roman-Dutch law was established in the Cape. Consequently, Roman law principles were 
incorporated, albeit in modified forms.
358
 In Roman law, water generally was classified as res 
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publicae, indicating that it was in the public realm (although water in containers could be 
privately owned). More specifically, water in streams and rivers was referred to also as res 
publicae, while rain water was designated res extra commercium, literally meaning a non-
negotiable thing; something which cannot be privately owned. Applied in the Cape, water in 
navigable streams remained res publicae (meaning that water in a stream or river could not be 
privately owned, but the river banks could be), while water in non-navigable streams, and spring 
water on land became the private property of the landowner.
359
 The role of the government was 
understood as that of custodian of water sources (dominus fluminis), with corresponding rights 
to regulate and control the use of water in navigable streams.
360
 
After around 150 years of Dutch domination, the Cape was formally ceded to Britain in 1814, 
and thereafter, despite setbacks, British influence increased throughout the country.
361
 Initially, 
British policy in South Africa was to avoid direct political control of the interior.
362
  But from 
1870 onwards this was replaced by a contrasting, and increasingly aggressive policy of 
subjugation and annexation. Indeed this policy was to spread beyond the borders of South 
Africa, into the whole sub-continent.
363
   
In this context of greater direct British influence, an alternative set of principles for water 
governance was adopted.
364
  Premised on English law, riparian owners (those owning the river 
banks) were given the right to share in the water from that river. While the consequence of this 
juridical shift may not be immediately apparent, the adoption of a more developed form of 
riparian rights meant that the government’s former role as custodian of water resources was 
greatly reduced.
365
The former principle, that water with a perennial flow was res publica, and 
consequently that riparian owners had no inherent right to the water arising on their land, was 
overturned. This reversal, and the consequent bolstering of riparian owners’ rights is clearly 
asserted by Hodges CJ in Silberbauer v Van Breda: 
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‘the right of the freeholder to water rising on springs from his land is undisputed and 
undisputable. He may use it as he pleases.’366 
Appreciation of the confluence of these two developments is crucial to understanding how 
water governance in South Africa evolved in such an unequal and discriminative way. Limiting 
the role of government as dominus fluminus removed the impetus to consider water resources 
at a macro level, or as a common, res publicae good. Instead, water became understood as 
something to be privately governed by those who owned the land. The potential for such a 
mode of governance to generate inequalities is clear. But it was to be compounded by the 
deliberate separation of non-white South Africans from the land.  
Two Acts in particular strengthened the connection between land ownership and water 
ownership. First, the Irrigation and Water Conservation Act 8 of 1912 confirmed that spring 
water on land, and water flowing over land, were the property of the landowner. Therefore the 
landowner could use the water, albeit that the water should also be available for lower-lying 
landowners.
367
 Second, the Native Land Act 1913, stipulated that Africans (non-whites) could no 
longer own land outside the ‘native reserves’ (which made up only between eight and 13 per 
cent of South African territory)
368
. Consequently, this disenfranchisement from the land meant 
disenfranchisement from water also.  
Throughout the twentieth century, despite a shift in emphasis on water supply from agriculture 
towards a growing industrial sector, the riparian rights paradigm remained paramount. This had 
inevitable consequences for uneven water distribution, something that was exacerbated by the 
fact that because water use and ownership was linked to land ownership, and because the white 
minority population owned 87% of the land
369
, the majority black population was thus inevitably 
placed at a normative and institutional socio-economic disadvantage. Until 1994 (and the end of 
apartheid), white South Africans enjoyed an abundance of relatively low-cost water, indicated 
perhaps most cruelly by their having one of the highest per capita levels of home swimming 
pools and golf courses in the world.
370
 The majority of government infrastructural investment 
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went into white-dominated cities and suburbs, leaving those living in the ‘Bantustan’ system of 
rural homelands with minimal supply.
371
  
  Racial segregation 
The legal changes to water governance, discussed above, took place against an enduring 
backdrop of inequality and segregation along racial lines. While the now infamous apartheid 
system - as a single, deliberate and coherent legal, political, and religious system – did not begin 
until 1948,
372
 perceptions of white racial superiority in South Africa have been present since the 
earliest encounters between Dutch settlers and Khoisan pastoralists.
373
 These perceptions were 
given legal status, and acquired a formal structure, early in the history of the VOC’s activities in 
the Cape. Company officials and settlers (free burghers), both white, headed the hierarchy 
above black categories of ‘Hottentots’ (Khoisan), free blacks (manumitted slaves) and slaves.374 
With some exceptions, this meant that labourers were black, while landowners and employers 
were white. Formal slavery continued in the Cape from 1658 to 1834, and contributed greatly 
to the embedding of racial hierarchy and segregation.
375
Even once slavery was abolished, it was 
replaced by what Terreblanche has called ‘unfree labour’.376 Despite the relative abundance of 
available land during the middle of the 19
th
 century, black workers were largely excluded from 
land ownership, and instead, remained in similarly unequal and exploitative relationships with 
the white landowning employers. Consequently, when diamonds and gold were discovered in 
1867 and 1868 respectively, black unfree labour was already an established economic and 
socio-political phenomenon, ready to meet the new surge in demand from the mines ‘for cheap 
and docile African labour’.377   
Even where legislation contained no explicit requirement of racial segregation, the 
consequences of it were to embed a racially segregated system. In the Cape, the Masters and 
Servants Ordinance of 1841 regulated labour contracts without reference to race.
378
 But the fact 
that almost all masters were white and nearly all servants were black meant that even such 
ostensibly ‘colour blind’ provisions formalised and perpetuated social division along racial 
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lines.
379
 At the turn of the century several Acts were passed with overtly discriminatory 
provisions. Perhaps most notably, the Glen Grey Act of 1894, limited the amount of land that 
African (black) families could own within their own homelands, effectively forcing black 
workers to remain labourers for white farms. This was heralded as a necessary and desirable 
feature of the emerging policy of formal and practical segregation, as the then Prime Minister of 
the Cape Colony, Cecil John Rhodes summarised in his speech to parliament on the second 
reading of the Act: 
‘I do not feel that the fact of our having to live with the natives in this country is a reason for 
serious anxiety. In fact, I think the natives should be a source of great assistance to most of us. 
At any rate, if the whites retain their position as the supreme race, the day may come when we 
shall all be thankful that we have the natives with us in their proper position.’380 
In 1902 a segregated location was formally established for Africans in Cape Town.
381
 The 
School Board Act of 1905 imposed compulsory educational segregation in government 
schools.
382
 In 1910 the Act of Union enfranchised all white adult males, but not black males. 
The franchise for the Cape Town municipality, established in 1839, continued to allow a small 
number of black voters, dependent on property requirements. However, black residents in the 
municipality were not permitted as parliamentary candidates, being reliant on whites for 
representation.
383
  
While the Act of Union unified South Africa into one colonial territory, it also acted as a 
catalyst to expand and entrench the repression and segregation of non-whites in the country. 
The Dutch Reformed Church Act, 1911 excluded black people from membership; the Mines 
and Works Act, 1911 imposed a colour bar to protect white workers; the Defence Act, 1912 
provided for a white-only citizenship force; and as mentioned above, the Natives Land Act, 
1913 segregated land ownership along racial lines. At this time, according to Worden ‘a cogent 
ideology of segregation emerged and was implemented’.384 
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The African National Congress 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the African National Congress (ANC) was also established at this 
tumultuous point in the country’s history. Formed in Bloemfontein on the 8th January 1912, the 
ANC (initially named the South African Native National Congress) was assigned the task of 
‘being a midwife in the process of national rebirth and regeneration’385. Comprising delegates 
from across South Africa’s provinces, as well as from Bechuanaland (now Botswana), and 
representing a commitment to unity beyond tribal or racial lines, the ANC was to be an 
inherently anti-colonial political vehicle to achieve ‘African freedom and liberty’.386   
Passed the following year, the Native Land Act, 1913 quickly became a principal target of 
opposition by the ANC. The Act, which prevented non-whites from ownership of all land 
except the approximately 13% of land designated as native reserves, quickly removed the threat 
to white farmers that a growing rural black population had been perceived to be. Furthermore, 
it created a mass of cheap rural labour, as well as leading to an exodus towards urban centres. 
But it also represented the legalised theft of land by a white-only government, which acted as a 
rallying cry for the ANC. In 1916 ANC Secretary General, Solomon Plaatje, described the 
effects of the Native Land Act as follows: 
‘Awakening on Friday morning June 20, 1913, the South African native found himself, not 
actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his birth.’387 
Experienced in this way, the Act transcended the practical consequences of people being 
separated from the means to subsist. It symbolised the great injustice at the heart of the South 
African polity. The ANC mounted a campaign against the Act, culminating in a mission to the 
British Government in London in 1914. But despite some sympathy from individual 
Westminster MPs, the British Government did not intervene, and the mission was swiftly 
overshadowed by the onset of the First World War.
388
 
While the response of the ANC to the Native Land Act was not successful, it marks the 
beginning of the ANC finding its place as a locus of organised political protest and popular 
consciousness-raising. Over the next three decades the ANC continued to publically critique 
and protest against segregation injustices. It also underwent fundamental changes, navigating its 
relationship with communism and pan-Africanism, and holding in tension opposing ambitions 
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variously to achieve integration into ‘common society’389, or to replace the state with a ‘black 
republic’.390 Its political influence waned in the 1930s, in part due to the rise of the Communist 
Party (CP) and trade unions, as alternative sites of protest. But by the time the National Party 
was elected in 1948, the ANC was again firmly placed to lead the opposition to the latest 
manifestation of racial segregation and discrimination: formal apartheid.
391
  
Apartheid 
By the early 1940s the segregationist project that had coalesced after the Act of Union, came 
under increasing pressure, as the number of Africans moving permanently to the cities grew. 
The relative abundance of employment opportunities in urban centres, compared to within 
reserves, drove this urbanisation, while simultaneously creating a new challenge for the white 
minority government: How to maintain racial hierarchy while allowing white demands for black 
urban labour to be met? The answer- apartheid - emerged as a revision of segregationist 
policies symbolising a revival of Afrikaner
392
 nationalism
393
. Apartheid became the slogan of the 
National Party (NP), which narrowly won the 1948 general election, and would retain control of 
government until 1994. The Union of South Africa remained a dominion of the British 
Empire, then of the Commonwealth until 1961, when having been subjected to criticism of 
apartheid policies, the country withdrew from the organisation. South Africa consequently 
became an independent republic in the same year. This was a popular move amongst Afrikaner 
nationalists, whose general distrust and resentment of British influence dated back to the Anglo-
Boer War (1899-1902).
394
 It also proved to be the beginning of ever-greater international 
isolation for the new republic.
395
 
Apartheid, literally meaning ‘apartness’396 or separateness, was pursued through a raft of new 
legislation that codified and extended racial discrimination and segregation. Crucial to apartheid 
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legislation was the categorisation of all South Africans according to race: White; Coloured; 
Asiatic (Indian); and Native (also described as Bantu, or African).
397
 Every facet of society, and 
of social interaction began to be addressed by apartheid legislation. The Prohibition of Mixed 
Marriages Act, 1949, and the Immorality Act 1950 together banned all sexual contact between 
white South Africans and other racial groups. The Group Areas Act, 1950, and the Natives 
Resettlement Act, 1954, facilitated a policy of racially segregated residential areas, and allowed 
the en masse relocation of Indian residents from central Pretoria and Durban, and of Coloured 
inhabitants from central Cape Town.
398
 The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, 1953, 
brought compulsory segregation to bear on all public amenities from transport, to 
entertainment and sports facilities.
399
  
In the context of this energetic imposition of institutionalised apartheid, the Water Act 54 of 
1956 represents an important milestone in the history of water governance in South Africa. 
Replacing the Irrigation and Water Conservation Act (1912) the Water Act 1956 sought to 
address growing demand from mining, agriculture and industry, while introducing greater 
control over ‘abstraction, use, supply, distribution and pollution of water’.400 As such, the Act 
aimed to sustainably supply the large, thirsty (water-intensive) economic development projects, 
which the NP prioritised in rural areas, where their support base was located. As competition 
for water intensified, the English law-inspired riparian rights mode of water governance became 
inadequate. As explained above, and as summarised by Hodges CJ in Silberbauer v Van Breda, 
the riparian principle was that the right of the landowner to water on their land was 
undisputable.401 However, this model, conceived in an agrarian context, was ill suited to multiple 
intensive demands on water within the same geographical area. If landowners upstream can 
remove water as they please, developments downstream will be affected. Therefore, the Water 
Act partially revived the dominus fluminis principle, reinstating the State as the controller of 
water in certain ‘control areas’, to be administered in the national interest.402 
Understood as part of the apartheid project, the Water Act demonstrated a willingness to affect 
redistribution of water resources, but only for the purposes of facilitating economic 
development, the beneficiaries of which were predominantly white South Africans. The Act 
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retained the crucial exclusionary connection between land and water, while reforming this 
connection in order to better achieve what was framed as the national interest, meaning the 
interest of the white population. Thus the Act was simultaneously reforming and conservative. 
It required both a reconception of proprietary interests, and the retention of the established 
racial hierarchy. As Goldblatt & Davies explain, the Act illustrates the pursuit of deliberately 
inequitable water management, skewed towards the interests of white landowners and industry 
chiefs.
403
 Ultimately such management resulted not just in inequities of water use between racial 
groups, but also in inefficient and unsustainable use of water resources in a water-scarce 
country.
404
  
The Freedom Charter, and water as a political aim 
In response to the formalisation of the apartheid regime under the National Party, and as part 
of the political protest against it, the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African 
Indian Congress adopted the Freedom Charter on June 26
th
 1955 at a Congress of the People 
in Kliptown, Soweto. This was to be a galvanising moment in the so called Defiance Campaign, 
which aimed to raise political consciousness and embrace all democratic forces in South Africa 
towards liberation from apartheid.
405
 
Framed as a series of aspirational statements for a post-apartheid South Africa, the Freedom 
Charter became the manifesto of the ANC.
406
 Its claims to individual equality and dignity sit 
alongside calls for wealth redistribution, nationalisation of mineral resources and fair 
distribution of land, food, health care and education. The fusion of land and water rights, which 
occurred during British colonial rule, and was maintained throughout the apartheid era, can be 
seen to be challenged in the preamble: 
‘[O]ur people have been robbed of their birthright to land, liberty and peace by a form of 
government founded on injustice and inequality’.407 
Although water was not specifically mentioned in the Freedom Charter, the inseparable 
association of water with claims to food, health, and land among others, made equitable 
redistribution of water an obvious and important aim of the ANC, evidenced by the inclusion 
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of the right to sufficient water in the interim Constitution, then the 1996 Constitution
408
 as well 
as the ANC’s promise of universal free basic water, made during the 2000 municipal 
elections.
409
 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse apartheid’s disintegration in detail. Suffice it to 
say that from the late 1970s and early 1980s, a combination of increasing internal resistance and 
external (international) opposition, including economic sanctions, began to undermine the 
regime. By 1990 these combined pressures had become sufficient to compel the newly-elected 
President, F.W de Klerk to unban the ANC (as well as the Pan Africanist Congress - PAC, and 
the Communist Party), and to commit to a process of significant political change. Nelson 
Mandela was released, and almost immediately began a formal process of negotiation for 
transitioning to majority rule. This involved the repeal of key apartheid legislation including the 
Group Areas Act, previously discussed.
 410
 In 1991 The Convention for a Democratic South 
Africa (CODESA) was established to create a new constitution, producing an interim 
constitution in 1993, which aimed to provide: 
‘…a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife, conflict, 
untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, 
democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South Africans, 
irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex.’411 
3.3.2 from 1994 to the present day 
The first multi-party, democratic elections were held in South Africa on the 27
th
 April 1994, 
ushering in the formal beginning of the new democratic constitutional era. A government of 
National Unity was elected with an ANC majority, and Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as 
President.  
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The practical consequences of inequitable water access, and the symbolic legacy of colonial and 
apartheid policies to exclude non-white South Africans from the intrinsically linked resources 
of land and water, meant that a thoroughly new approach to water governance was necessary. 
With the advent of majority rule in 1994 it was clear that such a new approach must be based 
on the acceptance of two fundamental factors: the extreme inequality of water distribution (pre 
1994), and the overall scarcity of water in terms of the total available to the country. Crucial to 
the form that this new approach took, was the inclusion of a right of access to sufficient water 
within the new Constitution.  
In order to appreciate the scope and impact of this right (and therefore the implications for its 
inclusion), it is necessary to consider the Constitution as a whole, as well as the role that the 
Courts (particularly the Constitutional Court) have played in interpreting this provision. The 
role of the Courts is analysed in Chapter Four. But the remainder of this chapter considers the 
constitutional right to water within the context of the Constitution’s Bill of Rights, before 
discussing the relevant legislation that has been passed since 1994 in order to give effect to the 
right to water.  
Water in the new Constitution (1996) 
Chapter 2 of the Constitution is the Bill of Rights. It contains a wide array of rights loosely 
grouped as civil and political rights (inter alia equality
412
, freedom
413
, dignity
414
), socio-economic 
rights (health, food, water
415
, education
416
) and group rights (cultural, religious and linguistic 
communities
417
). These broad groupings correspond largely to the first, second and third 
generation human rights as categorised by Karel Vasek.
418
 The extent of the protection of socio-
economic rights in the Constitution is however controversial.
419
 In the process of drafting the 
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Constitution, the African National Congress (ANC) government chose to incorporate these 
rights, despite the counsel of the National Party, supported by the South African Law 
Commission, that the Bill of Rights should stick to the traditional territory of civil and political 
rights. It was asserted that incorporating socio-economic rights would embroil the courts in 
problematic issues of resource allocation – a task that should be performed by the legislature 
and executive.
420
 This warning of tensions regarding the separation of powers is echoed in recent 
case decisions discussed below. This of course is not a South African issue alone
421
, but raises 
both comparative law instances of the difficulties of enforcing socio-economic rights as well as 
more theoretical difficulties with their implementation, including at the international level.
422
 
The ANC government chose, however, against maintaining the historical division between first 
and generation rights, challenging the ‘unscientific’ nature of the division:  
It is difficult to divide the protection of rights in negative and positive duties... Thus the 
protection of the right to life, recognised as a political and civil right, requires not merely 
forbearance on the part of the State, but also positive action.
423
 
The State is required to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfill’ each of the rights in the Bill of 
Rights
424
. The negative duty to respect is thus joined by the positive duties to protect, promote 
and fulfill. Yet the socio-economic rights enshrined in the Constitution are qualified
425
: Some 
more than others. The right to sufficient water (alongside housing, food, health care) for 
instance is to be realised through reasonable legislative and other measures, within the limits of 
the available resources of the State, and only in a progressive (not immediate) way.
426
 However, 
the rights of children set out in section 28 are not as qualified
427
. All rights may be limited only 
in terms of law of general application, to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom.
428
This corresponds largely to similar qualifications within international human rights 
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law, including broadly the proportionality test employed by the European Court of Human 
Rights
429
.  
The right to sufficient water is explicitly stated in section 27(1)(b) of the Constitution, as 
qualified in Section 27(2): 
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to - (a) health care services, including reproductive 
health care; (b) sufficient food and water;430(c) social security, including, if they are unable to 
support themselves and their dependents, appropriate social assistance. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, 
to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.  
 
Other Constitutional rights are related, directly or indirectly, to this right, namely the right to 
equality,
431
 right to human dignity,
432
 right to life,
433
 property rights,
434
 right of access to housing,
435
 
rights of children,
436
 right to have access to courts,
437
 locus standi provisions,
438
 and the 
‘environmental right’.439  
Additionally, Section 39 of the Constitution (the Constitutional interpretation clause) requires 
that a court, tribunal or forum must consider international law and may consider foreign law 
when interpreting any legislation and when developing the common law and customary law. 
This provision means that the scope of, and discourse around, an internationally acknowledged 
human right to water is particularly pertinent to the domestic, constitutional position in South 
Africa. Discourse around the scope and status of an international human right to water has 
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been considered at length in Chapter Two. The influence of international law upon Section 27 
of the South African Constitution is discussed at length in Chapter Four. 
Law in South Africa comes from several sources: legislation; judicial precedent; customary law 
and international law
440
. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) is supreme: 
‘Law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid and the obligations imposed by it must be 
fulfilled’.441 Legislation and court decisions give content to the rights within the 
Constitution
442
and, particularly regarding socio-economic rights and environmental law, judicial 
decisions provide a rich source of jurisprudence.
 443
  
Cumulatively, the status of the Constitution, and the scope of relevant constitutional provisions, 
places a clear obligation on the state to respect, protect, promote and fulfill the right of access to 
sufficient water. However, in order to be more accurate, this right of access to sufficient water 
requires a definition of both sufficiency and access. Neither terms are defined in the 
Constitution, but as already discussed, sufficient water has been defined in the literature 
variously as between 20 and 50 lpd and has received legislative definition as 25 lpd.
444
 
Sufficiency has been described as being dependent on three factors, accessibility, adequate 
quality and adequate quantity.
445
 These factors encompass the five components of the human 
right to water as interpreted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
namely that water must be sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable.
446
  
The Water Services Act 1997 
Key legislation has been promulgated in order to give effect to the right of access to sufficient 
water. The Water Services Act 108 of 1997 (WSA) is the principal legislative mechanism to 
actualize the obligations of the State. Section 3 of the WSA provides that: 
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3 (1) Everyone has a right of access to basic water supply and basic sanitation; (2) Every water 
services institution must take reasonable measures to realize these rights; (3) Every water 
services authority must, in its water services development plan, provide for measures to realize 
these rights.
447
 
The WSA aims to provide inter alia ‘the right of access to basic water supply and the right to 
basic sanitation necessary to secure sufficient water and an environment not harmful to human 
health or well-being’.448 The Act further addresses the social and ecological purposes of water 
respectively, setting ‘national standards and norms and standards for tariffs in respect of water 
services’ and aiming ‘to promote effective water resource management and conservation’.449 
Basic water supply is defined in the WSA as ‘the prescribed minimum standard of water supply 
services necessary for the reliable supply of a sufficient quantity and quality of water to 
households including informal households, to support life and personal hygiene’.450 The Act 
sets the minimum quantity for basic water supply as 25 litres of potable water per person per 
day (25 lpd), or 6 kilolitres per household per month, accessible within 200 metres.
451
 This 
minimum quota is to be provided free of charge and is designated as Free Basic Water 
(FBW).
452
 
Water services authorities, including municipalities, are charged with a duty ‘to consumers or 
potential consumers in its area of jurisdiction to progressively ensure efficient, affordable, 
economical and sustainable access to water services’.453 But there are no explicit provisions 
within the Act on how ‘access’ is to be achieved. 
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The National Water Act 1998 
The National Water Act 36 of 1998 (NWA) specifically aims to address the past racial and 
gender discrimination endured under apartheid, in relation to water.
454
 It is therefore crucial in 
implementing the constitutional right to water, as well as Section 24 of the Constitution’s 
provision of a right to a healthy environment. The chief aim of the Act is the protection of 
South Africa’s water resources and as such the NWA adds ecological aspects of the right to 
water to the primarily social aspects stressed in the WSA, and in so doing, clearly links the 
environmental right (Section 24) to the right to water.
455
 Section 2 states the purpose of the Act 
‘to ensure that the nation’s water resources are protected, used, developed, conserved, managed 
and controlled’,456 taking into account, amongst others, the basic human needs of present and 
future generations, equitable water access, social and economic development, public interest, 
growing demand for water, ecosystems and biological diversity, as well as international 
obligations.
457
 This echoes the Brundtland Commission’s emphasis on intergenerational and 
intra-generational equity as intrinsic to the definition of sustainable development.
458
 Section 2 
can therefore be understood as articulating a vision for sustainable
459
 use of the country’s water 
resources.  
Goldblatt and Davies argue that a comprehensive definition of sustainability must extend to 
include financial sustainability, which they contend has led to an emphasis on cost recoveries in 
the water sector.
460
 Indeed, Section 2 (d) requires the water use to be ‘efficient’, as well as 
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sustainable and beneficial, in the public interest.
461
 Efficiency here could certainly be interpreted 
to include an element of financial sustainability. Such an emphasis is seen most clearly within a 
paradigm of water-as-commodity (as defined in chapter one). The practical consequences of 
this are discussed in relation to the case of Mazibuko in Chapter Four. But here it is simply 
worth noting that if Goldblatt & Davies are correct, and if financial sustainability is pursued 
through water governance that requires cost recovery, then the requirement in Section 2 (b) for 
‘equitable water access’ may be hampered by the above interpretation of Section 2 (d), where 
(would-be) users are unable to pay for the water they need.  
The normative significance of the NWA can be seen most clearly by the Act’s reframing of 
water as ‘a natural resource that belongs to all people’.462 This stands in stark contrast to the 
previous Water Act (1956), which differentiated between private and public water. The 
practical application of this paradigm shift is articulated in Section 3, which provides for ‘public 
trusteeship of the nation’s water resources’.463 The clear intention of the legislature here is that 
water resources belong to all people. According to Pienaar & van der Schyff, reference to 
public trusteeship here allows the doctrine of public trust to be used: 
‘as the legal tool that encapsulates the state’s fiduciary responsibility towards its people and 
bridges the gap between the Roman-Dutch based property concept and the notion that water as 
a natural resource belongs to all people’.464 
The public trust doctrine represents a novel category in South African law, allowing property 
subject to the doctrine (including water in this case) to be neither private, nor State-owned. 
Rather the property title is vested in the State as trustee, with the nation (all people) as 
beneficiary.
465
Clearly such a proprietary model lends itself well to the constitutional provision 
that everyone is entitled to access to sufficient water. However, the statistics offered at the 
beginning of this chapter remind us that this provision is still not a reality for ‘all people’. The 
model also represents a challenge to a traditional concept of property as the object of a 
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relationship between persons and things, to which ownership is paramount.
466
 As such, van der 
Walt argues that public trusteeship acknowledges that ‘property has a public, civic or 
“proprietary” aspect to it that transcends individual economic interests and that involves 
interdependency and the common obligations that result from it’.467 As such the use of Public 
Trust in the NWA illustrates a broader trend within the new constitutional settlement, shifting 
from ‘ownership’, to ‘rights in property’.468 
Van der Walt’s emphasis on interdependency and common obligations echoes more in-depth 
discussion in Chapter Five regarding commons forms of water governance. But it is worth 
noting here that despite the apparent shift from ownership, towards rights in property, that 
public trusteeship in the NWA suggests, the continued individualistic articulation of rights, 
including the Constitutional right to water, seems ill-suited to foster modes of governance that 
reflect people’s interconnectness and interreliance, as opposed to their independence and 
atomisation.  
The confluence of the WSA and NWA illustrates the importance of considering the socio-
economic right to water within an environmental context that recognises and responds to 
competing claims for scarce water resources (including domestic, industrial, human, non-
human, present and future). Indeed, the NWA has been described as ‘the ecological 
grundnorm to facilitate access to water’469, setting the parameters within which sufficient water 
can be realised. However, the Constitution makes no mention of prioritising either the right of 
access to sufficient water above the ‘environment right’ or visa-versa. Similarly the NWA 
receives no explicit authority above that of the WSA. Therefore there is no legislative 
justification for limiting the social aspect of the right to water within the constraints of the NWA 
without acknowledging a corresponding need to view ecological priorities in light of the 
Constitutional obligation to provide access to sufficient water to every citizen.  The differing 
emphases of these two Acts should not encourage incompatible agendas regarding water 
resources and water services. The WSA and the NWA must be read in conjunction, with the 
aim of facilitating access to sufficient water for all within the context of present and future 
ecological sustainability
470
. The imperative of providing sufficient water to citizens now, provides 
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a pragmatic framework within which ecological aspects of (inter alia) sustainability, 
conservation, and biological diversity must be addressed
471
. 
At a more practical level, the NWA also defines types of water use,
472
 sets out a hierarchy of 
water management institutions, and establishes that the Department of Water Affairs (DWA), 
formerly the Department for Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF), is responsible for all aspects 
of the Act’s implementation. Provision is made to establish Catchment Management Agencies 
(CMAs) to development strategic plans to meet the NWA objectives in each Water 
Management Area (WMA).
473
 However, it must be noted that since beginning operations, there 
have been significant concerns raised about the functioning and competence of CMAs, which 
must be addressed if NWA objectives are to be reliably met.
474
 
Together, the constitutional right of access to sufficient water and its main promulgating 
legislation (WSA and NWA) have framed the ANC’s goal of realising access to sufficient water 
as an individual right. This right should be progressively realised, according to the State’s 
available resources and subject to certain qualifications. Measures to ensure economic 
imperatives, social development and environmental protection are included in these 
instruments and recourse to restitution is available where individual rights are violated 
unreasonably. Ultimately lack of fulfilment of the right to water, and of socio-economic rights 
generally, may be pursued through litigation. The following chapter will analyse examples of 
such litigation in action, and the ways in which the Courts have adjudicated on these rights. 
 
3.4 Wider factors influencing the changing shape of water governance in South Africa 
As the above brief history of water governance in South Africa explains, the formal transition to 
majority rule began in 1990. At precisely this time, internationally, economic orthodoxy was 
coalescing around neo-liberal approaches to resource allocation that prioritised privatisation 
and reliance on market forces.
475
 Broadly, such approaches are summarised by the term 
‘globalisation’.476 Nowhere was this more obvious than in the significant shifts that occurred in 
                                                          
471
 NWA, Section 2. 
472
 Section 21 NWA. 
473
 <http://www.inkomaticma.co.za> (Last accessed 27 July 2016). 
474
 B Schreiner & B van Koppen ‘Catchment Management Agencies for poverty eradication in South Africa’ (2002) 
27/11-22 Journal of the Physics and Chemistry of the Earth 969-976. 
475
 JE Stiglitz ‘The Post Washington Consensus Consensus’ (The Initiative for Policy Dialogue Working Paper, 
2004) 1. See Chapter One, 1.5.5 for further discussion. 
476
 JA Scholte ‘What is Globalization? The definitional issue – again’ (2002) 109/02 Centre for the Study of 
Globalisation and Regionalisation 15. 
107 
 
the water sector over the last two decades.
477
 These shifts include the huge increase in the 
privatisation of water services, including by foreign private companies.
478
 In 2015, ten per cent of 
consumers world-wide received water from private companies.
479
 But the influences of 
globalisation, and of neo-liberal economic orthodoxy were not limited to the private sector. In 
many jurisdictions, water service provision that remained in the public sector (nationally or 
municipally administered) became subject to commercialisation. 
 3.4.1 Commercialisation 
Commercialisation of a municipal service occurs when the service is delivered according to 
rules and principles normally reserved for private commercial markets.
480
 Chief among these is 
the principle of commodification, whereby a resource, hitherto seen as a necessity or a public 
good, is recast as an asset to be allocated according to a consumer’s willingness and ability to 
pay for it.
481
 
The commercialisation of a municipal service like water (and the corresponding 
commodification of water) does not necessarily require that water services are provided by the 
private sector. What it does require is that all actors involved in the service provision operate 
with a private-sector (market-oriented) logic. Therefore a combination of national and 
provincial legislation, municipalities, private companies and public-private partnerships can all 
contribute to a commercialised water service. Indeed, a commercialised water service, treating 
water principally as a commodity, need not have any private sector involvement. But such a 
combination of public (national, provincial and municipal) and private actors is what can be 
seen emerging in South Africa from the mid 1990s.
482
 From this point onwards cost-recovery 
became imperative for water services at Local Government level. In 1994 a DWAF water and 
sanitation White Paper stipulated that ‘where poor communities are not able to afford basic 
services, government may subsidize the cost of construction and basic minimum services but 
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not the operating, maintenance or replacement costs’.483 Such an approach would seem to be in 
direct conflict with the recognition of water, within the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP), ‘as a public good whose commodification would inherently discriminate 
against the majority poor’, which was adopted in the same year (1994).484 Indeed it is precisely 
this conflict, between the concept of water as a public good, and as an economic good (or 
commodity) that lies at the heart of the problem of realising access to sufficient water within a 
water-stressed country, and a globalised, capitalist economy. Yet commercialisation of water 
services, and the promotion of a water-as-commodity paradigm continue to be embraced.  
While it is certainly possible to commercialise water services without privatising them, private 
multinational companies have been involved in water service provision in South Africa (if not to 
as great a degree as elsewhere). For instance, in 2001 the French water management company 
GDF Suez was awarded a five-year contract for water services in Johannesburg. But publically 
owned corporations, run along commercial lines, have become the typical modus operandi for 
commercialised water services across the country.
485
 
The general pervading orthodoxy that encouraged moves towards commercialisation, had a 
significant influence on the emerging shape of post-apartheid South Africa. As Klein describes, 
after the release of Nelson Mandela, the negotiations between the NP and the ANC towards a 
transition to majority rule, were conducted on two parallel tracks: one regarding the political 
settlement, the other regarding the economic transition.
486
 While much of the attention focused 
on De Klerk and Mandela’s political summits, crucial negotiations around nationalisation of 
mineral resources, the status of the Central Bank, debt repayments, market restructuring and 
general macro-economic policy, were largely conducted away from public or media scrutiny.
487
   
The economic negotiations were presented as ‘technical’ and ‘administrative’, in contrast to the 
more explicitly normative questions around the shape of a new political settlement (including 
for instance whether the country should become a federation, and whether minority parties 
should have veto powers). The effect of this ‘technocratisation’ of economic concerns was to 
embed neo-liberal logic into the so-called administrative decisions that paved the way for how 
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resources (including water) would be governed in the new South Africa. Arguably the 
separation of political and economic considerations at this crucial point in the country’s history 
has damaged the government’s ability to pursue transformative policies to adequately address 
the legacy of vast inequality and poverty. According to Snyman, it was as if the ANC were ‘given 
the keys to the house, but not the combination to the safe’.488  
The impact of this on post-apartheid water governance was that key legislation drafted after 
1994 reflected the imperative of commercialisation. Consequently, alongside efforts towards 
achieving greater redistribution and equity, moves towards full cost recovery of water services 
can be seen. The NWA was drafted after a wide consultation exercise, which sought 
international advice on the ‘state of the art’ for water governance. By the early 1990s there was 
considerable consensus from states, NGOs and water sector professionals, around the efficacy 
of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) as an appropriate development tool, the 
influence of which is visible in the NWA.
 489
   
3.4.2 Integrated Water Resources Management 
The central conceptual theme of IWRM is that water resources are finite and interdependent.
490
 
First articulated through the Dublin Principles, IWRM contains four guiding principles, which 
promote a holistic approach to hydrological management, emphasising ecological, economic 
and social aspects.
491
 Principle No. 4 is particularly notable, as it reflects the emphasis on 
commercialisation of water services discussed above, while also affirming that access to water is 
a right: 
‘Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognised as an 
economic good. Within this principle it is vital to recognise first the basic right of all human 
beings to have access to clean water and sanitation at an affordable price…’492 
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The inspiration that IWRM has been to water governance in South Africa since 1994 can be 
summarised by the above principle.  The declaration of a constitutional right to water was an 
important response to the colonial and apartheid legacy of inequitable access to water, while 
affirming the economic value of water reflected the zeitgeist of commercialisation and 
commodification in an increasingly globalised world. But the compatibility, or otherwise of an 
individual right of access to sufficient water, with the concept of water as a commodity, remains 
a subject of controversy (as discussed in more detail in Chapter Four). 
More recently, IWRM has been criticised for lacking specific objectives, and questions have 
been asked as to whether its emphasis on all relevant factors should remain procedural, or 
extend towards a more substantive agenda,
493
 and whether IWRM is sufficiently sensitive to the 
priorities and context of developing states.
494
 Partly in response to such concerns, in 2013 the 
DWA issued its Second National Water Resource Strategy (NWRS2), which introduced the 
concept of developmental water management (DWM) as the central guiding principle for water 
governance, rather than IWRM. DWM, it explains: 
‘reflects and builds upon [IWRM] principles of equity, environmental sustainability and 
efficiency that underpin the National Water Policy and National Water Act… within the context 
of a developmental state’.495 
According to van Koppen & Schreiner, one important consequence of this conceptual shift is to 
restore ‘the vital importance of the state, unlike the tendency in IWRM to put a great deal of 
faith in the corporate sector and reduce state capacity and influence’.496 More specifically, 
diverging from IWRM, the NWRS2 rejects water management as an end in itself. Instead, it is 
reinterpreted as subject to the broader developmental goals of  ‘equitable, redistributive and 
broad-based social and economic development’.497 As such, the NWRS2 represents an 
opportunity to rebalance post-1994 water governance between the priorities of equity, and 
commercial imperatives. 
The NWA requires the periodic drafting and review of a National Water Resource Strategy. 
The NWRS2 is the latest manifestation of this. NWRS2 is a statutory instrument with the role 
                                                          
493
 B Mitchell ‘Integrated water resources management, institutional arrangements, and land use planning’ (2005) 
37 Environment and Planning 1335-1352. 
494
 B van Koppen & B Shreiner ‘Moving beyond integrated water resource management: developmental water 
management in South Africa’ (2014) International Journal of Water Resources Development 1-16, 1. 
495
 Department of Water Affairs. Republic of South Africa (2013). National water resource strategy second edition: 
Water for an equitable and sustainable future. Pretoria. 
496
 B van Koppen & B Shreiner ‘Moving beyond integrated water resource management: developmental water 
management in South Africa’ (2014) International Journal of Water Resources Development 1-16, 2. 
497
 Ibid at 1. 
111 
 
of operationalizing the NWA. It is binding on all authorities and institutions implementing the 
NWA.
498
 Because of this, the priorities and outstanding challenges identified in the NWRS2 are 
important to note, because they provide specific detail, lacking in the NWA, as well as revealing 
how approaches to water governance, even since 1994, have developed.  
Outstanding challenges identified in the NWRS2 include achieving water conservation and 
demand management targets, water allocation reform to redress poverty and inequality, and the 
decentralisation of water resources management.
499
 
The first National Water Resource Strategy in 2004 (NWRS1) details the objective of the 
pricing strategy (as per Section 56 NWA) as follows:   
‘The objective of the pricing strategy is to contribute to achieving equity and sustainability in 
water matters by promoting financial sustainability and economic efficiency in water use. One 
objective is to ensure that the real financial costs of managing water resources and supplying 
water, including the cost of capital, are recovered from users. Provisions are, however, made for 
a range of subsidies for water users from historically disadvantaged groups to promote equitable 
access to the use of water resources.’500  
The NWRS2 is perhaps less explicit about the importance of cost recovery. Instead, it focuses 
primarily on the financial challenges to the water sector if it is to meet the required demands for 
new and refurbished infrastructure. Faced with these challenges, the NWRS2 outlines the 
following response: 
‘While a portion of the required investment will be provided by the public sector, the private 
sector will have to contribute substantially. The public sector alone will not have sufficient funds 
to enable full value chain financial management in the sector.’501 
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But the NWRS2 does also acknowledge that municipalities are not recovering all of their costs 
from their customers, and water boards are thus not recovering all of their costs from these 
municipalities. Therefore the aim of cost recovery remains. But how this aim coexists with the 
on-going challenge to redress poverty and inequality is not clear. The following extracts from 
interviews conducted by the author illustrate the enduring challenge of securing access to 
sufficient water, when people lack the ability to pay for it: 
 ‘We get water from a standpipe, here. I used to get it to my house, but they [Durban 
Municipality] sawed it off. I don’t know who supplies [the water]. I don’t care, as long as we’ve got 
enough… The boys came to connect it again, but it’s not worth it. So I just queue up… Sometimes 
no water comes through. But most of the time you get enough. But it takes a long time and I have 
to make two journeys if I want two buckets [20 litres each] and there are others waiting’502 
------ 
‘Sometimes I can’t go to the standpipe so I hope I’ve got enough water left from yesterday. If 
there’s not much left I cook mieles [corn] or make tea, but don’t sluice the toilet until the next 
day. I’ve got to eat first.’
503
 
------ 
‘Prepaid meters are the problem. The water is on and off. If you haven’t paid you don’t get any. 
Nothing.’504 
 
3.5 Chapter summary and concluding comments 
The grave inequalities, segregation and ingrained discrimination that characterised white 
political and economic power in the country since 1652 are reflected in the ways that water has 
been governed. Understandably, since 1994 significant attempts have been made to begin to 
redress inequitable water access, including the adoption of a novel, and explicit Constitutional 
right to water. While notable changes in the proprietary status of water have accompanied this 
right to water, the right has two weaknesses in particular. First, it is qualified (to be progressively 
fulfilled, subject to available resources). Second, it is expressed in individual terms (each 
individual has a right to water). As the next chapter explores, both of these aspects of the right 
to water have seriously affected the extent to which the Courts have applied the right, and 
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therefore, the extent to which the right can help realise the transformational goal of securing 
access to sufficient water for everyone. Furthermore, arguably, other (potentially competing) 
aims for water governance (namely cost recovery, and the inclusion of the private sector) are 
impacting on the efficacy of the right to water as a transformational tool. 
Archbishop Tutu’s warning (quoted at the beginning of this chapter) reminds us that without 
significant advances in people’s living standards, for which access to water is paramount, the 
seismic political transition that South Africa has undergone, will count for little. Because of this 
it has been imperative to scrutinise how and why water governance has been reconfigured since 
1994, and to expose the factors that have influenced this reconfiguration. Affirming a 
constitutional right to water, and introducing new normative understandings of water in relation 
to the public trust doctrine, can be seen as deliberate and bold attempts to remedy past water 
injustices. But general acceptance of a commercialised approach to water services may 
represent an insidious development, which ultimately inhibits the aim of achieving equitable 
access to water. Indeed, the spectre of commercialisation is visible behind some of the seminal 
decisions of the Constitutional Court, considered in the next chapter. 
Charting the history of water governance in South Africa has allowed connections to be made 
between general developments in the country’s economic, political, social and legal spheres, 
and specific reconfigurations in water law and water access. In particular, economic demands, 
first for land, then for labour, have clearly influenced water governance (as well as other areas of 
law) at key historical points. Undoubtedly, the pressures of international economic sanctions 
(and of international capitalism generally) were also a significant catalyst for the political 
transition to majority rule. Furthermore, the changes to water governance post-1994 reflect the 
emerging international consensus around the commercialisation of the water sector. The 
Marxian insight that the superstructure (including a nation’s political, legal and cultural 
institutions and norms) is determined by the demands of the economy, is useful here, in order 
to understand the potentially determining effect that economic exigencies have on other 
institutional and relational configurations. 
In the preface to ‘A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’, Marx writes:  
‘In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable 
and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of 
development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production 
constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and 
political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The 
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mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in 
general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, 
their social being that determines their consciousness.’505 
Such an analysis is applied by Saul & Bond in order to explain how ‘racial capitalism’506 (as 
expressed through the formal structures of apartheid) thrived in the 1960s and 70s, but 
disintegrated in the 1980s and ‘90s. Despite instances of international condemnation, 
particularly regarding the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, apartheid created the conditions for a 
decade of uninterrupted economic boom, with growth rates between six and eight per cent per 
annum. Mining and the mineral sector was the principal growth industry, supplying a buoyant 
international market. The profitability of the mineral sector was greatly assisted by the 
maintenance of low wages for black workers, and by the suppression of organised opposition 
(the ANC, Communist Party, and PAC were all banned in 1960
507
). In short, during this time 
‘the alliance between racism and capitalism still held’.508 By the 1980s the importance of the 
mineral sector was beginning to decline. At the same time, a rapidly changing capitalist system 
(emerging in the form of globalisation) began to require greater skilled labour, as well as a wider 
consumer market. In the long term, neither of these would prove compatible with the ‘super-
exploitation’509 of the black population. So the slow demise of apartheid can be attributed, at 
least in part, to changes in the relations of production, which globalisation has heralded.  
However, we should be wary of reducing such an analysis of the development of water 
governance in South Africa to a simplistic view of economic determinism, which ignores the 
myriad other factors at play. Political aims (micro-political, through to geo-political), 
theological/mythological narratives, eugenics, immigration, industrialisation, and urbanisation 
can all be identified in the historical developments outlined above. While some of these are 
clearly influenced by economic demands, the connection between others of these and the 
economy is more tenuous. Indeed, the notion of determination, and more forcefully, of 
determinism, come from theological ideas of predestination, and fate that minimize the role of 
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human agency.
510
 In applying such notions, the very human story of this period of history (and 
of any other) risks being lost to an overly didactic account of the results of the demands of the 
economy over time. Indeed, while emphasising the close relations between economic needs 
and socio-political structures, Saul & Bond ultimately conclude that ‘the renewed political 
challenge from the dominated black population would prove to be the system’s real Achilles 
heel’.511 
Regarding the formal transition to majority rule, and the concurrent drafting of a new 
Constitution, Barendt’s reflections on ‘constitutionalism’ are pertinent. For Barendt the central 
insight that constitutionalism offers is that: 
‘the concentration of power in the hands of any institution of government is dangerous and that 
it should so far as practicable be dispersed’.512   
While generally this restates the importance of the separation of powers, in the context of the 
1996 South African Constitution this is particularly significant to appreciating the breadth of 
rights included therein.  
By explicitly including individual rights to water, food, housing, healthcare, education and social 
security, amongst others, the ANC (and more broadly CODESA) were signalling that such 
rights would no longer be subject to government power alone (and therefore, that exclusion of 
people from the necessities that these rights represent, would no longer be within the purview 
of the government alone). Rather, elevated to constitutional rights, within a hierarchy of laws, 
and thereby insulated from undue government interference, realisation of these rights would be 
pursued by the Constitutional Court, and they would therefore enjoy a greater measure of 
protection than if such rights had only been expressed through legislation (characterised by 
Ridley as ‘ordinary legislation’).513  
In this context, enshrining a right to water in the new Constitution can be seen to symbolise not 
just an attempt to move towards more equitable water governance, but also a faith in 
constitutionalism to drive social transformation. It is such a faith (and arguably the subsequent 
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loss of this faith) that is discernable in the seminal early case decisions of the Constitutional 
Court, considered below.  
Identifying changes to the ways in which water has been governed must not be allowed to 
obscure the continuity that these changes have ensured, until the advent of majority rule: 
namely the entrenchment of profound inequities through racial hierarchy, exploitation, and 
segregation. But it is also important to recognise recurring themes. The return of the concept of 
dominus fluminus, in modified form, within the public trust doctrine in the NWA, has 
encouraged the state to (re)engage with its role as custodian of water, in part through 
establishing CMAs, and most recently through the NWRS2.   
Moreover, where certain concepts have been resurrected for positive reasons, it raises the 
possibility that others could also be rediscovered and profitably applied. In particular, the 
Roman precept of water as res extra commercium, and African customary law’s rejection of 
water as private property could find themselves rearticulated (and reanimated) within a water-as-
commons paradigm (discussed in Chapter Five). 
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4 
Socio-economic rights in the 
Constitutional Court 
 
ZY: Because our whole jurisprudence is that quota is not the way you decide these things, we 
are not on minimum quotas. We are saying everybody must act reasonably and reasonableness 
depends on the circumstances, and the situation. We are for flexibility; we are not for 
mechanical determination. 
 
NC: No, but surely the notion of reasonableness becomes more complicated when it’s in 
relation to progressive realization, because I suggest what’s reasonable one day isn’t necessarily 
reasonable the next. 
 
ZY: Of course it does. And that is the beauty of the test. For me that’s not a problem. That is 
the wonder of it. 
Author’s interview with Justice Zak Yacoob514 
 
‘The Court had a historic opportunity to give meaningful, lived content to the right to water. It is 
to their, and our country’s, discredit that they have miserably failed’ 
Public Statement, Coalition Against Water Privatisation
515
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Transition to majority rule in 1994, and the concomitant creation of a new and wide-ranging 
Constitution, has been discussed in the previous chapter. Having stated that a right of access to 
sufficient water exists, and having considered why such a right is included in the Constitution, it 
is important to reflect on the ways that this right has been interpreted, applied and adjudicated 
on to-date, and what potential there may be for applying this right in the future. 
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It has already been established that the right of access to sufficient water is one component of a 
set of socio-economic rights, within a comprehensive Bill of Right, pertaining to civil, political, 
environmental, religious, economic, social and cultural aspects of life and of citizen-state 
interaction. It is asserted that adjudication on the right to water should not be analysed in 
isolation from adjudication on other Constitutional rights. Therefore, the principal purpose of 
this chapter is to analyse generally, how the rights within the new Constitution (focussing 
principally, but not exclusively, on the socio-economic rights) have been interpreted and 
applied by the Courts (most notably by the Constitutional Court), and what the consequences 
of such adjudication have been for the fulfilment of those Constitutional rights. In particular, 
appraising the court’s interactions with a spectrum of Constitutional rights, allows for a realistic 
evaluation of the (potential) effectiveness of the constitutional right to water, as a tool to realise 
access to sufficient water for everyone in the country. But, as would be expected, the Court’s 
adjudication on the right to water will be given specific attention. 
Furthermore, the central assumption of human rights lawyers – that designating a particular 
claim (to life, to privacy, or to water for instance) as a right strengthens the weight of such a 
claim, and thereby improves the chances of that claim being met – is challenged in light of the 
Court’s general approach to socio-economic rights adjudication to-date. 
 4.1.1 Chapter outline 
The chapter begins by considering different perspectives on the legitimate interpretative and 
adjudicative roles of the judiciary. While South African jurisprudence has developed a distinct 
perspective, theory and experience from other jurisdictions is also drawn upon here, in order to 
provide some theoretical foundations, on top of which can be placed the ensuing critique of the 
Constitutional Court’s judgments.  
Next, within the South African context, the chapter examines the relationship between the 
government and the judiciary, particularly regarding the public law principle of separation of 
powers, and a reimagined ethos of constitutionalism. The institution of the Constitutional Court 
is introduced, and a small number of seminal cases relating to civil and political rights, are 
analysed, before undertaking a detailed examination of the most important cases heard by the 
Court since 1997 that concern socio-economic rights, including the right of access to sufficient 
water. The aim of such a case examination is to identify and reflect upon the Court’s interaction 
with socio-economic rights in the period since the adoption of the new Constitution. In so 
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doing, it is argued that a more or less coherent jurisprudence can be identified (with important 
ramifications on attempts to build effective approaches to water governance).  
The practical limitations of this jurisprudential approach are then critiqued in light of the 
different perspectives on the legitimate role of the judiciary (identified at 4.2), and in relation to 
the expansive content of the Constitution’s socio-economic rights, as well as the serious and 
enduring need to address poverty in the country. It is argued that the Constitutional Court 
currently finds itself in a liminal space between an initial, strong impetus to effect substantial 
social transformation through the promulgation of socio-economic rights, and a more 
managerial role of affirming the progressive realisation of such rights only to the extent that 
constitutional deference, judicial restraint, and limited resources allow. The resulting critique of 
the legitimacy of the Court’s (allegedly) changing role, offers an original contribution to the 
literature on socio-economic rights and the Constitutional Court in South Africa, by arguing 
that the Court’s current role is necessarily located at the threshold between a naïve form of  
‘transformative constitutionalism’,516 and a more restrained, if constitutionally cogent ‘judicial 
managerialism’.517  
Read in such a way, the judgments of significant socio-economic rights cases can be 
reconsidered in ways that reveal the limits of rights-based conceptions of (water) governance, 
(referred to as the limits of ‘rights talk’) and the potential, and necessity, for new/old modes of 
governance to (re)emerge. This original conceptual lens is referred to as ‘liminal 
constitutionalism’.518  
For the sake of brevity, rights pertaining to social and economic entitlements, including the 
provision of basic material necessities, are referred to as ‘socio-economic rights’. This conforms 
to the usual designation in the wider literature and practitioners’ materials.519 Within the Bill of 
Rights,
520
 the Constitution protects the following socio-economic rights: right to a healthy 
environment;
521
 right of access to land and security of tenure;
522
 right to adequate housing and 
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protection against unlawful evictions and demolitions;
523
 rights of access to healthcare services, 
sufficient food and water, social security, including social assistance, as well as the right not to be 
refused emergency medical treatment;
524
 children’s rights to basic nutrition, shelter, basic 
healthcare services and social services;
525
 right to education;
526
 and prisoners’ rights to adequate 
accommodation, nutrition, reading materials and medical treatment.
527
 
4.2 The legitimate role of the judiciary 
While the connection between this section, and the right to water, may not be immediately 
obvious, the themes and theories arising from a general consideration of the legitimate role of 
the courts, will inform the case studies below, facilitating a more critical inquiry. 
The scrutinising of government action, and the interpretation of legislation, are two crucial 
functions of the judiciary, which are integral to the operation of public (or constitutional) law. In 
executing both functions, the judiciary must determine where the legitimate limits of each 
function lies, and which questions that are raised are appropriate or inappropriate for judicial 
resolution. In making such determinations the judiciary exercises ‘judicial restraint’.528   
That judges should exercise judicial restraint is not in question. Without a measure of restraint, 
the judiciary’s encroachment onto legislative or executive territory would become 
commonplace, and meaningful distinctions between the separate arms of the state would 
disappear. But it is the degree of restraint that should be exercised, and the reasons for this, that 
is the subject of recurrent contention, attracting a broad spectrum of opinion. For example, in 
the English case of Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department
529
 various models for a 
doctrine of judicial restraint were offered, including the acknowledgment of a margin of 
discretion on the part of the government (which echoes the ECtHR’s use of the ‘margin of 
appreciation’), due deference, the principle/policy distinction, and relative institutional 
competence (explained below). But such attempts to clarify a specific doctrine of judicial 
restraint have been rejected by some judges and jurists, for a variety of reasons. The eminent 
British judge, Lord Bingham advocated that the appropriate degree of restraint must be 
decided on in the context of each particular case. Moreover, this decision was part of:  
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‘the performance of the ordinary judicial task of weighing up competing considerations on each 
side and according appropriate weight to the judgment of a person with responsibility for a given 
subject matter and access to special sources of knowledge and advice’.530 
Rejection of a doctrinal approach, in favour of a ‘case-by-case’ view is not without its problems 
though. Without an established standard for judicial restraint, it is difficult to determine how 
much weight is appropriate to give to a person with ‘special sources of knowledge’ for instance. 
While Bingham may not have acknowledged the underlying set of considerations operating to 
determine the appropriate degree of restraint, such considerations will exist nevertheless.
531
 
In contrast, a priori models of judicial restraint provide a degree of predictability. They also 
make explicit the considerations that condition judicial restraint, rather than leaving observers 
to guess. Traditionally two main models for judicial restraint have been used, examples of 
which exist across common law jurisdictions.
532
 The first seeks to determine appropriate judicial 
restraint by recourse to the distinction between law and politics. This distinction clearly implies 
that law is the province of the Courts, while politics belongs to the legislature and executive. 
Therefore questions of law can legitimately be addressed by the judiciary. However, while the 
clarity of such a binary distinction may be attractive, it is sometimes far from simple to 
determine whether the instant question is a legal or a political one.
533
 
Similar problems are encountered when a distinction between principle and policy is used. 
This model implies that principles (as defined below) fall within the purview of the Courts, 
while the executive decides policies. Ronald Dworkin’s definition of both ‘policy’ and 
‘principle’ is extremely pertinent to the central focus of this chapter, and the overarching focus 
of the thesis: 
‘A ‘policy’ [is] that kind of standard that sets out a goal to be reached, generally an improvement 
in some economic, political or social feature of the community… A ‘principle’ [is] a standard 
that is to be observed, not because it will advance an economic, political, or social situation 
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seemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension 
of morality.’534 
The socio-economic rights within the South African Constitution, and the right of access to 
sufficient water in particular, reflect features of both policy and principle. The Constitutional 
requirement for progressive fulfilment echoes Dworkin’s reference to setting a goal to be 
reached through ‘improvement’, while the subject matter of the right to water clearly has 
economic, political and social features to it (as discussed in Chapter Three). But, as will be 
argued forcefully later in this chapter and in Chapter Five, the right to water also has a strong 
moral dimension, the fulfilment of which is a question of justice. Therefore it would not be a 
simple task to immediately define a question engaging the right to water, as either a matter of 
policy, or of principle. This illustrates the wider definitional problems encountered with this 
model. 
Each model can be criticised not just for the difficulties affecting its practical application, but 
also for its false pretence to objectivity: 
‘a belief in the capacity of judges to deduce objective and apolitical legal answers from abstract 
legal rules… without recourse to policy considerations.’535 
Such a questionable claim to objectivity in legal scholarship, is critiqued in Chapter Five, in 
relation to the need for more fluid and responsive forms of water governance. But limited here 
to discussion of the legitimate role of the judiciary, it has been observed that the pursuit of 
rational objectivity can create ‘mechanical jurisprudence’, whereby the consequences of judicial 
decisions are held as being of less importance than the decision’s ‘correctness’.536 This is 
perhaps an apt description of the judgment in Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg 
(discussed below). 
Responding to the problems associated with a wholesale rejection of a doctrinal approach to 
judicial restraint, as well to practical and normative weaknesses of more formalist models, 
detailed above, an ‘institutional approach’ to judicial restraint has been advocated. This 
approach asks questions about relative institutional competence: Essentially, which institution is 
the best among the available alternatives for resolving a given problem?
537
 Posing such a 
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question opens up what Lester & Pannick call a ‘discretionary area of judgment’.538 Arguably, 
within this area, judicial restraint can be exercised in more responsive ways than doctrinal 
prescription may allow for, without reverting to an entirely case-by-case approach. 
Mureinik has identified three key features of this institutional approach, which together might 
help plot the boundary of such a discretionary area of judgment.
539
 First, a ‘culture of 
justification’540 should encourage judges to take an expansive view of what is reviewable and 
justiciable. Second, significant weight should be given to views of other decision-makers. Third - 
acknowledging judicial concerns about trespassing beyond the limits of their institutional role - 
the degree of restraint shown by the judiciary should be explained with reference to relevant 
principles, in order to make explicit when and why restraint is required.
541
 
As will become apparent from the forthcoming case discussion, issues of judicial restraint (or 
judicial deference) in the South African context, continue to be raised in relation to separation 
of powers, to the distinction between law and politics, policy and principle. But an institutional 
approach to judicial restraint offers a useful perspective from which decisions can be more 
effectively analysed. The idea of ‘liminal constitutionalism’ (briefly introduced at 4.1, and 
elaborated on below) reflects some of the themes of an institutional approach to judicial 
restraint, tailored to the specific constitutional and judicial circumstances of South Africa. But 
first of all the Constitutional Court must be introduced, and the environment in which it 
operates must be explained. 
4.3  Establishing a new constitutional ethos in South Africa 
After the efforts of CODESA and the agreement of an interim Constitution, the final 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa was adopted on the 10
th
 December 1996. The 
signing event was carefully orchestrated to communicate that the ‘Rainbow Nation’ was 
deliberately leaving behind its troubled past, and embracing a new and better future. Standing 
in Sharpeville, Gauteng, at the site where, in 1960, police shot and killed 69 peaceful protestors, 
former President Mandela inaugurated this new constitutional chapter with the following words: 
‘Today we cross a critical threshold. Let us now, drawing from the unity, which we have forged, 
together grasp the opportunities and realise the vision enshrined in the Constitution. Let us give 
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practical recognition to the injustices of the past, by building a future based on equality and 
social justice…’542 
A commitment to the transformational role that the new Constitution should play is clearly 
apparent in Mandela’s exhortation.  It is also reflected in the Preamble to the Constitution 
itself, which recognizes the need to:  
‘Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice 
and fundamental human rights; [to] [L]ay the foundations for a democratic and open society in 
which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by 
law; [and to] [I]mprove the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person.’543 
Such faith in the transformative ethos of the Constitution - as the site where poverty and 
extreme inequality should be confronted - is firmly rooted in the notion of ‘transformative 
constitutionalism’, which in South Africa has a distinct human rights dimension to it.544 Indeed, 
it is essential to appreciate the importance ascribed to the Constitution, and to the 
Constitutional Court, within the collective psyche of the nation. Particularly in the early years of 
the democratic era, the Constitution and Court’s commitment to meaningful and significant 
socio-economic transformation was perceived to be central to the success of the new South 
Africa:  
‘The new constitution obliges us to strive to improve the quality of life of the people. In this 
sense our national consensus recognises that there is nothing else that can justify the existence of 
government but to redress the centuries of unspeakable privations, by striving to eliminate 
poverty, illiteracy, homelessness and disease…’545 
Put simply, the Constitution (with its accompanying Court) was heralded as integral to 
eradicating poverty and to reforming the experiences of the majority of the country’s 
disenfranchised population.
546
 Central to this transformed vision would be access to water and 
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sanitation, to health care and to housing, as evidenced by the judgments of the Constitutional 
Court considered below.  
 
4.4  Role and structure of the Constitutional Court 
The Constitutional Court is South Africa’s highest court for constitutional matters. It became 
operative in 1994, under the Interim Constitution.
547
 The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to 
constitutional matters, including decisions that relate to constitutional matters. In respect of all 
other matters, the Supreme Court of Appeal is the highest court, and is able to hear and decide 
appeals on any High Court decision.
548
 
The court structure is established in Chapter Eight of the 1996 Constitution, which states that 
all courts in the country are ‘independent, and subject only to the Constitution and the law, 
which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice’.549 Judicial 
independence is crucial to the legitimacy and impartiality of any court system, including that of 
a country’s Constitutional Court. It has been described by Chief Justice Larmer of the Supreme 
Court of Canada, as ‘the lifeblood of constitutionalism in democratic societies.’550To ensure 
such independence, Section 165 (3) states that ‘no person or organ of the state may interfere 
with the functioning of the courts’551, and Section 165 (4) requires organs of the state to assist 
and ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts, 
through legislative and other means.
552
  
The Constitutional Court is comprised of the Chief Justice of South Africa, the Deputy Chief 
Justice, and nine other judges.
553
 The President makes judicial appointments, from a shortlist of 
candidates. Candidates are recommended by the Judicial Service Commission, which ensures 
that they are sufficiently competent and appropriate for judicial office, and that the Judiciary 
reflects the country’s gender and racial composition.554 Judges are usually appointed to serve 
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twelve-year terms.
555
 Matters before the Constitutional Court must be heard by at least eight 
judges.
556
  
Section 167 (3) explains the role of the Court.
557
 Furthermore, Section 167 (4) confirms the 
Court’s exclusive jurisdiction regarding the powers and constitutional status of the branches of 
government.
558
 Regarding the role of the Court specifically in relation to the Constitution’s Bill 
of Rights, Section 39 (2) requires that ‘when interpreting any legislation, and when developing 
the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.’ This obligation is equally applicable to the 
Constitutional Court. Indeed, such is the importance of this obligation that the Constitutional 
Court has held itself to be ‘under a general duty to develop the common law when it deviates 
from the objectives of the country's Bill of Rights’.559  
4.4.1  Content and scope of the Bill of Rights 
As discussed in the previous chapter (at 3.3.2), Chapter Two of the Constitution, the Bill of 
Rights, contains a host of rights that encompass civil, political, economic, social, and cultural 
areas of life and activity. The State is obliged to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfill’ each of 
the rights in the Bill of Rights
560
, which requires variously negative and positive duties. The rights 
are to be realised progressively, within the available resources of the State.
561
 Yet socio-economic 
rights (including the right of access to sufficient water, housing, food, health care, amongst 
others) are qualified,
562
 albeit that the rights of children are less so.
563
 All rights may be limited 
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only in terms of the law of general application, to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.
564
 
International law must be taken into account and foreign law may be taken into account when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights
565
. So the interpretation and realisation of the rights contained 
within the Bill of Rights is a significant aspect of the Constitutional Court’s role. 
4.4.2  A new parliamentary model 
One of the biggest changes to the constitutional landscape of South Africa after 1994 was the 
shift from Parliamentary Sovereignty to the supremacy of the (interim, then the new) 
Constitution. To this end, Section 2 of the 1996 Constitution affirms the Constitution as the 
highest law in the country, binding upon everyone.
566
 As well as the inclusion of a 
comprehensive Bill of Rights, the 1996 Constitution provides for a new parliamentary model. 
Replacing the previous tricameral parliament, sanctioned under the 1983 Constitution,
567
 a 
bicameral model was adopted, consisting of a National Assembly, and Council of Provinces. 
This provides that provincial interests are represented alongside national ones, and that both 
chambers share legislative powers.
568
 Furthermore, this model provides for some separation of 
powers (though to a lesser extent than in other bicameral parliaments, including the United 
States Congress for instance).
569
  
Within this bicameral model, the ANC has remained the dominant party since first gaining 
power in 1994, retaining between 62.1% and 69.7% of seats in the National Assembly, over five 
election terms.
570
 The relevance of this to discussion of the role and structure of the 
Constitutional Court is twofold. First, the Constitution provides that constitutional amendments 
may be made with the support of two thirds of parliament. Therefore, the unrivalled 
dominance of one party could create the conditions necessary for significant amendments to be 
made at the behest of only that party. Second, many commentators have expressed concern for 
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the fragility of South Africa’s democracy, in the face of ANC dominance and intransigence.571 It 
is therefore important to consider how the ANC-dominated executive and parliament have 
related to the Constitutional Court. 
4.5  The relationship between the Executive, the Legislature, and the Constitutional Court 
Because the ANC has remained in power since 1994, consistently commanding a large majority 
in Parliament, it is the relationship between the government (the executive, under the 
leadership of the President), and the Constitutional Court, that is of particular interest here. 
While opposition parties within Parliament have been instrumental in directing the Court’s 
attention towards instances of government conduct, the ability of parties other than the ANC to 
shape legislation is limited, due to the clear majority that the ANC government holds.  
Since the Constitutional Court began to operate in 1994, there have been four Presidents: 
Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Kgaleme Motlanthe, and Jacob Zuma. Motlanthe’s brief 
presidency (from September 2008 to May 2009) was occasioned by Mbeki’s resignation. Once 
the ANC won the 2009 general election, Zuma replaced Motlanthe as the country’s President, 
having already won presidency of the ANC party. The following section is therefore split in to 
three subsections, in order to allow consideration of the Constitutional Court’s relationship with 
the government under each of the Presidents (excluding Motlanthe). 
 4.5.1 Mandela 
From its inception the Constitutional Court sought to confirm its role as an independent arbiter 
of the Constitution, insulated from the demands of the public and government. The first case 
heard by the Court is instructive in this regard. S v Makwanyane 1995
572
 considered the 
sentence of execution for convicted murderers.
573
 The case required the Court to decide 
whether capital punishment was consistent with the right to life, and the right to human dignity, 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights.
574
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The position of the State regarding this question was complex. Capital punishment had not 
been settled during the constitutional negotiations, although the then President Mandela and 
other senior ANC figures were in favour of abolishing it.
575
 The South African government’s 
counsel in the case, George Bizos, conceded that the death penalty should be deemed 
unconstitutional.
576
   However, the State’s interest in the case was represented not by Bizos, but 
by the Attorney General of the Witswatersrand (subsequently this office would be renamed as 
the Director of Public Prosecutions), who argued, independently, to retain the option of capital 
punishment for certain situations: 
‘The death sentence meets the sentencing requirements for extreme cases of murder more 
effectively than any other sentence can do. It has a greater deterrent effect than life 
imprisonment; it ensures that the worst murderers will not endanger the lives of prisoners and 
warders who would be at risk if the "worst of the murderers" were to be imprisoned and not 
executed; and it also meets the need for retribution which is demanded by society as a response 
to the high level of crime. In the circumstances presently prevailing in the country, it is therefore 
a necessary component of the criminal justice system.’577 
Furthermore, the Attorney General asserted that because the issue of capital punishment had 
not been addressed in the interim Constitution, this implied that the issue should be decided 
on by Parliament (and by implication, not by the Court). It was widely agreed that the Attorney 
General’s position closely reflected the majority public opinion in the country.578 Chaskalson P, 
speaking for all eleven sitting judges, acknowledged this. However, he asserted the proper role 
of the Court as follows: 
‘The question before us, however, is not what the majority of South Africans believe a proper 
sentence for murder should be. It is whether the Constitution allows the sentence.’579 
Chaskalson P argued that in light of the recent substitution of Parliamentary Sovereignty in 
favour of Constitutional supremacy, to hold that public opinion should be allowed to determine 
the question of the legality of the death penalty would represent a de facto return to 
Parliamentary Sovereignty, where the protection of people’s rights is left once again to a 
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mandate from the public.
580
 He then concluded that the death penalty was unconstitutional, and 
to be outlawed accordingly. 
‘[T]he death sentence destroys life, which is protected without reservation under section 9 of 
our Constitution, it annihilates human dignity which is protected under section 10, elements of 
arbitrariness are present in its enforcement and it is irremediable [...]. I am satisfied that in the 
context of our Constitution the death penalty is indeed a cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishment’581 
Section 277(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, which provided for the death 
penalty, was ruled to be invalid, along with any similar provisions in force in South Africa. The 
court also forbade the government from executing any prisoners already sentenced to death, 
requiring them to remain in custody until new sentences were imposed.
582  
In his concurring judgment, Ackerman J emphasised the Court’s commitment to the principle 
of constitutionalism as a bulwark against arbitrary decisions or populist sentiment:  
‘We have moved from a past characterised by much which was arbitrary and unequal in the 
operation of the law to a present and a future in a constitutional state where state action must be 
such that it is capable of being analysed and justified rationally. The idea of the constitutional 
state presupposes a system whose operation can be rationally tested against or in terms of the 
law. Arbitrariness, by its very nature, is dissonant with these core concepts of our new 
constitutional order. Neither arbitrary action nor laws or rules which are inherently arbitrary or 
must lead to arbitrary application can, in any real sense, be tested against the precepts or 
principles of the Constitution.’583 
The fact that by this point in time the ANC was largely in favour of the abolition of capital 
punishment suggests that the Constitutional Court’s judgment here was politically safe to the 
extent that despite running contrary to public opinion, it was in keeping with the (informal) 
position of the ruling party. As such, the case does not represent a direct confrontation with 
government. But given the unpopularity of the Court’s decision (at the time of the case almost 
75% of South Africans supported the retention of the death penalty
584) and the Court’s strong 
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insistence on the guiding principle of constitutionalism, it did set a precedent for its own 
independence, as well as for a progressive approach to constitutional interpretation:
585
 attributes 
that have proved to be less politically palatable in subsequent judgments. The case is also 
noteworthy for its thoughtful consideration of universal values and the principle of Ubuntu, 
which are returned to in Chapter Six. 
For Roux, Makwanyane also evinces a keen self-awareness of the Court’s need to navigate 
between public popularity (including respect for the general moral zeitgeist), and its 
requirement to coexist with government (in order to ensure its own longevity). As such, the 
judgment can be seen to constitute a ‘largely successful exercise in judicial politics’.586 The 
Court’s alleged willingness to strike such a balance (however unconsciously) will be returned to 
in relation to some of the socio-economic rights cases considered below.  
 4.5.2 Mbeki 
A second notable case regarding the Constitutional Court’s relationship with government and 
Parliament is Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2005.
587
 The case raised the question of 
whether the common law definition of marriage – as between one man and one woman588 – was 
constitutional. It was argued that this definition violated the rights respectively, to equality, 
dignity, and privacy,
589
 to the extent that it prevented same-sex couples from being able to marry, 
and to enjoy the same benefits and status as heterosexual couples. Following the principle 
established in Makwanyane (that the operative question must be whether the Constitution has 
been violated in relation to the instant case, not whether public opinion would be offended), the 
Court was satisfied that the common law definition of marriage was incompatible with the 
express provisions for equality in the Constitution. Section 9, subsections (2) and (3) are 
particularly relevant here, defining the right and its corresponding obligations upon the State as 
follows: 
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the 
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, 
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or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. 
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.
590
  
Here, the ground of sexual orientation is explicitly included in subsection (3) regarding 
protection from unfair discrimination by the State. The Court’s conclusion thus far is 
unsurprising. Summarising the constitutionally appropriate application of equality to the issue 
of marriage, Sachs J stated that: 
Equality means equal concern and respect across difference. It does not presuppose the 
elimination or suppression of difference. Respect for human rights requires the affirmation of 
self, not the denial of self. Equality therefore does not imply a levelling or homogenisation of 
behaviour or extolling one form as supreme, and another as inferior, but an acknowledgement 
and acceptance of difference. At the very least, it affirms that difference should not be the basis 
for exclusion, marginalisation and stigma. At best, it celebrates the vitality that difference brings 
to any society.
591
 
However, it is what the Court ordered to be done in response to its conclusion that is 
noteworthy about this case in relation to the current discussion. Therefore it is the Court’s so-
called ‘remedial jurisprudence’592 that is now considered. In particular, it is the varying 
approaches to the relative importance of Separation of Powers, reflected in the minority and 
majority judgments in Fourie that are most pertinent to the socio-economic rights cases 
discussed below, which are to be reflected on in preparation for a thoroughly contextualised 
analysis of the Court’s adjudication on the right to water.   
As in the case of Makwanyane, here the Court’s decision regarding the unconstitutionality of 
the relevant legislation was unpopular among the public in general, which included an 
organised and vocal opposition to same-sex marriage.
593
 However, this time the ANC was 
ambivalent at best, on the issue of marriage equality. Indeed, shortly before the Fourie 
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judgment, the then Deputy President, Jacob Zuma amongst other senior ANC members, had 
expressed opposition to same sex marriage.
594
 
Rather than striking down the unconstitutional section of the relevant legislation (here Section 
30(1) of the Marriage Act 1961
595
), as was the approach in Makwanyane, the order of the 
Constitutional Court included that: 
‘[t]he common law definition of marriage is declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution 
and invalid to the extent that it does not permit same-sex couples to enjoy the status and the 
benefits coupled with responsibilities it accords to heterosexual couples… The declaration of 
invalidity is suspended for twelve months from the date of this judgment to allow Parliament to 
correct the defect.’596 
Furthermore,  
‘[I]f Parliament fails to cure the defect within twelve months, the words “or spouse” will 
automatically be read into section 30(1) of the Marriage Act. In this event the Marriage Act will, 
without more, become the legal vehicle to enable same couples to achieve the status and 
benefits coupled with responsibilities which it presently makes available to heterosexual 
couples.’597 
Clearly the Constitutional Court was aware of the risks involved in choosing this remedial 
action, and deferring to Parliament, in favour of the more direct approach in Makwanyane: 
‘Two equally untenable consequences need to be avoided. The one is that the common law and 
section 30(1) of the Marriage Act cease to have legal effect. The other unacceptable outcome is 
that the applicants end up with a declaration that makes it clear that they are being denied their 
constitutional rights, but with no legal means of giving meaningful effect to the declaration; after 
three years of litigation Ms Fourie and Ms Bonthuys will have won their case, but be no better 
off in practice.’ 
In pre-empting Parliament’s possible failure to act, by directing the rephrasing of the relevant 
section of the Marriage Act after 12 months, the Court could be fairly certain that neither of the 
above eventualities would arise. However, it is worth considering in more detail the Court’s 
sensitivity to the second consequence listed above, namely that the claimants’ remedy must 
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bring about practical change. That this represents the most basic requirement of transformative 
constitutionalism is clear: Applying the provisions of the Constitution ‘in action’ must lead to 
positive, substantive change.
598
 But the Court’s concern that the transformative aspect of its 
judgment may be lost in the face of parliamentary inaction is something that will be reflected on 
in more depth below, particularly in relation to the dissonant reality for many, of having a 
constitutional right to water, and simultaneously not having access to sufficient water. Sachs J’s 
concerns, quoted above, clearly indicate that the Court is not ignorant of the deeply troubling 
nature of such disconnection between what could be described as ‘rights as declared, and right 
as lived’. 
Notwithstanding this, the approach in Fourie (to allow Parliament to correct the defect 
identified in the relevant Act, in a way of its choosing), was variously defended as compatible 
with the doctrine of Separation of Powers, and criticised by the minority judgment as unduly 
deferent. Despite the difference of opinion, the majority judgment could be understood as 
reflecting an ‘institutional approach’ to judicial restraint: the Court taking an expansive view of 
what is reviewable and justiciable, while affording significant weight to the views of Parliament as 
the other decision-maker, and doing so explicitly. It could also be interpreted in light of the 
distinction between principle and policy: Ensuring that the principle of marriage equality 
(characterised as a matter of justice or fairness) is protected, while deferring to the legislature 
regarding questions of policy (see discussion at 4.2). 
 
The term  ‘separation of powers’ or ‘trias politica’ was coined by Charles-Louis de Secondat, 
baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, in the 18th century, and first expressed in his book The 
Spirit of the Laws.
599
 The doctrine provides that the political power of the State is divided into 
legislative, executive and judicial branches, which must be separate and act independently. The 
aim of this is to prevent the concentration of power and thereby, to promote liberty and 
accountability.
600
 In the context of the South African state, the three arms of the State are 
defined as Parliament (legislature), President and Executive, and the Judiciary. The scope and 
remit of each is detailed in chapters Four, Five, and Eight respectively of the 1996 Constitution. 
Section 44 asserts that the passing and amending of legislation is within the purview of 
Parliament. 
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Sachs J, giving judgment for the majority in Fourie, sought to respect and maintain this 
separation of powers between the role of the Court, as interpreter of the Constitution, and 
Parliament as the author of legislation, by preserving Parliament’s legislative role regarding the 
issue of marriage: 
‘This judgment serves to vindicate the rights of the applicants by declaring the manner in which 
the law at present fails to meet their equality claims. At the same time, it is my view that it would 
best serve those equality claims by respecting the separation of powers and giving Parliament an 
opportunity to deal appropriately with the matter. In this respect it is necessary to bear in mind 
that there are different ways in which the legislature could legitimately deal with the gap that 
exists in the law.’601 
In so-doing, according to Roux, the Court’s order communicated to Parliament, and to the 
public ‘we are confident that when the people’s representatives reflect upon this matter in 
Parliament, armed with the guidance we have given them, they will arrive at the position 
required by constitutional principle’.602 But such confidence in, and deference towards 
Parliament’s legislative role was not held unanimously. By contrast, Justice O’Regan explains: 
‘The doctrine of Separation of Powers is an important one in our Constitution but I cannot see 
that it can be used to avoid the obligation of a court to provide appropriate relief that is just and 
equitable to litigants who successfully raise a constitutional complaint.’603 
Rather, for O’Regan, the principal issue is whether the Constitution has been violated. If the 
Court has satisfied itself that this is the case, then it is duty-bound to remedy the violation. 
Consideration of Separation of Powers is subordinate to this duty, not because the Court has 
concluded such, but because the Constitution requires it: 
‘It would have been desirable if the unconstitutional situation identified in this matter had been 
resolved by Parliament without litigation. The corollary of this proposition, however, is not that 
this Court should not come to the relief of successful litigants, simply because an Act of 
Parliament conferring the right to marry on gays and lesbians might be thought to carry greater 
democratic legitimacy than an order of this Court. The power and duty to protect constitutional 
rights is conferred upon the courts and courts should not shrink from that duty.’604  
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Despite O’Regan’s dissent, the Court’s order stopped short of providing immediate relief for 
the applicants. But the following year, Parliament enacted the Civil Union Act 2006
605
 ‘to 
regulate the solemnisation and registration of civil unions, by way of either a marriage or a civil 
partnership’.606This allowed for same-sex marriages, since no distinction is made in the Act 
between same-sex and heterosexual couples. Again, for Roux, this is illustrative of the 
Constitutional Court’s self-awareness regarding the potential consequences of their decisions 
upon the continued independence of the Court itself. Following O’Regan’s argument, the 
Court clearly had the constitutional power to amend the Marriage Act. But did it have the 
institutional power?
607
 Viz. Was the Court sufficiently confident in its own position, in the face 
of government hostility and unpopularity in the public perception, to act to the exclusion of 
Parliament? If Roux’s analysis is correct, the answer to this would be ‘no’. Also, ten years after 
Makwanyane, this case was heard within a different political/constitutional climate. The country 
was under different Presidential leadership (albeit it that the government has remained ANC), 
and President Mbeki’s relationship with the courts was strained.608 Arguably, by 2005 the 
‘honeymoon’ period of South Africa’s new democracy had waned, and the transformative work 
of the Court was becoming correspondingly less strident (albeit perhaps no less effective in the 
Fourie case, in light of Parliament’s positive legislative response).  
 4.5.3 Zuma 
Tensions between the government and Constitutional Court since Mbeki’s resignation in 2008 
have deepened. When President Jacob Zuma took power in 2009, there was concern that he 
would actively try to limit the Constitutional Court’s influence.609 On several occasions before 
and after taking office, Zuma and other senior ANC officials expressed concern with what they 
considered to be the Court’s ‘judicial politicking’610 in opposition to the government. Straining 
credibility, the ANC Deputy Minister of Correctional Services, Ngoako Ramthlodi, in 2011, 
accused the Judiciary and civil society of: 
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‘sustained and relentless efforts to immigrate [sic] the little power left with the executive and the 
legislature… to curtail efforts and initiatives aimed at inducing fundamental changes’.611  
It is worth noting that Zuma has had personal battles with the courts and national prosecutors 
in recent years (he was acquitted in 2006 of raping a female domestic worker,
612
 then 
investigated for corruption in 2007 – the charges were subsequently dropped, but this decision 
has recently been appealed
613
), although whether these experiences have influenced his 
professional view of the courts is not certain.  His comments in 2012 that ‘we don’t want to 
review the Constitutional Court, we want to review its powers’614 seem incongruent with the 
Court’s institutional independence, as enshrined in the Constitution, and discussed above. 
Nevertheless, in the same year, following several court decisions against the government on 
issues of executive power,
615
 the ANC’s Department of Justice issued a ‘Discussion Document 
on the Transformation of the Judicial System’.616 The following extract from this document is 
instructive. It summarizes the government’s appraisal of the current role of the Constitutional 
Court, while betraying its annoyance with some of the Court’s decisions: 
‘Over the past few years, many in the Judiciary have shown a profound understanding of 
constitutional imperatives and set out to defend the basic law of the land. This includes many 
judgments, particularly by the Constitutional Court, that have reflected progressive 
interpretation of the Constitution and social rights in particular. Government continues to 
respect and implement the courts’ decisions unconditionally. Notwithstanding these 
achievements, in an evolving polity, the issue of appropriate balance among the three centres – 
the Judiciary, the Executive and Parliament – is one that will continually be contested.  
There have been some instances where certain court decisions are perceived not to fully 
advance the transformative purpose of the Constitution. There is therefore a need for open and 
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constructive debate on the decisions of the courts and how they seek to advance the vision of a 
non-racial, non–sexist and prosperous democratic society.617 
The ‘transformative purpose of the Constitution’, mentioned above is defined in the same 
document as including:  
(a) The entrenchment and realization of democratic values enshrined in the Constitution.  
(b) Eradicating poverty and underdevelopment, within the context of a thriving and growing first 
economy, and the successful transformation of the second economy.  
(c) Providing adequate safety and security measures for all people in South Africa to be and feel 
safe.  
(d) Building a strong and democratic state that truly serves the interests of all people and 
promotes social justice  
(e) Contributing to the achievement of the African renaissance and a better world.
618
  
As will be apparent in the analysis of socio-economic rights cases below, some criticism of the 
Court’s failure to fully advance an agenda of transformation is justified. But, levelled by 
government, such criticism has been interpreted as ‘code for the ANC seeking more compliant 
courts’.619 
Most recently, in March 2016, the Constitutional Court decided that Zuma had acted 
unconstitutionally when using public money to pay for non-essential upgrades to his private 
residence; ordering him to repay the money.
620
 This decision may serve to deepen any personal 
animosity the incumbent President has towards the Court. But it would be erroneous to 
conclude that the Constitutional Court is showing signs of capitulation in the face of 
government pressure. Indeed, Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng took the opportunity in this 
most recent case to remind Zuma, without compromise, of the President’s grave responsibility: 
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 ‘The president is the head of state, his is the calling to the highest office in the land… The 
nation pins its hopes on him to steer the country in the right direction.’621 
While it remains the case that the relationship between the government, the ANC-dominated 
Parliament, and the courts is delicate at best, and that under Zuma’s presidency, a truly 
independent judiciary is felt as ‘a thorn in its side’,622 it is also clear that the courts (and the 
Constitutional Court in particular) continue to function as a site of government accountability, 
and a champion of the Constitution. Explanations of case decisions, based on considerations of 
deference to Separation of Powers, judicial activism, and even the Court’s own existential 
concerns, will continue to be developed and applied to the discussion of socio-economic rights 
cases below.  
Notwithstanding the ensuing discussion of whether the Constitutional Court has acted in a 
sufficiently transformative way in certain cases (including most relevantly for the purpose of the 
present study, regarding interpretation of the right of access to sufficient water), it is clear that 
the Court has embraced its role as arbiter and protector of the Constitution with diligence. In 
light of this record of institutional independence, and in particular, being mindful of the Court’s 
willingness to hold government to the standards that the Constitution imposes, attention now 
turns to the judgments of the Constitutional Court that specifically relate to socio-economic 
rights (including the right of access to sufficient water), in order to refocus on the central 
problematic of this thesis: the extent to which a right to water can achieve access to sufficient 
water for everyone.  
 
4.6 Case decisions on socio-economic matters: an illusive (transformative) narrative? 
The Constitution’s Bill of Rights imposes significant positive duties on government: to protect; 
promote; and fulfil the rights therein (as well as the negative duty to respect). Since the 
protection, promotion and fulfilment of economic and social rights potentially places onerous, 
and costly obligations on government (to provide housing, healthcare or water for instance), the 
interpretation and application of such rights (here labelled socio-economic rights) are 
particularly likely to affect the relationship between the Constitutional Court (as the interpreting 
power) and the government and Parliament (as the branches of the State charged variously with 
fulfilling the rights at issue, and with passing legislation, and agreeing budgets to enable such). 
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Given the high potential for adjudication of socio-economic rights to create tensions with the 
government and legislature, the foregoing general discussion of the relationship between the 
courts and the other branches of the State has provided the context within which to interrogate 
key socio-economic rights cases. Of particular importance will be how these court decisions 
take into account the corresponding obligations of the State. To omit the preceding discussion 
would risk scrutinizing the court’s judgments on socio-economic rights in isolation from the 
political and constitutional context in which decisions have to be made. It would also ignore the 
insightful shift from greater to lesser direct legislative intervention, evidenced in Makwanyane, 
then Fourie. 
It is also important to clarify that while the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the 1996 
Constitution was a subject of some controversy (see discussion at 3.3.2), the question of 
whether these rights are justiciable was directly addressed during the certification proceedings 
before the Constitutional Court: 
‘[T]hese rights are, at least to some extent, justiciable. As we have stated in the previous 
paragraph, many of the civil and political rights entrenched in the [constitutional text before this 
Court for certification in that case] will give rise to similar budgetary implications without 
compromising their justiciability. The fact that socio-economic rights will almost inevitably give 
rise to such implications does not seem to us to be a bar to their justiciability. At the very 
minimum, socio-economic rights can be negatively protected from improper invasion.’623 
Therefore, further discussion regarding whether these rights should be justiciable will not be 
pursued here, although it should be noted that globally, the role of socio-economic rights 
remains highly contentious. Rather, attention will focus on how particular socio-economic rights 
have been adjudicated on by the Constitutional Court, and to what ends. 
 4.6.1 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) (1997)
624
 
The first case for consideration here immediately reminds us that while the Bill of Rights 
contains a broad range of socio-economic rights, these rights are qualified, and are to be 
realised progressively, within the available resources of the State (see 3.3.2 and 4.3.1). This case 
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was the first to raise the scope of Section 27 (1) - (3), access to healthcare, and to emergency 
medical treatment,
625
 before the Constitutional Court. The appellant was a 41 year old, 
unemployed man who suffered from diabetes, ischaemic heart disease, cerebrovascular disease 
and chronic renal failure. The appellant began undergoing dialysis treatments in a public 
hospital. However, due to the high demand, lack of equipment and the patient not qualifying 
for continuous treatment, his dialysis was stopped. The appellant consequently began the same 
treatment in a private hospital, but quickly became unable to finance this himself.  
He appealed to the Constitutional Court under Section 27(3) in casu that he was refused 
emergency medical treatment, as well as regarding Section 11; the right to life. Counsel for the 
appellant compared the appellant’s situation to the case of Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor 
Samity and others v State of West Bengal and another
626
 before the Supreme Court of India. In 
this case, the right to life in the Indian Constitution was interpreted as including a positive duty 
on the State ‘to extend medical existence for preserving human life’. Therefore it was held that 
by refusing treatment, the patient was denied the right to life.
 627
 However, before the 
Constitutional Court, Chaskalson P noted the differences between the Constitutions of South 
Africa and India, adding that the expansive, positive interpretation of the right to life in the 
Indian context was warranted because of the relative lack of separate economic and social 
rights, compared to those in the South African Bill of Rights: 
‘In our Constitution the right to medical treatment does not have to be inferred from the nature 
of the state established by the Constitution or from the right to life which it guarantees. It is dealt 
with directly in section 27.’628 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court stated that on the instant facts the appellant did not 
require emergency treatment. He was suffering from chronic disease and required dialysis two 
or three times a week, therefore the Court held that this case did not fall within section 27(3), 
but better related to section 27(1) and (2), under the right of access to health care services. 
These sections entitle everyone to have access to health care services provided by the state 
‘within its available resources’.  
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The Court’s reasoning here confirmed that the obligations upon the State, which Section 27 (1) 
and (2) entail, do not require immediate fulfilment, and that the resources currently available 
will therefore dictate the degree to which the appellant is entitled to these rights at the present 
time. The stark reality was that ‘[a]t present the Department of Health in KwaZulu-Natal does 
not have sufficient funds to cover the cost of the services which are being provided to the 
public.’629  
Furthermore, by acknowledging that the available resources in relation to such rights cannot but 
shape the extent to which the rights can be made manifest at any one point in time, the Court 
reaffirmed that decisions about the allocation of such scarce resources should remain with the 
politicians and policy makers, and not with the courts: 
‘The provincial administration which is responsible for health services in KwaZulu- Natal has to 
make decisions about the funding that should be made available for health care and how such 
funds should be spent. These choices involve difficult decisions to be taken at the political level 
in fixing the health budget, and at the functional level in deciding upon the priorities to be met. 
A court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the political 
organs and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to deal with such matters.’630 
This represents an early indication of the Constitutional Court’s sensibilities around the 
Separation of Powers, as later articulated by Sachs J in Fourie (discussed above). Here, the 
correct interpretation of Section 27 (1) and (2) did not require a co-option of executive (policy-
making) power by the Court. Consequently the Court concluded that the state had not 
breached any of its constitutional duties and therefore the appellant was not entitled to relief.  
However, despite this decision, which the Court acknowledged was a tragedy for the appellant, 
Chaskalson P reiterated the Constitutional Court’s commitment to social transformation, albeit 
mindful of the limitations facing this task, which the instant case cruelly illustrated:  
‘We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. Millions of people are living 
in deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is a high level of unemployment, 
inadequate social security, and many do not have access to clean water or to adequate health 
services. These conditions already existed when the Constitution was adopted and a 
commitment to address them, and to transform our society into one in which there will be 
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human dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart of our new constitutional order. For as 
long as these conditions continue to exist that aspiration will have a hollow ring.’631  
This case therefore affirms the Constitutional Court’s transformative impetus, while 
acknowledging that without sufficient resources, the prospects for meaningful transformation 
are severely constrained. Such a tension will become a familiar one as subsequent cases are 
considered. Moreover, this decision reinforced the constitutionally orthodox separation of roles 
between the courts and the executive, whereby decisions about the size and share of resources 
remain within the remit of the executive. Not to ignore the personal human consequences of 
these constitutional questions, the appellant, Thiagraj Soobramoney died from renal failure a 
few days after the Court’s decision.632 
4.6.2 Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom                         
(2000)
633
 
This is undoubtedly the most famous and celebrated decision of the Constitutional Court to-
date. Any attempt to identify a distinct jurisprudential approach to the Court’s socio-economic 
rights decisions must acknowledge the guiding role that the concept of reasonableness has 
played since this seminal case. Yet, as will be argued, there is a troubling disconnection between 
the prominence given to the Court’s reasoning and decision in Grootboom, and the remedial 
consequences for the parties involved, which must draw into question the transformative limits 
of this and other socio-economic rights decisions.  
Mrs Grootboom and others (the respondents), living in an informal settlement in appalling 
conditions, without water, sewerage or refuse removal services,
634
 decided to illegally occupy a 
plot of land due to be the site of a new low-cost housing development. In due course the 
respondents were evicted: their shacks were bulldozed, and their possessions lost in the 
process. The respondents were rendered homeless as a result of the eviction, and applied to 
the High Court ‘for an order requiring government to provide them with adequate basic shelter 
or housing until they obtained permanent accommodation’.635 The appellants (the Government 
of the Republic of South Africa, the Premier of the Province of the Western Cape, Cape 
Metropolitan Council, and Oostenberg Muncipality) were ordered to provide the respondents 
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with at least a minimum standard of shelter, which included ‘tents, portable latrines and a 
regular supply of water (albeit transported)’.636 The appellants challenged the correctness of this 
order. The case was subsequently heard in the Constitutional Court. Consequently, the majority 
of the legal argument in Grootboom relates to interpreting the scope and application of the 
respondents’ constitutional right to housing, and the corresponding State obligations that this 
requires.  
The Court accepted that the respondents had no right to claim shelter immediately, since the 
stated nature of the right to housing obliged the State to ‘act positively and proactively within its 
available resources to ameliorate the plight of indigent people living in deplorable conditions,’637 
but it did not require the immediate fulfilment of the respondents’ rights. The Court was critical 
of the government’s approach to housing policy since 1994, which they inferred was overly 
focussed on commercial concerns, including prioritising the ‘normalisation of the market for 
housing in townships’:638 
‘The definition of housing development as well as the general principles that are set out do not 
contemplate the provision of housing that falls short of the definition of housing development in 
the Act. In other words there is no express provision to facilitate access to temporary relief for 
people who have no access to land, no roof over their heads, for people who are living in 
intolerable conditions and for people who are in crisis because of natural disasters such as 
floods and fires, or because their homes are under threat of demolition. These are people in 
desperate need. Their immediate need can be met by relief short of housing which fulfils the 
requisite standards of durability, habitability and stability encompassed by the definition of 
housing development in the Act.’639  
As a result of the State’s failure to enact housing policy to the standards required by the 
Constitution, the Court set aside the order of the High Court, and issued an order to create and 
implement a housing programme that included provision of relief for those people who had not 
yet been provided with accommodation.
640
 A more detailed analysis of the Court’s reasoning, as 
it relates to socio-economic rights more generally, is undertaken below. 
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Yacoob J, who provided the lead judgment, emphasised the need to understand all socio-
economic rights as being interconnected, and embedded within the nation’s social and 
historical context.
641
 Consequently, he identified apartheid as the underlying cause of Mrs 
Grootboom’s plight:  
‘Colonial dispossession and a rigidly enforced racial distribution of land in the rural areas had 
dislocated the rural economy and rendered sustainable and independent African farming 
increasingly precarious. Given the absence of formal housing, large numbers of people moved 
into informal settlements throughout the Cape peninsula. The cycle of the apartheid era, 
therefore, was one of untenable restrictions on the movement of African people into urban 
areas, the inexorable tide of the rural poor to the cities, inadequate housing, resultant 
overcrowding, mushrooming squatter settlements, constant harassment by officials and 
intermittent forced removals.’642 
 While this was undoubtedly the case in general historical terms (echoing the author’s account 
of apartheid’s legacy, set out in the previous chapter), the immediate issue before the 
Constitutional Court was rather more specific, namely the scope of Section 26 of the 
Constitution; the right to housing: 
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to 
achieve the progressive realisation of this right. 
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of 
court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary 
evictions.
643
 
It is appropriate to quote Yacoob J at length here regarding the correct interpretation of socio-
economic rights, since, as will be become apparent, his interpretation has become an influential 
schema, followed in subsequent cases: 
‘Like all the other rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution (which contains the Bill of Rights), 
section 26 must be construed in its context. The section has been carefully crafted. It contains 
three subsections. The first confers a general right of access to adequate housing. The second 
establishes and delimits the scope of the positive obligation imposed upon the state to promote 
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access to adequate housing and has three key elements. The state is obliged: (a) to take 
reasonable legislative and other measures; (b) within its available resources; (c) to achieve the 
progressive realisation of this right… The third subsection provides protection against arbitrary 
evictions.  
Interpreting a right in its context requires the consideration of two types of context. On the one 
hand, rights must be understood in their textual setting. This will require a consideration of 
Chapter 2 and the Constitution as a whole. On the other hand, rights must also be understood 
in their social and historical context.’644 
Particularly notable here is the State’s obligation to take reasonable measures, within the 
confines of the resources available to it, to improve the degree to which the relevant right is 
realised. It is undoubtedly the case that, in practice it may be difficult to identify exactly what 
resources are available at any one point in time, and it may be complicated to effectively 
monitor the progressive realisation of particular rights (ensuring that the degree to which 
respective rights are fulfilled does not plateau or regress). Therefore elements (b) and (c) may 
represent considerable practical challenges. But both elements can be recognised as 
epistemologically objective: ‘Available resources’ is a quantifiable concept, in theory at least, 
while ‘progressive realisation’ describes a trajectory directed towards on-going improvement, 
which is also theoretically capable of measurement, despite complexity regarding what metrics 
to use. In contrast, the State’s obligation to take reasonable (legislative and other) measures 
eschews the objective attributes of elements (b) and (c). What constitutes reasonable measures 
requires subjective consideration. This is not to say that element (a) should be dismissed as an 
arbitrary standard. Rather, Yacoob’s approach above prescribes that what counts as reasonable 
measures will depend on two contexts; the textual, and the social/historical. But the 
objective/subjective distinction here does suggest that it is reasonableness that is the principal 
concept with which the Constitutional Court interrogated the scope of the right to housing in 
the instant case, and would apply in subsequent socio-economic decisions. Yacoob J defined 
reasonableness as follows: 
‘[a] court considering reasonableness will not enquire whether other more desirable or 
favourable measures could have been adopted or whether public money would have been 
better spent. The question would be whether the measures that have been adopted are 
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reasonable. It is necessary to recognise that a wide range of possible measures could be adopted 
by the state to meet its obligations.’645 
Given that the right to water is the central focus of this thesis, a more detailed consideration of 
reasonableness as a legal principle is undertaken specifically in relation to the case of Mazibuko 
below. But it is important to note here that what is prescient to the application of 
reasonableness as per Yacoob’s definition, is that it allows for the accommodation of a 
legitimate diversity of views within the ‘limits of reason’.646 Explained in light of an institutional 
approach to judicial restraint, significant weight is afforded to these views, and consequently the 
Court’s restraint will be in evidence unless such views (and the actions stemming from them) 
are outside the scope of what is reasonable.
647
 
In the case of Grootboom, the State’s failure to provide for situations akin to those that Mrs 
Grootboom and others found themselves in was deemed unreasonable. In other words, the 
Court held that the State had not fulfilled its obligation to take reasonable legislative and other 
measures to progressively realise the respondents’ rights. What the Court did not do, however, 
was to stipulate what such reasonable measures would have been. This represents the 
fundamental distinction between a ‘minimum core’ (sometimes referred to as a minimum 
quota) approach to realising socio-economic rights, and the approach of reasonableness, which 
the Constitutional Court pioneered in Grootboom, and has favoured ever since. As the author’s 
interview with Justice Yacoob illustrates (a portion of which is quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter), the Court believed that adoption of a jurisprudence of reasonableness provides 
greater flexibility  - allowing for a greater permissible range of policy decisions, than would the 
‘mechanical determination’648 of minimum quotas. Moreover, this faith in the benefits of 
reasonableness, according to Yacoob J, has remained steady. Speaking to me shortly after 
retiring from the bench in January 2013 Justice Yacoob said ‘I think that all the judgments of 
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our court while I was there have been consistent’.649 Certainly, the Court’s adoption of 
reasonableness is central to the Mazibuko judgment on the right to water, discussed below.  
It is important to note that whatever the perceived benefits of applying a ‘reasonableness 
approach’ to socio-economic rights cases, this represents a divergence from the approach 
developed by the United Nations General Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR), whose task it is to interpret the obligations of State-parties to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The Committee, and Covenant 
are discussed in more detail in Chapter Two. But in relation to the right to housing, raised in 
Grootboom, the ICESCR is directly relevant. Article 11.1 provides that: 
‘The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and 
to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate 
steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of 
international co-operation based on free consent.’650 
At the time of the Grootboom judgment, the Republic of South Africa was a signatory to the 
ICESCR, but had not yet ratified it. Ratification subsequently took place in January 2015.
651
 
Despite this, Section 39 of the Constitution obliges courts to consider international law 
(whether or not it is binding upon the South African State) when interpreting the Bill of Rights, 
an obligation elaborated on by Chaskalson P in Makwanyane: 
‘public international law would include non-binding as well as binding law. They may both be 
used under the section as tools of interpretation. International agreements and customary 
international law accordingly provide a framework within which [the Bill of Rights] can be 
evaluated and understood, and for that purpose, decisions of tribunals dealing with comparable 
instruments, such as the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the European 
Commission on Human Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights, and, in appropriate 
cases, reports of specialised agencies such as the International Labour Organisation, may 
provide guidance as to the correct interpretation of particular provisions of [the Bill of Rights].’652  
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Therefore the approach taken by the CESCR to interpreting State-parties’ obligations regarding 
the right to housing in the Covenant was important to consider. The CESCR’s approach is 
summarised below as follows: 
‘On the basis of the extensive experience gained by the Committee, as well as by the body that 
preceded it, over a period of more than a decade of examining States parties’ reports the 
Committee is of the view that minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very 
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party. Thus, 
for example, a State party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential 
foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic 
forms of education, is prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant. If the 
Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it 
would be largely deprived of its raison d’etre.’653 
The CESCR’s explicit adoption of minimum core obligations would seem an appropriate 
approach for the Constitutional Court to follow. Yet this is rejected for three reasons in the 
instant case, which Yacoob J makes clear. First, the CESCR’s conclusion was based on 
‘extensive experience’ that allowed for an accurate determination of what a minimum core 
should be. The Constitutional Court, according to Yacoob J lacked comparable information, 
and could therefore not determine such a minimum core.
654
 Second, it was stated that the ‘right 
to housing’, set out in the ICESCR differs from the ‘right of access to housing’ in Section 26 of 
the Constitution. Yacoob J contested that determination of a minimum core in the more 
nuanced context of the Constitutional right ‘presents difficult questions’:655 
‘This is so because the needs in the context of access to adequate housing are diverse: there are 
those who need land; others need both land and houses; yet others need financial assistance. 
There are difficult questions relating to the definition of minimum core in the context of a right 
to have access to adequate housing, in particular whether the minimum core obligation should 
be defined generally or with regard to specific groups of people.’656 
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Third, the diversity of needs in relation to individuals’ right of access to housing seems to 
undermine any claim that there is one (single) minimum core
657
, leading the Court away from 
the adoption of such an approach, and towards the more flexible concept of reasonableness. 
While the Grootboom judgment has been broadly celebrated, it has also been criticised. Some 
commentators have interpreted the Court’s eschewal of a minimum quota approach as fatal to 
fulfilling its own transformative role, as mandated by the Constitution. Shortly after the 
judgment, Bilchitz pertinently criticised Yacoob J’s claim that the diversity of needs regarding 
housing disqualifies a ‘minimum core’ approach: 
‘The fact that some need access to land, some need land and houses and others need financial 
assistance, is not relevant to the determination of the minimum core. Each is entitled to the 
same level of provision; the differential needs people have will determine in what way the 
government is required by the Constitution, if at all, to assist them.’658 
Bilchitz contests that it would be perfectly workable to set a minimum core that provides clarity 
regarding the particular obligations of the State towards each individual: 
Let us specify the minimum core obligation imposed by s 26 as requiring the government to 
provide each person in South Africa with shelter that protects him or her from the elements. It 
then becomes clear that those who have such shelter have no basis upon which to claim it from 
the government. Those who have land but no shelter, could claim building materials for 
instance. Those with neither land nor shelter, could claim both. But the general obligation of 
the state does not vary.’659 
Certainly the rejection of a minimum core approach largely on the basis that it ‘presents 
difficult questions’, raises its own questions about how thoroughly this approach was considered 
before the concept of reasonableness was preferred. As Bilchitz’s example above illustrates, 
adopting a minimum core approach to the issue before the Court in Grootboom was possible, 
but it would also have conferred a significant obligation upon the State (albeit ameliorated 
within the constraints of progressive realisation and available resources). Living without land or 
shelter, Mrs Grootboom’s community could have claimed that their right of access to housing 
required the provision by the government of both of these. But instead, limiting itself to the 
question of whether the government’s housing policy was reasonable, the Court avoided 
imposing any direct or specific obligations upon the State, other than to revise its housing 
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programme. Indeed, it is the issue of State obligations that may best help explain the adoption 
of a jurisprudence of reasonableness in preference to that of a minimum core. Mindful of the 
finite resources available to the State, and deferent to the policy-making and legislation-creating 
roles of the executive and legislature respectively, it seems that the Court chose to remain firmly 
within its remit, as dictated by the Separation of Powers, while fulfilling its own ‘minimum core’ 
obligation towards the Bill of Rights. Directing government to devise and implement a new 
housing programme that included measures to provide relief for those lacking accommodation, 
can be seen as requiring the least encroachment on government’s discretion, while promoting 
the ‘spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’.660   
If such an analysis is correct, the jurisprudence of reasonableness can be understood as 
containing within it a high degree of judicial deference. Whether this deference is due to 
constitutional sensibilities or realpolitik is harder to say. This is not to deny any transformative 
role for the Court. That socio-economic rights are justiciable at all, represents a degree of 
transformative potential for the Courts, not available in other jurisdictions. But it is plausible to 
assert that determining a minimum core for the right of access to housing, in this case, would 
have led to greater positive transformation for the respondents, than was the case here. Echoing 
Mr Soobramoney’s experience, once again the expansive rights in the Constitution failed to 
benefit the vulnerable litigants involved. In response to the Court’s order to revise its housing 
programme, the government embarked on a significant new housing project for poor residents 
in the Western Cape.
661
 But Mrs Grootboom remained destitute, despite the Court’s judgment 
in her favour. She died ‘homeless and penniless’662. Her obituary is a poignant reminder of both 
the enduring need to effectively secure socio-economic rights, and the potential that exists for 
dislocation between the work of the courts to this end, and the reality for indigent people: 
‘Irene Grootboom was the woman whose name became known around the world for enforcing 
the state's obligation to respect socio-economic rights… Grootboom’s death, and the fact that 
she died homeless, shows how the legal system and civil society failed her. I am sorry that we 
didn’t do enough following up after the judgment was given in her favour. We should have 
done more’.663 
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In response to this, Saul & Bond’s frustration around the limitations of the Grootboom 
judgment are reflective of many for whom the approach of reasonableness represents an overly 
inhibited, managerial, and deferent judicial role: 
‘The Court did not have the courage and self-mandate to prescribe the policies and practices 
that would be considered of minimal acceptability’.664 
While the strength of feeling here is not misplaced, given the gravity of the situation for those 
experiencing homelessness, this criticism does betray a lack of understanding of (or perhaps 
lack of concern with) the fundamental separation of powers at the heart of the South African 
polity. It is tempting to conclude that transformative constitutionalism would be achieved more 
deeply and more quickly by more activistic and prescriptive socio-economic rights decisions. 
But any gains made may risk being undermined by the loss of constitutional integrity, and 
adherence to the foundations of constitutionalism – the rule of law and the separation of 
powers - that such judgments would inevitably entail.
665
  
Whatever the merits of the Grootboom judgment, its application of reasonableness, and the 
Court’s sensitivity towards separation of powers and illegitimate encroachment into the realms 
of policy-making are themes that recur in the subsequent cases discussed below. 
 
4.6.3 Manqele v Durban Transitional Metropolitan Council (2002)
666
, and Residents 
of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local Council (2002)
667
 
Before proceeding to the next Constitutional Court case to be considered, it is worth 
considering the juridical problems caused for lower courts, by the eschewal of a minimum core 
for socio-economic rights, in favour of a jurisprudence of reasonableness. Mention of the 
following two cases is important to this end, but also because both cases relate to the issue of 
access to water, and the right of access to sufficient water in Section 27 of the Constitution. 
Manqele 
Here, the applicant, an unemployed mother with seven dependent children was a tenant in an 
apartment owned by the local municipality. The applicant failed to pay for her water services 
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and so supply to the apartment was disconnected. The applicant petitioned the High Court for 
a declaratory order that the disconnection was unlawful and a direction to the respondent (the 
municipality) to reinstate and maintain basic water services. She based her petition on her right 
to basic water supply as per Section 3 of the WSA (discussed above in Chapter Three). Her 
legal council chose not to rely on the applicant’s constitutional right of access to sufficient 
water.
668
  
The respondents claimed that at that time there was no quantum applied to the constitutional 
right (reiterated in Section 3 of the WSA), which was capable of being enforced. The term 
‘sufficient water’ used in the Constitution had not been quantified. Similarly the municipality’s 
obligation to provide a ‘basic water supply’, defined in Section 1 of the WSA as ‘the prescribed 
minimum standard of water supply services’ had, according to the Court, not been effectively 
prescribed. The Court held that prescription had to be by regulation and no regulations existed 
at that time as to the extent and manner with which a basic water supply should be realised
669
.  
Furthermore, the respondents argued that, in the absence of a prescribed quantum for basic 
water supply, they had adopted a policy of providing residents with the first six kilolitres of 
water per month free. The applicant had far exceeded this amount, which resulted in her water 
supply being disconnected. 
The applicant’s counsel argued that the WSA must be read in conjunction with the 
Constitution and that therefore the right to a basic supply of water must be read as 
incorporating at least the amount of water that would meet the Constitutional requirement.
670
 
But the court disagreed: 
 In the absence of regulations defining the extent of the right of access to a basic water supply, I 
have no guidance from the Legislature or Executive to enable me to interpret the content of the 
right embodied in s 3 of the Act. The interpretation that the applicant wishes me to place upon 
s 3 of the Act, in the absence of prescription of the minimum standard of water supply services 
necessary to constitute a basic water supply, requires me to pronounce upon and enforce upon 
the respondent the quantity of water that the applicant is entitled to have access to, the quality of 
such water and acceptable parameters for ‘access’ to such basic water supply. These are policy 
matters, which fall outside the purview of my role and function, and are inextricably linked to 
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the availability of resources. Given the fact that the prescribed minimum basic water supply has 
not yet been promulgated, notwithstanding the commencement of the Water Services Act... it 
would seem that such resources are not yet available on the scale required to give national 
content to s 3 of the Act.
671
 
Therefore, the conclusion of the Court was that the right upon which the applicant relied was 
incomplete and could not be enforced. The Court also remarked on the fact that the applicant 
had not limited her family’s water use to the six kilolitres per month provided for free by the 
municipality and had therefore had to pay for the additional water used. This, in the Court’s 
view, seemed to justify the disconnection and discontinuation of water services. The application 
was dismissed and judgment delivered in favour of the respondents.  
No discussion was entered into regarding the sufficiency (or otherwise) of 6 kilolitres per 
household per month. Rather, the willingness to accept the appropriateness of a particular 
volume of water seemed at odds with the court’s explicit reasoning that quantification of water 
supply is a matter of policy and outside the court’s purview.  
While scant attention was paid to the capacity of the service provider, the case sent a clear 
signal that the Court was adamant about maintaining separation of powers, and not straying into 
policy matters. This clear positioning of the courts in their traditional and constitutionally 
restrained place is perhaps justified (especially since no minimum core for access to sufficient 
water had yet been decided). But it also illustrates the limitations of the Court’s role in realising 
the protection, promotion and fulfilment of socio-economic rights.  
  Bon Vista Mansions 
The applicants in Bon Vista were residents of an apartment block in Johannesburg. Their water 
supply was disconnected following non-payment for water services. An order was sought from 
the High Court by the applicants to direct the respondent (the local municipality) to restore 
their water supply. The Court granted the order. In setting out the reasons for its decision the 
court analysed the right of access to sufficient water, affirming the interpretative value of 
international law regarding the role of the State regarding socio-economic rights, with reference 
to the ICESCR and its associated General Comments. In particular the State ‘must refrain from 
action which would serve to deprive individuals of their rights’,672 and ‘that a violation of the duty 
                                                          
671
 Paragraph 427C-F 
672
 Bon Vista. Paragraph 16. 
155 
 
to respect a right arises when the state, through legislative or administrative conduct, deprives 
people of the access they enjoy to socio-economic rights’.673  
Because the applicants already had existing access to water services, it was held that the 
respondent’s disconnection amounted to a breach of the State’s Constitutional duty to respect 
the right of access to water.
674
 The applicants made an urgent interim application to the High 
Court in order to have water supply restored for themselves and other residents, pending the 
final decision on an application for similar relief that had already been lodged. The Court 
granted the urgent application to have water supply restored for themselves and other residents, 
directing the respondents (the local municipality) to restore the water supply. The respondents 
contended that the applicant did not have the requisite locus standi to bring the application. But 
the Court found that, given the urgent nature of the interim application (made in order to 
ensure access to water for several residents for several days) the applicant was not required to 
follow the usual formalities. The Court reiterated that water services were a ‘basic and essential 
service’675and emphasised the serious consequences to residents’ health if the service was 
discontinued. 
The Court’s attention then turned to analysing the right of access to sufficient water. The 
landmark judgement of Chaskalson P in Makwanyane
676
, which affirmed the interpretative value 
of international law in the adjudication of socio-economic rights, was particularly persuasive in 
the Court’s thinking here.  
‘International law is particularly helpful in interpreting the Bill of Rights where the 
Constitution uses language similar to that which has been used in international instruments... It 
assists in understanding the nature of the duties on the state...’677 
The nature of the duties arising on states from the ICESCR, and from its associated General 
Comments are twofold. First, the State (or State body, including a municipality such as the 
respondent in this case) must refrain from actions that would deprive individuals of their 
rights.
678
 Second, the State has a duty to respect rights and will be said to have violated that duty 
if people are deprived access to socio-economic rights that they have hitherto enjoyed.
679
 This 
applied here to a discontinuation of water services that residents had accessed up until this 
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point. Consequently, the decision of the municipality to disconnect water supply was judged to 
be in violation of its Constitutional duty to respect the right of access to sufficient water.
680
 
The question then arose as to whether the municipality was justified in their breach. Accepting 
that the WSA formed the relevant statutory framework, the Court looked to section 4(3)
681
 of 
the WSA to establish the circumstances under which water services can be limited or 
discontinued. The Court described section 4(3) as a deliberately demanding set of 
circumstances because of the potentially serious human and health consequences of 
terminating water services.
682
 The respondents were not able to justify their reasons for 
disconnection in line with the requirements of section 4(3) and the applicants had shown at 
least a prima facie right to continued access to water. 
In light of the State’s obligation to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfill’ each of the rights in the 
Bill of Rights, Bon Vista demonstrates the court’s willingness to enforce respect for a socio-
economic right at its current level of realization. By not allowing the applicants to suffer a 
discontinuation of water services that they had had access to, their right of access to sufficient 
water was maintained. Likewise, the right was afforded protection by the Court’s purposive 
application of the relevant legislation. The application of international law here shows its 
authoritative importance in domestic judicial reasoning as well as adding substance to the scope 
of the right to water and the associated duties of the State. But this was a constrained judgment 
in many ways. Again, failure to articulate a minimum core to the right to water limited the 
ability of the Court to promote progressive realisation of the right, in a transformative way. 
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4.6.5 Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) 
(2002)
683
  
Despite the prominence given to the case of Grootboom as ‘a positive precedent for the judicial 
enforcement of economic and social rights’684, arguably it is Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) 
that represents the most transformative judgment to-date by the Constitutional Court on socio-
economic rights. 
The case concerned the provision of an anti-retroviral drug, nevirapine, which prevents mother-
to-child transmission of the HIV virus during pregnancy and birth. It is estimated that almost 
seven million people living in South Africa have HIV, representing a prevalence rate amongst 
adults of 19% of the population.
685
 Given these high figures, the issue of HIV and its treatment 
has been an important challenge for the country for many years, despite the fact that at the time 
of the TAC case, then President Mbeki’s notorious ‘Aids denialism’ sought to repress the use 
of HIV/Aids medication.
686
 
Several pharmaceutical companies offered nevirapine to the South African government free of 
charge for a five-year period. But the government confined the drug’s use to pilot sites, denying 
most mothers access to the drug. TAC, a coalition of civil society, medical practitioners, 
activists and others, challenged this decision, arguing that it violated Section 27 of the 
Constitution, the right of access to healthcare services, for those mothers not supplied with the 
drug. Additionally, the Institute for Democracy in South Africa, and the Community Law 
Centre acted as amicus curiae. As discussed above regarding the scope of Section 27 in 
Soobramoney, the right of access to healthcare services does not require immediate or 
unconditional fulfilment:  
Section 27 (1) Everyone has the right to have access to - (a) health care services, including 
reproductive health care; (b) sufficient food and water; (c) social security, including, if they are 
unable to support themselves and their dependents, appropriate social assistance.  
(2) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, 
to achieve the progressive realization of each of these rights.  
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(3) No-one may be refused emergency medical treatment. 
Following the Constitutional Court’s approach in Grootboom, the High Court in TAC asked 
whether the government had taken reasonable measures, within its available resources, to 
progressively realise the right. The High Court concluded that the government had not acted 
reasonably in this regard: 
‘More specifically the finding was that the government had acted unreasonably in (a) refusing to 
make an antiretroviral drug called nevirapine available in the public sector where the attending 
doctor considered it medically indicated and (b) not setting out a timeframe for a national 
programme to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV.’687 
The government was consequently ordered by the High Court to make nevirapine available in 
public health centres across the country. The government appealed this order before the 
Constitutional Court. The Court referred to both Soobramoney and Grootboom in its analysis 
of the State’s obligations as being grounded in a social and historical context.688 It also analysed 
amicis’ argument that Section 27(1) established an individual positive right, and has a minimum 
core to which everyone is entitled.
689
 But, following Grootboom again, the Court decided that 
Section 27(1) and (2) must be read together in order to determine an individual’s rights and 
corresponding State obligations:  
‘A purposive reading of sections 26 and 27 does not lead to any other conclusion. It is 
impossible to give everyone access even to a “core” service immediately. All that is possible, and 
all that can be expected of the state, is that it act reasonably to provide access to the socio-
economic rights identified in sections 26 and 27 on a progressive basis.’690 
The minimum core approach was therefore explicitly rejected for a second time. The Court 
then proceeded to describe the issue before it as follows: 
‘The question in the present case is not therefore whether socio-economic rights are justiciable. 
Clearly they are. The question is whether the applicants have shown that the measures adopted 
by the government to provide access to healthcare services for HIV-positive mothers and their 
new-born babies falls short of its obligations under the Constitution.’691 
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Satisfied that answering this question was within the Court’s purview, and eschewing a 
minimum core approach to doing so, the Court applied its jurisprudence of reasonableness to 
the government’s policy.  The government cited four reasons for restricting the use of 
nevirapine to test sites. First, it was concerned that, despite being able to provide the drug itself, 
it may not be able to provide all users with a ‘comprehensive package’692 including additional 
information, counselling, and materials: Nevirapine is usually effective when provided at birth, 
but a child can also contract HIV when breast-fed. Therefore the government submitted that 
they would need to provide mothers with appropriate formulae milk as a substitute. Second, 
some mothers and/or children may show resistance to the drug in the future. Third, the 
government raised concern about the safety of the medicine (although medical trials show that 
only prolonged administration of the drug can lead to side effects). The fourth concern was the 
lack of appropriately trained staff and budgetary constraints.
693
  
Rejecting each of these reasons in turn, the Court concluded that: 
‘the policy of confining nevirapine to research and training sites fails to address the needs of 
mothers and their new-born children who do not have access to these sites. It fails to distinguish 
between the evaluation of programmes for reducing mother-to-child transmission and the need 
to provide access to healthcare services required by those who do not have access to the sites.’694 
The government’s policy was therefore deemed unreasonable, since in light of Grootboom, in 
order to be reasonable: 
‘measures cannot leave out of account the degree and extent of the denial of the right they 
endeavour to realise. Those whose needs are the most urgent and whose ability to enjoy all 
rights therefore is most in peril, must not be ignored by the measures aimed at achieving 
realisation of the right.’695 
The Court held that the government’s policy excluded those who could reasonably be including 
within the programme. The government was ordered to make nevirapine available nationwide 
in hospitals and clinics, and to take reasonable measures to increase the reach of counselling 
and testing services across the public health sector.
696
 
The consequences of this decision have been positive and far-reaching in the fight against the 
HIV/Aids pandemic. Following the judgment, nevirapine was swiftly made available in public 
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health centres. In 2015 more than two and a half million people were using anti-retrovirals – 
more than in any other country.
697
 
The implications of the TAC judgment are also significant for appraising the Constitutional 
Court’s willingness and ability to give transformative effect to socio-economic rights. Perhaps 
more clearly than was the case in Grootboom, the Court’s consistent application of a 
reasonableness test for government policy, generated a thorough reconsideration of the 
particular policy in question, which quickly improved many more people’s experience of their 
right to healthcare services. Yet this transformative success was achieved without defining a 
minimum core for Section 27, which according to the Court’s own constitutional sensibilities, 
would inevitably have transgressed beyond the Court’s remit of review and interpretation, 
towards policy-creation.  
But despite retaining such a position of constitutional deference, the Court’s order in TAC was 
both specific and prescriptive in its requirements. Arguably to prescribe such a fundamental 
expansion of antiretroviral therapies across the country, complete with counselling and 
additional services, represents the imposition of a de facto policy upon government by the 
Court. Here, in the author’s opinion, the Constitutional Court succeeded in balancing the 
competing requirements of constitutionalism: for transformative action, and appropriate 
deference to the executive. Thus the order can be read as drawing the outer contours of a new 
and reasonable policy, while leaving government free to decide its interior topography. The 
final clauses of the Court’s order are pertinent here: 
‘the orders made… do not preclude government from adapting its policy in a manner consistent 
with the Constitution if equally appropriate or better methods become available to it.’698  
The next case to be considered is the most directly relevant to the focus of this thesis. As such, 
the following analysis concentrates not only on the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of 
socio-economic rights, and specifically the right of access to sufficient water, but also on the 
interpretation provided by the High Court, and the Supreme Court of Appeal. Together, the 
judgments in this case reveal the scope and limitations of using the right of access to sufficient 
water to achieve the goal that this thesis sets out to examine: how to realise access to sufficient 
water for everyone in South Africa. 
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4.6.6 Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others (2010)
699
 
The context for consideration of the right of access to water in South Africa has been discussed 
at length in Chapter Three. The Constitutional Court, in Mazibuko’s opening paragraphs 
provides an apposite summary of this context: 
Although rain falls everywhere, access to water has long been grossly unequal. This inequality is 
evident in South Africa. While piped water is plentifully available to mines, industries, some 
large farms and wealthy families, millions of people, especially women, spend hours laboriously 
collecting their daily supply of water from streams, pools and distant taps … despite the 
significant improvement in the first fifteen years of democratic government, deep inequality 
remains and for many the task of obtaining sufficient water for their families remains a tiring 
daily burden. The achievement of equality, one of the founding values of our Constitution, will 
not be accomplished while water is abundantly available to the wealthy, but not to the poor.
700
 
Mazibuko was first heard in the Witswaterand High Court and was brought by a group of 
residents from the Phiri area of Soweto, near Johannesburg.
701
 It challenged the legality of 
installing pre-payment water meters in light of the constitutional right to sufficient water. 
Installation was undertaken by the City of Johannesburg and its water company, Johannesburg 
Water in response to acute water losses in Soweto as a result of corroded pipes, an inaccurate 
tariff system (that meant more water was used than was predicted to be necessary) and a ‘culture 
of non-payment’ for water services that had ‘arisen originally as part of the resistance to 
apartheid local government’702. 
The case examined the obligations of the City of Johannesburg and Johannesburg Water 
regarding access to water and the supply of free water for residents who cannot afford to pay. It 
was contended that since pre-payment water meters, by design, require users to pay for water in 
advance, access to sufficient water is curtailed if users cannot afford to pre-pay. Such a situation 
was commonplace for Phiri residents and was raised as incompatible with the constitutional 
right of access to sufficient water. The WSA’s quantification of sufficient water as a minimum 
standard of 25 lpd was directly challenged in this case on the basis that what is a sufficient 
quantity of water depends on the requirements of users in particular social circumstances. For 
instance people using waterborne sanitation require a greater volume of water to support life 
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and personal hygiene than those using pit latrines.
703
 The decision of the High Court put great 
emphasis on the need to redress past injustices (as a result of apartheid policies) and the dire 
social and material state of many Phiri residents, described as ‘poor, uneducated, unemployed 
and ravaged by HIV/AIDS’.704  
In determining the applicants’ grounds, the High Court looked to General Comment Number 
15 of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
705
 Applying the 
General Comment, the court’s view was that ‘[T]he State is under an obligation to provide the 
poor with the necessary water and water facilities on a non-discriminatory basis’.706 
Moreover, the progressive realisation of the constitutional right of access to sufficient water 
meant that: 
Retrogressive measures taken by the state are prohibited. If such retrogressive measures are 
taken, the onus is on the state to prove that such retrogressive measures are justified with 
reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant
707
. The state is obliged to 
respect, protect and fulfil the right to water.
708
 
The installation of prepayment meters was held to be just such a retrogressive step, preventing 
residents from access to sufficient water that they had previously enjoyed (before the 
prepayment meters, Phiri residents had access to a constant supply of water - despite many 
accruing arrears as a result
709
). The retrogressive step was taken without adequate justification. 
It was held that, given the particular needs of the Phiri community (including the need to use 
waterborne sewerage) a volume of 50 lpd would be a more appropriate quantification of 
sufficient water than the statutory 25 lpd limit. Satisfied that the respondent could provide this 
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increased amount ‘without restraining its capacity on water and its financial resources’710the High 
Court decided wholly in the applicants’ favour.  
The City of Johannesburg and Johannesburg Water appealed to the South African Supreme 
Court of Appeal in February 2009.
711
 The quantity amounting to sufficient water for Phiri 
residents was reduced on appeal to 42 lpd. But the High Court’s approach was otherwise 
upheld, and the City of Johannesburg and Johannesburg Water were directed to formulate a 
revised water policy accordingly.
712
 
Mazibuko in the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal was heralded as an important 
milestone in socio-economic jurisprudence in South Africa
713. It showed the courts’ willingness 
to push the legislature towards concrete manifestations of constitutional rights and not to allow 
the ‘progressive realization’ of these rights to result in unconstitutional policies. The impetus to 
promote and fulfill the right of access to sufficient water was clearly discernible (particularly in 
Tsoka J’s High Court judgment714) in the acceptance of the need for sufficient water to be a 
quantity that promotes dignity and goes beyond the minimum of Free Basic Water already 
set.
715
 The potential implications of Mazibuko for people living in similar situations to the Phiri 
residents were significant. Both decisions demonstrated the courts’ engagement with polycentric 
matters in order to help realize socio-economic Constitutional rights more quickly and more 
explicitly than would otherwise be the case. But the environmental implications of Mazibuko 
may have been significant too, potentially doubling the demand for water from a significant 
portion of the population, in a ‘water-stressed’ country716.  
However, in September 2009 the Phiri residents appealed to the Constitutional Court 
(unhappy with the Supreme Court of Appeal’s order to reduce the amount of water deemed to 
be sufficient from 50 to 42 lpd). This was the first time the Constitutional Court had considered 
the proper interpretation of the right of access to sufficient water. The orders made by the High 
Court and Supreme Court of Appeal respectively were set aside.  
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The Constitutional Court held that the City of Johannesburg’s Free Basic Water policy was not 
in conflict with Section 27 of the Constitution or Section 11 of the Water Services Act
717
 and the 
installation of pre-paid water meters was lawful. The court was satisfied that while the Free 
Basic Water Policy was flawed, it was consistent with the constitutional right of access to 
sufficient water.
718
 This was particularly so since the City of Johannesburg had continually 
amended its Free Basic Water Policy during the course of the litigation.
719
 Consequently the 
applicants’ appeal was dismissed, and the installation of prepaid water meters in Phiri was 
affirmed as compatible with Section 27 of the Constitution.
720
  
Crucial to an understanding of this judgment is the guiding role that reasonableness has played 
in the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence since Grootboom, discussed above at length above. 
Although Grootboom related specifically to the constitutional right to adequate housing,
721
 the 
standard established in this case, and followed in TAC, required that government action in 
relation to socio-economic entitlements generally, must be reasonable.  
The principle of reasonableness was applied to the Constitutional Court’s judgment in 
Mazibuko as follows: First, the nature of the right of access to sufficient water was accepted as 
being one of progressive realization.  Second, the actions of the respondents (namely the City of 
Johannesburg, and Johannesburg Water) in constantly reviewing their Free Basic Water Policy, 
and by providing on occasion for additional free water allowance as well as relief from other 
municipal charges, together represent reasonable actions in relation to the constitutional right to 
water, notwithstanding the respondents’ continuing obligation towards progressive realization.722 
The clear implication here is that while the actions and policy of the respondents were deemed 
reasonable at the time of the judgment, they must not be allowed to solidify in to an established 
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standard. Rather, the impetus of progressive realization must engender continual revision.
723
  
This application of reasonableness directly contrasts with the alternative approach to 
adjudicating on socio-economic rights, followed by the lower courts in Mazibuko: namely 
establishing a minimum core obligation for the state to fulfil. Establishing the minimum 
quantum of water to be deemed sufficient, by reference to international standards and 
domestic, context-specific evidence
724
would seem an appropriate approach to interpreting the 
constitutional right to water. So it is important to note the reasons that the Constitutional Court 
raised to vindicate their continued, deliberate and explicit rejection of a minimum core 
approach, in favour of reasonableness. 
First, a constitutional defense can be made for the Court’s approach here. It reflects an impetus 
to maintain a clear separation of powers and to refrain from encroaching on matters of resource 
allocation, under the purview of the legislature and executive.
725
 Arguably such a ‘restrained and 
focused role for the Courts’726 may help achieve ‘appropriate constitutional balance’727 by 
avoiding direct incursion into budgetary and policy priorities: 
The Constitution does not require government to be held to an impossible standard of 
perfection. Nor does it require courts to take over the tasks that in a democracy should properly 
be reserved for the democratic arms of government.
728
 
 Second, the argument is made that quantifying a minimum core requirement here would 
detract from the duty imposed on government to continually review its policies to ensure the 
progressive realization of the right.
729
 Indeed, a situation could be envisaged where a defined 
minimum quantum of water may impede rights holders from receiving more than this quantum 
in keeping with the provider’s capacity to supply. In order to avoid this, the Court reiterates that 
it is for government to set the target it wishes to achieve, and for the Courts to submit such a 
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target to the standard of reasonableness.
730
  
It is plausible to suggest that defining a (static) minimum core content to the right to water may 
have negative practical consequences in the future. Regarding this, the decisions of the High 
Court and Supreme Court of Appeal, to quantify the content of the right, without clarifying how 
a minimum core content relates to progressive realization, was unfortunate.
731
 But it seems less 
plausible that a minimum core approach is necessarily incompatible with reasonable, 
progressive realization. Indeed there seems to be scope here to explore a mutually reinforcing 
model for these two principles, whereby a provisional minimum core is established, based on 
current capacity, but coupled with the requirement to continually pursue a fuller realisation of 
the right, to the extent that available resources allow. Such a hybrid approach would 
presumably require the periodic redefinition of the minimum core to reflect the progress made 
in realizing the right to date. Indeed, the degree of complementarity or antagonism between a 
reasonableness approach to socio-economic rights and a minimum core approach has been 
considered at length elsewhere, and remains contested.
732
  
Third, it is asserted that a jurisprudence of reasonableness encourages a continuous 
contestation for the content of socio-economic rights, enabling ‘citizens to hold government 
accountable not only through the ballot box but also, in a different way, through litigation’:733 
Citizens and the courts combining in a dynamic, collaborative endeavour to negotiate what 
content the right (to water, in this case) should have at any one point in time. Indeed, the 
product of such litigation, according to O’Regan J, is to foster ‘a form of participative 
democracy’.734 The clear implication here is that if the Court instead set an ultimate standard for 
such rights, the accountability of government would be affected, and citizens’ role in the 
democratic process would be diminished. To this end the Constitutional Court maintained that 
litigation regarding the positive obligations of socio-economic rights was an important element 
of government accountability, concomitant with the founding provisions of the Constitution, ‘to 
ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness’.735 Such litigation also complements the 
right of access to the courts in Section 34 of the Constitution, which Lindiwe Mazibuko and 
others were entitled to as litigants:  
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‘Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided 
in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial 
tribunal or forum’. 736 
Reading Sections 1 and 34 together, the requirements of accountability, responsiveness and 
openness, and that of a fair public hearing, reflect much of the content ascribed by Bernstein to 
the value of fairness (‘accountability, representation, and responsibility, as well as distributive 
justice’737). When considered in the light of these standards, the Constitutional Court’s judgment 
in Mazibuko has clearly facilitated government accountability by requiring ‘a detailed 
accounting from government’.738 Furthermore, it has supported the representation of the 
applicants, by allowing their appeal, and clarified the responsibility of the City of Johannesburg, 
and Johannesburg Water respectively. However, whether the judgment also achieved 
distributive justice remains contentious.  
  A personal insight 
In 2014, I interviewed Justice Yacoob, who provided the lead judgment in Grootboom, and in 
so doing, first articulated the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence of reasonableness. Justice 
Yacoob was not on the bench that heard Mazibuko. I asked him what he thought of the 
judgment, and of the Court’s continued rejection of a minimum core approach, in favour of 
reasonableness. His thoughts, although shared after retiring from the Constitutional Court, are 
insightful, particularly in as much as they suggest that the Court’s judgment, though 
disappointing for many, represents the extent of what could be expected from an appropriately 
deferent (or restrained) court within the confines of a constitutional democracy: 
ZY: I didn’t sit in Mazibuko because I was sick, but people invited me to talk at a conference on 
Mazibuko thinking that because I didn’t sit in it I would be against it. And I must tell you, I’m 
completely for Mazibuko and I’m quite happy now that I’m not a judge I can write an article 
saying why Mazibuko is right, and why all those people who are against Mazibuko are quite 
wrong… I think that all the judgments of our court while I was there have been consistent with 
Grootboom, and I think in broad terms that Mazibuko would be the case that many people 
knew, is a bad example because it is really invidious in all the circumstances relating to water to 
say how many kilos people should have. 
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NC: Invidious in what way, because it risks the court overstepping the mark into policy, or 
what? 
ZY: Invidious because we are not in a minimum quota then beyond the reasonableness test and 
the only issue was whether the water being supplied in all the circumstances at that time was 
reasonable. Not whether a certain amount was reasonable. And that we can’t determine, and I 
think that the answer to that question should have been all the circumstances taken into 
account, everything, that the water supplied at that time could not be said to be unreasonable.
739
 
Much work has been done to quantify the minimum quantum of water required for daily life in 
various conditions.
740
 So it is not entirely clear why Yacoob J considered such quantification as 
automatically negative, other than for the reasons identified early: namely that such an 
establishment of a minimum core would involve encroachment by the Court on the purview of 
government. Furthermore, quantifying what counts as ‘sufficient water’ may possibly risk losing 
the ‘progressive realisation’ aspect of the right. But it is asserted here that this is not an 
inevitable consequence of adopting a minimum core. Indeed, designating the core as being the 
minimum required, arguably provides impetus to move forward from this point. To this end, as 
mentioned earlier, it would seem sensible to periodically ‘ratchet up’ such a minimum core, in 
order to promote progressive realisation, and to ensure that the progress that has been achieved 
is not lost.  
The reasons set forth by the Constitutional Court in Mazibuko can be summarized as 
delivering a constitutionally deferent, pragmatic, and conditional judgment that the actions of 
the water service providers regarding the claimant’s right to water had been reasonable. 
Scholarly disagreement persists around the judgment,
741
 and its potential consequences for 
effective water governance are considered below at 4.7. The explicit restatement of 
reasonableness as the appropriate approach to socio-economic rights litigation is perhaps 
understandable in a country with limited resources and manifold social and economic 
problems. Nevertheless, it emphasizes the tension at the heart of the justiciability of socio-
economic rights, visible in each of the preceding cases: the pragmatism of progressive 
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realization versus the necessity of immediate fulfillment. To those Phiri residents now denied a 
quantum of water commensurate with their needs, and necessary for their dignity, their right to 
water rings hollow.  
 
4.7 Critique 
Throughout the preceding case analysis various conceptual lenses have been hinted at, through 
which the Court’s jurisprudence may be better understood. These lenses have been described 
as ‘judicial managerialism’, ‘judicial deference’, and ‘transformative constitutionalism’. The 
purpose of this section is to reflect upon the critical value of these lenses, in order to reach 
some instructive conclusions regarding the appropriate role that the Constitutional Court could 
play in helping to achieve the goal of access to sufficient water, by adjudicating on the right of 
access to sufficient water.   
 4.7.1 ‘Judicial Managerialism’ or (legitimate) judicial restraint? 
The exasperation behind the public statement issued by the Coalition Against Water 
Privatisation, in response to the final Mazibuko judgment (quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter) is palpable. For the vulnerable litigants, their amicus curiae, activists and campaigners 
in academia, and in broader civil society, the Court’s decision to affirm as reasonable, the 
installation of prepayment meters, and to reject calls to define a minimum core for ‘sufficient 
water’, represented the most constrained example of the judiciary’s deference to the executive 
as the sole appropriate decision maker on resource allocation. Indeed, considered in light of 
the theory on institutional approaches to judicial restraint, it appears that the judiciary afforded 
themselves an extremely small discretionary area of judgment.  In activist circles it has also 
come to symbolise the abject failure of the Court to grasp the transformative potential of the 
Bill of Rights, and to take concrete steps towards its realisation, instead lapsing into conservative 
inertia and mechanical jurisprudence. As activist and academic Jackie Dugard notes, Mazibuko 
was about more than securing the right of access to sufficient water for the people of Phiri:  
‘[T]he case has always represented a challenge to the degradation of the progressive potential of 
the Freedom Charter,
742
 the RDP,
743
 and the human rights framework, by local government 
technocrats who have come to dominate South African hydro-politics’.744  
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As such, it was hoped that the Constitutional Court would champion this challenge, and 
support a new and progressive chapter for water justice. Because of this weight of expectation, 
the actual judgment was inevitably a grave disappointment. But, without denying this, it is 
important to review the Mazibuko decision in light of the previous decisions of Soobramoney, 
Grootboom and TAC, in order to reflect on the degree of consistency that exists across the 
Court’s judgments. While this does not reduce the impetus for greater meaningful realisation of 
the right to water than Mazibuko delivered, arguably it does push us to consider other avenues 
for sustainable, equitable water delivery.  
As Justice Yacoob was keen to emphasise, arguably the Constitutional Court’s approach to 
socio-economic rights, has been consistent; developing and applying a test of reasonableness 
with which to determine the constitutional legitimacy of State (in)action. Moreover, since 
Grootboom, if government action has been deemed unreasonable, the Court’s remedial 
jurisprudence has also been consistent; broadly stipulating the necessary requirements to satisfy 
the State’s obligation to take reasonable legislative and other measures regarding the particular 
right at issue, without being overly-prescriptive regarding the minutiae of such requirements. 
Contrasting the Court’s orders in Makwanyane and in Fourie respectively, it can be clearly seen 
that, after an initially direct intervention, the Court chose to restrain itself from direct legislative 
involvement, deferring instead to the government (and Parliament). Similarly, while the orders 
in Grootboom and TAC directed government policy and activity towards particular ends, in 
both instances government retained the policy-making role. Indeed, had the Court’s decision in 
Mazibuko been otherwise, and the supplier’s actions had been found to be unreasonable, it is 
highly likely that a similarly ‘light touch’ order would have followed (eschewing the approach of 
the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal to set a particular quantum for sufficient water). 
Nevertheless, despite claims of consistency, the Mazibuko judgment can be seen to 
demonstrate a managerial (or technocratic) approach to socio-economic rights adjudication, at 
odds with the tenor in previous cases. The fact that Johannesburg Water’s ability to increase 
water supply was not scrutinised, nor was sufficient consideration given to issues of 
environmental sustainability, suggests that the Court’s conclusion that the State’s actions were 
reasonable was reached without a sufficiently deep appraisal of all the relevant factors. To 
return to Yacoob J’s schema, outlined in Grootboom, determination of the reasonableness or 
otherwise of the measures taken by the State must be made with regards to the requirements 
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for progressive realisation within available resources. While much was made of the progressive 
(i.e. progressing) quality of the water supplier’s policy (being periodically reappraised), too little 
attention was paid to establishing what constituted available resources in this context. While 
available water resources are clearly relevant to such an appraisal, there would also be likely 
consequences in relation to financial and infrastructural resources. On this point, it is important 
to provide some perspective to the ‘available resources’ qualification encountered regarding 
each of the socio-economic rights discussed. 
Recent figures remind us that public finances in South Africa are consistently dwarfed by the 
scale and cost of poverty and inequality in the country. 40% of the population is categorised as 
destitute. Welfare recipients outnumber taxpayers by three to one, and with a Gini coefficient
745
 
of 0.7%, South Africa has recently surpassed Brazil as the most unequal emerging State.
746
 The 
immediate implications of this are that the resources available to the State with which to realise 
significant improvements in people’s access to water are limited. Here, Roux’s sceptical reading 
of Makwanyane and Fourie, discussed above, offers an insightful perspective from which to 
consider the ultimate Mazibuko judgment: Ever mindful of the perceived need to maintain an 
appropriate balance in its relationship with government, the Constitutional Court not only 
refrained from setting or affirming a minimum core for the right to water, but also avoided 
imposing a multidimensional test for reasonableness (one which seriously investigated the 
relevant social, economic and environmental factors), for fear of imposing (overly) significant 
obligations upon the State. If such an appraisal is at all accurate, it is not to say that the Court’s 
judgment here was reached consciously, for existential reasons, much less Machiavellian ones. 
Rather, the high degree of deference shown towards government, and the consequently 
managerial approach to adjudicating on the right to water evident in this judgment, together 
suggest a systemic/institutional limitation to the transformative ability of the Courts: interpreting 
rights in their current, qualified form, against a backdrop of finite resources and seemingly 
infinite needs. 
 4.7.2 Transformative Constitutionalism 
At the risk of repeating the discussion at the beginning of this chapter, the dawn of the 
democratic era, and the adoption of a new Constitution and Constitutional Court, provisioned 
with an expansive and justicable Bill of Rights, signalled a new era of constitutionalism in the 
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country, and more specifically, an era of social and economic transformation following the 
recent political changes. Building on the argument above regarding the consistency of the 
Court’s approach to socio-economic rights, a shallow appraisal of the Court’s work over the last 
two decades may suggest that the Court has gradually retreated from its initial activist role, 
towards a more constrained, managerial approach. Such an analysis, it is argued, focuses too 
much on the outcomes of the various seminal cases considered above, rather than on the 
Court’s careful crafting of a consistent and distinctive jurisprudence. Doubtless at first glance 
the decision in Grootboom, ordering the government to build houses for the poor, or, in TAC, 
requiring antiretroviral drugs to be made available to all who need them, indicate a strong 
commitment to pursuing positive socio-economic transformation through rights interpretation. 
Equally it is not surprising that in contrast, Mazibuko’s failure to secure access to sufficient 
water for many, has been dismissed as being constrained at best. But even at such a superficial 
analytical level, there remains a transformative aura around the Court, discernable both in 
certain decisions, and in its very structure. Christiansen reminds us of the latent transformative 
energy in the Court’s generous locus standi provisions, outlined in Section 38 of the 
Constitution: 
Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right in the 
Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, including 
a declaration of rights. The persons who may approach a court are—  
(a) anyone acting in their own interest;  
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name;  
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons;  
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and  
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members. 
Extending beyond the usual classes of persons with immediate remediable harm, such broad 
standing facilitates greater access to the court system than is the case in most jurisdictions.
747
 
Similarly, inclusion of socio-economic rights that are justiciable, provides the Court with tools 
with which to affect transformation, and so distinguishes the Court’s role and potential from 
that of similar courts in other countries.
748
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 4.7.3 ‘Liminal Constitutionalism’ 
In anthropology, a liminal space is an intermediate stage between two, more fixed states, for 
instance the space between life and death.
749
 Liminal constitutionalism, it is suggested, is a useful 
idea to describe the role the Constitutional Court has adopted in relation to socio-economic 
rights adjudication. It applies the concept of liminality to the changing role of the Court: 
variously pushed and pulled by demands towards driving substantive transformation through 
expansive interpretations, and towards more constrained, managerial and deferential 
adjudication. These demands, which are described in the preceding discussion, are labelled 
‘Transformative Constitutionalism’ and ‘Judicial Managerialism’. 
Applied in this context, the author suggests that the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence can be 
understood by reference to such a liminal space, between an expansive and a constrained 
application of socio-economic rights. Furthermore, it is asserted that this liminal space must 
necessarily be an intermediate one, before collapsing back towards one or other of the fixed 
states outlined above. Despite initial enthusiasm for a more overtly transformative Court, and 
despite evidence that the Court remains more transformative (or at least more capable of 
affecting transformation) than its foreign counterparts, it is difficult to imagine how this could be 
maintained in the long term, if the doctrine of trias politica is to be respected. Therefore, 
recourse to a more constitutionally appropriate degree of judicial restraint (which detractors 
may call ‘managerialism’) would seem to be likely. Adopting an institutional approach to 
judicial restraint may have encouraged judges to take an expansive view of what is reviewable 
and justiciable, within a ‘discretionary area of judgment’ less inhibited by doctrinal prescription, 
than would more formalist approaches. But in the particular context of South Africa, this 
‘discretionary area’, or ‘space’ should not be seen as being fixed. Rather, the degree of 
discretion that the judiciary afford themselves (and consequently the degree of restraint shown) 
is better understood as representing a temporary, flexible, or liminal space. Plotted on top of 
the preceding case discussions, the concept of liminal constitutionalism reveals how the 
Constitutional Court has generally adopted a constitutionally appropriate (although often 
disappointing) degree of judicial restraint since its inception, despite the fact that the 
transformative activism shown by the Court has changed (and arguably diminished).  
It can be claimed that what constitutes appropriate judicial restraint may change as the country’s 
political and judicial systems evolve, and as people’s material conditions slowly improve. But, 
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perhaps more radically, in relation to the issue of access to sufficient water, it is asserted that 
discussion of transformative versus managerial roles, or minimum core versus reasonableness, 
continues to take place within the dominant paradigm, that prioritises water as a commodity. 
Therefore it may be that in relation to the overarching question of how to achieve access to 
sufficient water for everyone, even a more transformative judicial reading of the right to water 
than was in evidence in Mazibuko, may have limited benefit in securing significant 
improvements. This raises the question of how else constitutional rights can be fulfilled in order 
to promote substantive transformation (an essential aim, given the continuing and profound 
challenges of poverty experienced by many). In short, how else can socio-economic rights (and 
particularly the right to water) be pursued and championed, other than through the Courts? 
The utility of conceptualising the Constitutional Court as being in a liminal space is that it 
invites a more authentic, self-critical evaluation of the Court’s role (both actually, and 
aspirationally), including the current/potential consequences of this role for constitutionalism. 
This in turn leads to a consideration and critical re-evaluation of modes of water governance 
lying outside the current configuration of individual rights claims (made within a water-as-
commodity paradigm), and that therefore do not necessarily rely on the courts to act as the 
guarantors of distributive justice. In short, liminal constitutionalism leads us to acknowledge that 
discourse on access to water may have reached the limits of ‘rights talk’. What lies beyond is 
less familiar terrain.  
 
4.8 Reaching the limits of ‘rights talk’750 
The plight of the Phiri residents, in the aftermath of the Mazibuko judgment, reflects the 
enduring reality of water poverty for people across the country, despite their right to water. In 
Durban, where the author’s empirical work has focused, this work reflects the same problems 
as in Phiri, namely that the poorest people must routinely navigate daily existence with 
insufficient water. Paying for more water than the amount currently provided for free is rarely 
an option for people in this position. Therefore the absence of a minimum core for water that 
accurately reflects people’s most basic needs, condemns many to perpetual water poverty. It is 
against this grim reality that the Mazibuko judgment appears as such a profound failure for 
transformative constitutionalism. While the interpretative approach of the Court can be 
acknowledged for its consistency with preceding judgments, and its scrupulous adherence to 
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separation of powers sensibilities, it nevertheless represents an impotent constitutional and 
judicial response to such a crucial and basic need. The profundity of this failure inevitably raises 
the question of whether the transformative potential of socio-economic rights within their 
present interpretive framework, have reached their limits.   
The social repercussions of insufficient water for the residents of Phiri (as well as for others in 
similar situations) are obvious, although it may be difficult for those of us untouched by poverty 
to fully empathise with people in such dire conditions. Average households contain more than 
16 residents, most of whom are dependent on State pensions and/or child support grants. As a 
community they were described by the High Court as ‘poor, uneducated, unemployed and… 
ravaged by HIV/AIDS’.751 Insufficient water, regularly experienced, has multiple detrimental 
consequences for (amongst other things), health, education, gender equality, child safety, and 
domestic violence, as well as (perhaps most fundamentally) human dignity.
752
 
But there are doubtless economic and environmental consequences too. It is anticipated that 
the impact of climate change on communities like Phiri will be serious, since the existing socio-
economic deprivations undermine the material and physical resilience necessary to effectively 
adapt. As the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability working group explains: 
‘Poor communities are especially vulnerable, in particular those concentrated in high-risk areas. 
They tend to have more limited adaptive capacities and are more dependent on climate 
sensitive resources, such as local water and food supplies.’753 
In this context, any scope for economic development is seriously limited by high 
unemployment, low rates of training and education and a dearth of all but the most peripheral 
entrepreneurial opportunities.  
 Emphasising the social, economic and environmental consequences for people living with 
insufficient water reflects the established ‘Trinitarian’ model of sustainable development. This 
model (requiring consideration of social, economic and environmental factors) is central to the 
IWRM/ developmental water management (DWM) approach to water allocation, discussed in 
Chapter Three (at 3.4), and evident in the Second National Water Resource Strategy 
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(NWRS2). The model is also visible to differing degrees in the Courts’ engagement with the 
Mazibuko case. But it is the social concerns of the Phiri residents, pitched against the economic 
impetus of Johannesburg Water, that are seen most clearly. The High Court and Supreme 
Court of Appeal afforded more weight to those social considerations of individual necessity for 
water and dignity; the Constitutional Court emphasized the nature of water as an economic 
good and the pragmatic limitations of progressive realization. The question of sustainability was 
raised before the Constitutional Court in relation to the ability of Johannesburg Water to 
provide a particular quantity of sufficient water per person. But this was distinctly a question of 
economic sustainability linked to the assumption that the water provider must be able to 
operate competitively. Concerns about environmental protection and the potential ecological 
implications of climate change, or of doubling the quantum of sufficient water, were 
conspicuous by their absence from the judgments of the High Court and Supreme Court of 
Appeal. Neither court mentioned the so-called ‘environmental right’ (particularly sustainable 
development) in Section 24 of the Constitution
754
. Despite environmental protection and 
sustainability featuring heavily in the legislation, these considerations appeared neither in the 
obiter or ratio of the Mazibuko judgments.  
The absence of environmental considerations is common to rights-talk in general, since 
individuals’ rights claims are contested largely in isolation from the realities of resource scarcity. 
Such an atomised approach to rights adjudication emphasises the very practical limitations of an 
anthropocentric human rights narrative. Yet given the exigencies of water scarcity in South 
Africa, and more generally the Anthropocene challenges mentioned earlier in Chapter Two, it 
seems essential that the focus of water governance must be eco-socially sustainable. Stewart and 
Horsten’s critique of the absence of environmental considerations in Mazibuko leads them to 
ask how and where water is used (60% agriculture, 15% industry etc), and the justification for 
such use in the face of the dual realities of water scarcity and insufficient water access for 
many
755
. Such questions, if raised in the context of litigation are likely to transgress the legitimate 
purview of the Courts. But when asked outside this forum, they can aid the imperative of 
keeping social, economic and environmental aspects of water access interconnected. 
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A second critique is that adjudication of rights claims can remove their public, political 
dimensions, ‘domesticating issues of poverty’ and casting them as private, or familial matters756.  
The limitations of a rights-based approach to basic resource allocation are briefly sketched 
below. 
A liberal analysis of the limitations of rights tends to focus on flawed implementation: Sound 
ideas suffer from insufficient resources or poor application. But a radical critique suggests that 
the limitations of using rights to achieve genuine socio-economic improvements lie in the way 
that rights (internationally accepted human rights or constitutional rights) give legal form to 
moral claims. In so doing the moral claim is diluted, turning it into a technical legal problem 
and bureaucratizing away the imperative to meet the claim on which the right is founded
757
. 
When conceived as a legal problem, considerations like progressive realization, reasonableness 
and available resources become acceptable explanations for unmet claims. The moral claim 
that everyone should have access to the quantum of water required for dignified existence is 
immediately diminished because of the Constitution’s limitations clause, which provides that 
the State can restrict rights if it is doing so reasonably
758
. Similarly the Constitution provides for 
the progressive realization of socio-economic rights, but only within available resources. Lack of 
available resources is therefore a (legally) legitimate reason for unfulfilled rights, despite the size 
and nature of available resources remaining undisclosed. So, expressing the claim of access to 
water in legal form (as a right) creates practical difficulties, and allows for inchoate application. 
But there is also a normative dissonance between the moral claim and the narrative of a human 
right to water, particularly when interpreted in light of water commodification and privatization. 
As Karen Bakker explains:  
‘Human rights are individualistic, anthropocentric, state-centric, and compatible with private sector 
provision of water supply… Moreover, ‘rights talk’ offers us an unimaginative language for thinking 
about new community economies…occluding possibilities for collective action beyond corporatist 
models of service provision’.759  
Such a critique need not deny that the right of access to sufficient water has helped reduce the 
number of people living with insufficient water in South Africa. The pursuit of the right has had 
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positive substantive and normative effects and has underpinned significant legal victories.
760
 But 
Pieterse
761
 and Bond
762
 assert that human rights generally, and Constitutional rights specifically in 
South Africa, concentrate on consciousness-raising and recognition of individual’s rights to 
necessities, rather than focusing on redistribution, reparation, and environmental exigencies. 
Their potential for social transformation is therefore limited. More stridently, Brand asserts that 
‘the law, including adjudication, works in a variety of ways to destroy the societal structures 
necessary for politics, to close down space for political contestation’.763 The importance of 
contestation is explored further in Chapter Five. 
Countering these limitations are a growing cacophony of voices advocating for a paradigm shift, 
away from individualized rights, towards the ‘commons’, and a culture of sharing, which is 
becoming known as ‘commoning’, towards which attention will shortly turn. 
Critiqued in this way, the Constitutional Court’s decision in Mazibuko illustrates the limitations 
of using rights (including principally the right of access to sufficient water) to achieve sustainable 
access to sufficient water for the most vulnerable. Unsurprisingly therefore, the strategy of 
campaigners, civil society and those affected by water poverty, is changing in response. Reliance 
on litigation and an overly-optimistic conception of the developmental role of the Courts, is 
being challenged, and replaced. Instead a shift towards advocating for greater grass-roots, 
community action, is emerging, aimed not at challenging the legality of inchoately experienced 
rights, but at reconfiguration at the community level, to address the underlying problem of 
water poverty more effectively than does the status quo.
764
  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
760
 See: Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local Council [2002] JOL 9513 (W). Hereafter 
Bon Vista. 
761
 M Pieterse ‘Eating Socio-economic Rights: The Usefulness of Rights Talk in Alleviating Social Hardship 
Revisited’ (2007) 29 Human Right Quarterly 796, 822. 
762
 P Bond ‘South Africa’s rights culture of water consumption: Breaking out of the liberal box and into the 
commons?’ (Syracuse conference, Cape Town, February 2010). 
763
 D Brand ‘The politics of need interpretation and the adjudication of socio-economic rights claims in South 
Africa’ in A J van der Walt (ed) Theories of Social and Economic Justice (African Sun Media, 2005) 17, 35. 
764
 See: Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa website <http://www.seri-sa.org> (Last accessed 27 July 
2016). 
179 
 
4.9 Chapter summary and concluding comments 
Charting the role of the Constitutional Court and its interpretation of socio-economic rights in 
the context of contemporary South Africa (including an expansive Bill of Rights, an intransigent 
ANC government, manifold social and economic problems, and limited resources) has been an 
essential step towards understanding the limitations surrounding using the right to water to help 
realise the goal of access to sufficient for everyone. 
While analysis of the Court’s approach to socio-economic rights has variously emphasised its 
jurisprudential consistency on the one hand, and its retreat from transformative 
constitutionalism, towards more managerial decisions, on the other, the enduring material 
realities of insufficient access to healthcare, shelter, and water, amongst other necessities, 
nevertheless leads to the conclusion that a ‘top-down’ transformative role for the Courts should 
not be overly relied upon. For example, sixteen years after the Grootboom decision, many 
South Africans still do not have access to adequate housing. 
It is perhaps unfair to excessively criticise the Constitutional Court for not presiding over 
greater positive transformation than it has, despite the surfeit of socio-economic rights at its 
disposal. Indeed, the Court’s current Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng adds some much-
needed perspective as to the scale of the task: 
‘By any standards, 20 years is too short a period to gauge the effectiveness of the mechanisms 
designed to undo at least 300 years of racial subjugation and economic disempowerment. A lot 
of good has been done. There has [sic] been quite a number of teething and unanticipated 
problems. But there has also been several self-inflicted and progress-inhibiting impediments. 
We need a radical paradigm shift in our approach to this.’765 
The final line here also hints at the limitations inherent within the current judicial approach to 
socio-economic rights (however expansively they are framed, and no matter how transformative 
their outcomes might be at times). Arguably such limitations stem from an overly individualistic 
conception of rights. Conceived as such, any constitutional right is inchoate and can raise hope 
beyond what can realistically be achieved. Moreover, despite judicial differences between the 
lower and higher courts in Mazibuko, the final judgment – representing what is ultimately a 
constrained expression of a moral claim – signifies the inevitable limitation of achieving 
development through law. What actually occurred is that the Constitutional Court filtered the 
moral claim through a legal lens, which invariably diminished the significance of the overriding 
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goal to be reached. Perhaps in a democratic society, and a capitalist economy, this is as much as 
can be expected from a judicial forum.
766
 Any more is pure utopia. But this need not be the end 
of the tale. There are other approaches, such as an emphasis upon collective rights and 
commons allocation, which might equally provide an alternative, and perhaps more effective, 
means to achieve transformative goals, even if they currently stray beyond the confines of what 
is considered generally appropriate. Moreover, such approaches also emphasise the 
significance, nay the necessity, of moving away from the traditional and sterile dichotomies in 
development discourse – public v. private, market v. State-controlled, commodification v. 
human right, international v. municipal - that have so far informed the dominant discourses on 
water governance at the international and national (South African) levels and towards more 
pluralist interpretations of the interlinkages between law, development and politics. Although 
such interpretations may be less easy to categorise and rationalise from a formal, legal 
perspective, they are as much part of the social reality as are the keynote constitutional 
judgments considered above. 
 
Here, the notion of liminality may be of use once again, in helping to conceptualise the 
epistemic shifts hinted at thus far. Rather than just denoting a temporary jurisprudential location 
in the self-image of the Constitutional Court (between more transformative and more 
constrained judgments), liminal constitutionalism can also describe the threshold between 
understanding the courts as the principal guardian of socio-economic rights, and emerging 
‘new/old’767 modes of water governance that are becoming increasingly important sites for 
contesting sustainable and equitable solutions. Serendipitously, the physical properties of water, 
as flowing, fluid, and resisting stasis, would seem to encourage consideration of similarly fluid 
modes of governance. It is towards some of these, that our attention now turns.  
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5 
Water stories, community 
organisation and ‘commons’ 
thinking 
 
‘And all those who had believed were together and had all things in common; and they 
began selling their property and possessions and were sharing them with all, as anyone 
might have need.’ 
Acts 2:44-45
768
 
‘The first step towards reimaging a world gone terribly wrong would be to stop the 
annihilation of those who have a different imagination – an imagination that is outside 
capitalism as well as communism. An imagination which has an altogether different 
understanding of what constitutes happiness and fulfilment. To gain this philosophical 
space, it is necessary to concede some physical space for the survival of those who may look 
like the keepers of our past, but who may really be the guides to our future’ 
Arundhati Roy
769
 
‘With deregulation, privatisation, free trade, what we're seeing is yet another enclosure and, 
if you like, private taking of the commons. One of the things I find very interesting in our 
current debates is this concept of who creates wealth. That wealth is only created when it's 
owned privately. What would you call clean water, fresh air, a safe environment? Are they 
not a form of wealth? And why does it only become wealth when some entity puts a fence 
around it and declares it private property? Well, you know, that's not wealth creation. That's 
wealth usurpation.’ 
 
Elaine Bernard
770
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5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have outlined a rights-based approach to access to water, and have 
concluded that this approach, in its current configuration, is unlikely to be successful in 
achieving access to sufficient water for everyone in the country. 
 
This chapter will first use an empirical study to provide supporting evidence for the claim that 
20 years of a constitutional right to water have made inadequate impact on the ground for the 
many people still living in water poverty (the statistical data in support of this has already been 
outlined in Chapter Three). It is hypothesised that the current, primary legal solution to the 
problem of water poverty (a right of access to sufficient water), framed within a water-as-
commodity paradigm, is inadequate, because of the inadequacy of the theory behind the law: 
namely that conferral of a qualified, individual right will affect significant positive change. 
Therefore, it is suggested that the paradigm upon which the current legal solution is based 
needs to be reconsidered. This is supported by the perceived failure of the right to water to 
effectively facilitate access to sufficient water for everyone in the country – as evinced in the 
Constitutional Court’s judgment in Mazibuko.  
 
This chapter then looks to current practice to see whether any viable alternatives arise from 
within the empirical study undertaken. It identifies practices that reflect ‘commons’ approaches 
to water access, which it is suggested may help to redesign and reinvigorate water governance in 
South Africa. The chapter examines the potential that commons approaches represent as an 
alternative (or as an adjunct) to the present, dominant mode of water governance in South 
Africa (as discussed in Chapters Three and Four), seeking to understand these practices 
through an alternative legal paradigm, referred to as ‘water-as-commons’. 
 
Structured in this way, the chapter contains two distinct sections; one is comprised of research 
(interview findings), the other analysis. But rather than present these sections in separate 
chapters, they have remained together as a reminder that ‘the medium is the message’: that 
including the voices of water poor people within analysis of the right to water is an integral part 
of reimagining water governance (this methodological insight is explained and applied more 
fully below at 5.2.2). Here, commons approaches to water governance are scrutinised using a 
combination of theoretical, historical and empirical enquiry. Central to the use of empirical 
data is the connection between people’s experiences of living with insufficient water, and 
commons approaches that are arising in response to these experiences.  
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  The limits of a right of access to water within a water-as-commodity paradigm 
Throughout the thesis so far, mention has been made of the various ways in which water, and 
access to water can be conceived. Particular emphasis has been given to conceptions of water as 
being a public good (held on trust and administered by the State), or a commodity (the 
economic value of which is prioritised). As detailed in Chapter Two, and Chapters Three and 
Four respectively, the commodification of water (treating water primarily as an economic good) 
in recent years has been encouraged and embraced internationally (with varied success), as well 
as in South Africa. This has had a considerable effect on water governance in South Africa, 
generating legislation and strategic priorities that advocate full cost recovery, and influencing 
judicial decisions on the reasonableness of water policies. Throughout the thesis a terminology 
of paradigms is used in order to describe the various conceptions of water that are considered. 
Conceiving of water primarily as a commodity is referred to as a ‘water-as-commodity 
paradigm’. 
 The previous chapter concluded that a constitutional right to water, as it is currently expressed, 
(requiring reasonable measures to be taken towards its progressive fulfilment, contingent upon 
available resources) could not ensure that everyone experiences access to sufficient water with 
which to meet their basic needs. Viewed from within a water-as-commodity paradigm, one 
response to this perceived failure may be to reappraise the current expression of the right to 
water. This could include debating the advantages of a minimum core approach to the right to 
water versus a reasonableness approach (as developed and favoured by the Constitutional 
Court). Another response may be to pursue greater clarity and transparency around the issue of 
available resources, and to identify opportunities within the current political structures to 
advocate for greater prioritisation of socio-economic rights. More radically, the sacrosanct status 
of Separation of Powers, (as attested to by the Court’s consistently deferential stance towards 
government and parliament), could be further critiqued, perhaps emphasising an 
instrumentalist approach to transformative constitutionalism, less sensitive to trespassing on 
policy decisions, in the pursuit of securing significant material improvements. And there are, no 
doubt, other ways to respond to, and improve on, the inchoate right of access to sufficient water 
in its present form, within a water-as-commodity paradigm. 
Some of the above critiques have been elaborated on in Chapter Four, while others lie outside 
the remit of this thesis. But each of them shares some common attributes, the identification of 
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which is crucial to introducing the purpose of this chapter. First, the right of access to sufficient 
water, in its current form, pertains to individuals: ‘Everyone has the right of access to… 
sufficient food and water’.771 As such, the right is not conferred collectively on groups (families, 
communities etc.). Rather, each person has her/his own right. Second, the right is one of ‘access 
to sufficient water’, as opposed to ‘ownership of sufficient water’ or a ‘right to water’.772 This 
complements the designation of water in the National Water Act, as being under ‘public 
trusteeship’, administered by the State, for the benefit of the nation (see discussion at 3.3.2). 
This also limits potential encroachment upon individuals’ property rights under the 
Constitution
773
 (which will be critiqued at length below, in relation to access to water). Third, 
despite the emphasis on individuals’ rights of access to water within the Constitution and 
legislation, simultaneous reference to water as an economic good, and to the need to achieve 
‘efficient use’ of water, has perpetuated and reinforced commercial approaches to water service 
provision, which emphasise cost-recovery.
774
 Such an approach was clearly acknowledged in 
Mazibuko, and was accepted without criticism by the Constitutional Court (see above at 4.7). 
Together, these attributes support a reading of the current right of access to sufficient water as 
existing within a water-as-commodity paradigm (as introduced in Chapter One, and applied in 
the South African context in Chapter Three at 3.4). In short, the right to water is individualistic; 
it is compatible with private property rights; and it is interpreted in light of a priori assumptions 
about the commerciality of water services.  Therefore, further debate around judicial deference, 
government priorities, or the reasonableness of ‘reasonableness’ (!), however beneficial, is likely 
to take place within the same paradigm, asserting (more or less consciously) the same attributes 
of the right to water identified above.  
However, the conclusions drawn in the previous chapter, about the limits of rights talk, provide 
the impetus for this thesis to open up new space in which to reimagine water governance, and 
the role and efficacy of a right to water. It is therefore the principal purpose of this chapter to 
attempt such a reimagination, and to propose a paradigm shift: from water-as-commodity, 
towards water-as-commons.  
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  Exploring and experiencing the consequences of a paradigm shift 
The chapter begins by reflecting on the experiences of some of the many people living in water-
poverty in South Africa (regularly experiencing insufficient access to water, with myriad negative 
consequences). This applies the practice of ‘narrative inquiry’ (see above at 1.3.1 and below at 
5.2.1).
775
 Embracing narrative (the telling of a story) as both a method and a phenomenon of 
study, narrative inquiry ‘involves the reconstruction of a person’s experience in relationship 
both to the other and to a social milieu’:776 By deliberately including within this thesis the voices 
and stories of water-poor people, the shortcomings of the current right to water can be exposed 
not just as causing legal or political problems, but also social problems, personally and 
communally experienced. As will be seen, these experiences create multiple histories that attest 
to some material improvements, as well as to continuing disenfranchisement and 
discrimination, suggesting some unsettling continuities with the country’s troubled past. 
Moreover, the application of narrative inquiry
777
 here - actively listening to the experiences of 
water-poor people, and their responses to water-poverty – reveals ideas, attitudes and actions 
that can inform and inspire attempts to reimagine water governance in more equitable and 
sustainable ways. To this end the chapter considers the enfranchising potential of narrative, 
before analysing the interviews conducted, and their connection to the arguments in the current 
and preceding chapters. 
As will become apparent, it is argued that across myriad community/communal/co-
operative/commons organisational modes attested to in the empirical work conducted by the 
author, as well as by other researchers, there are some sufficiently discernable shared 
characteristics, which warrant discussion of these modes within a single (albeit broad) paradigm: 
commons approaches to water governance, or ‘water-as-commons’. Commons theories are 
introduced, and the history of ‘commoning’ in various parts of the world is traced, in order to 
locate ‘commons thinking’ within a rich and complex mixture of ancient traditions, indigenous 
knowledge systems and postmodern theory. It is asserted that commons thinking, applied to the 
task of helping achieve access to sufficient water, is capable of reimagining water governance to 
effectively respond to key problems associated with insufficient water access. Of particular note 
here is the emerging conceptual shift from government to governance, and consequently the 
growing importance of multi-level governance and grass roots organisations, both of which 
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prioritise stakeholder participation and enfranchisement.
778
 This shift is analysed in more detail 
below. 
Although serious criticisms of commons thinking exist in the literature, and are acknowledged 
and explored here, this chapter’s consideration of the potential of the commons to help 
reimagine water governance is unapologetically optimistic in parts. This optimism (and the 
conscious suspension of negative preconceptions associated with non-hierarchical, grass-roots 
modes of governance, which it entails) is crucial to creating fresh epistemic space within which 
ideas can emerge and play, uninhibited by the confines of the dominant paradigm. Within such 
a space, the erstwhile inviolate phenomena of private property, commodification,
779
 and human 
rights are deconstructed and reconsidered in relation to how best to meet the challenge of 
securing access to sufficient water for everyone. 
This interrogation of commons thinking will prepare the way to argue that the current state of 
water governance in South Africa should be reviewed in order to better facilitate and encourage 
the growth of community-specific bottom-up water solutions. 
 
5.2 Story-telling: Listening to people’s lived experiences 
So far in this thesis most of the research underpinning my writing has come from sources that 
are traditionally accepted and expected in legal scholarship, including books, journal articles, 
case reports, legislation, and treaties. While the sources used have been chosen for their 
specific relevance to the subject of the thesis, it is perceived that they also meet a more general 
standard, which warrants their inclusion, namely that of offering ‘methodologically validated 
knowledge about society’780 (or at least that part of society being scrutinised). There is an 
assumption that such scholarly resources are accepted because they pursue and/or reflect 
‘truth’.781 
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By contrast, we tend to think of ‘story-telling’ differently. We synonymise stories with fiction, 
rhetoric, and even hyperbole, which mark story telling out as an altogether less serious 
endeavour than scholarship.
782
 Indeed, for a long time, story-telling (narrative form, or 
‘narrativity’, as it is referred to in sociological literature) has been deliberately avoided in legal 
scholarship; scorned by scholars as being ‘forever a bastard discipline’:783 particularistic, 
idiosyncratic and imprecise. More recently however, narrative form has begun to be embraced, 
as a means of incorporating subjective and specific accounts of social life, within consciously 
socio-legal work. In such a context, the criticisms of particularism, idiosyncrasy, and 
imprecision are beginning to be celebrated as providing ‘a promising vehicle for introducing 
legal decision-makers to a more complex, ambiguous legal subject’.784  This has been driven, in 
large part, by the emerging challenges within social-scientific scholarship, to claims of ‘truth’, 
and ‘pretence to objectivity’ (as mentioned above in relation to formalist approaches to judicial 
restraint).
785
 These challenges are themselves symptomatic of a ‘postmodern turn’ within wider 
society, described by Best & Kellnor as:  
‘a turn away from modern discourses of truth, certainty, universality, essence, and system, and a 
rejection of grand historical narratives of liberation and revolution’.786 
This section offers a brief reconsideration of the role of legal research through stories, asserting 
that narrative inquiry is necessary in order to understand law in action, and therefore, in the 
context of this thesis, essential for appreciating the manifold challenges facing people seeking to 
secure access to sufficient water. Although commonplace in sociology, and notwithstanding the 
work of scholars including Ewick & Sillbey, and Abrams, this method remains underused in 
legal research.
787
 Having deliberately adopted such a method here, a brief justification for it is 
provided. It is argued that including people’s stories alongside ‘legal’ materials is necessary in 
order to more fully understand the potential that commons approaches have to positively shape 
water governance. Furthermore, it is asserted that the traditional ‘legal’ materials identified 
above are themselves examples of telling stories. Some of the decentring consequences of this 
assertion are considered below.  
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 5.2.1 Enacting a methodology of narrative inquiry 
The general methodology and method that my empirical work follows is detailed in Chapter 
One (1.3). Here, some deeper reflections are offered around the particular importance of 
narrative inquiry in the specific context of this thesis and its focus. 
In March 2000, shortly before the Millennium Development Goals were agreed, the World 
Bank published a significant report on people’s experiences of living in poverty, entitled ‘Voices 
of the Poor: Can anyone hear us?’788 It was compiled from 60,000 interviews in 60 countries, 
offering important context for the forthcoming MDGs. In so doing, the report brought narrative 
inquiry to the forefront of development studies. Voices of the Poor also gave essential insight 
into the nature of poverty, concluding that poverty is much more than lack of income. Poverty 
was also identified with people’s experience of under-representation in their political 
institutions, and of being denied a ‘voice’ with which to influence the key decisions that affect 
their lives. 
  Voices of the water-poor 
Inspired by the report’s methodology, as well as by its conclusions around the disenfranchising 
effects of poverty, the interviews I conducted with members of water poor communities, have 
sought to emulate it (on a much-reduced scale), by recording personal accounts of people’s 
experiences of accessing (in)sufficient water, and the implications of this. Also, in the process of 
interviewing, I sought to acknowledge the (modest) enfranchising potential of narrative itself. 
The very act of listening to people’s accounts of the challenges they face in accessing water can 
communicate affirmation to the story-teller: that their experiences matter; that they have been 
noticed; and that, in some small way at least, they have a ‘voice’. As Spanbauer lyrically reminds 
us: 
‘The only thing that keeps us from floating off with the wind is our stories. They give us a name 
and put us in a place, allow us to keep on touching.’789 
Such sentiments are affirmed in my own experience of interviewing people, most of whom have 
been extremely eager to tell their stories, to share their names, and to open their homes.  
Throughout the thesis, as people’s experiences are represented in quotations from their own 
stories, it is important to be mindful that any process of representation is complex. Here some 
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of the recent scholarship on narrative methodologies and postmodern approaches to social 
research is relevant. Critiquing the modernist assumption that meaning can be discovered by 
dispassionate observation and experimentation, postmodern approaches to social science 
suggest that there is a first step that must precede such empirical work. This first step ‘requires a 
shifting of the way the world is seen and the construction of a new world to investigate’.790 In 
light of this, my attempts to capture and represent people’s stories can be seen as a mode of 
intervention, which changes the way the world (here, the phenomenon of living without access 
to sufficient water) is understood, and opens up new spaces to investigate.
791
  Not only can this 
insight break open the epistemological closures that are assumed in traditional legal research 
(for instance a justiciable right of access to sufficient water, granted within certain constraints is 
expected to result in effective provision of sufficient water), it also decentres epistemology as the 
pivot of research, requiring that fresh ontological enquiry must precede it.
792
 
Applying these insights to the foregoing research into water governance at the international and 
domestic levels, including the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence, we are reminded that 
epistemological research traditions (that delineate knowledge from thought and experience) are 
never independent of the socio-cultural context in which they are practised. Rather, they are 
inevitably coded by ‘the structures, conceptuality and conventions of language, embodied in 
discourses and texts’.793 Even though the sources that have been used to analyse water 
governance thus far are familiar to (legal) epistemological research, they cannot escape socio-
cultural contextualisation. Neither can they avoid relying upon the meaning-constituting system 
that language is. Therefore, even the most positivist/empiricist sources used can be understood 
as stories, which cannot be separated from their subjectivity, history or socio-cultural location, 
or from the coding of the language in which they are represented. The same holds for the 
ensuing discussion of the commons, and the reflections on people’s lived experiences of access 
to (in)sufficient water.  
Some of the experiences shared below affirm that there have been improvements in access to 
water, particularly since 1994. But most of the people interviewed also document that 
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challenges remain. Many of the stories shared remain focused on the problems of accessing 
sufficient water. While others tell us how their experiences of water-poverty have led them to 
develop responses that (to differing degrees) reflect the salient features of commons thinking.  
5.2.2 ‘The Medium is the Message’: the importance of narrative inquiry for commons 
thinking 
In 1964 the philosopher and communication theorist Marshal McLuhan coined the phrase ‘the 
medium is the message’.794 McLuhan’s insight - that the medium through which a message is 
communicated, influences the message itself – is pertinent to the inclusion here of the 
experiences of water-poor people, in a discourse around alternative modes of water 
governance. Without this, the content of the ‘message’ - that more appropriate approaches to 
water are possible - risks being undermined by the medium used (by an enquiry undertaken at 
a great distance - geographically, empathetically and experientially - using legal and other 
scholarly materials, the privileged status of which results in an over-emphasis on the efficacy of 
legal mechanisms, without sufficient appreciation of their lived consequences).  
In contrast, this enquiry has deliberately sought to embed the legal analysis of the right to water 
within the social context that makes it meaningful: the experiences of those living without 
sufficient water. Therefore, it is hoped that as the role of community organisation and 
commons thinking are analysed, the medium – discourse that includes people’s experience of, 
and response to, water poverty – will positively influence, ground, and sensitise the message (or 
conclusions that are reached). 
Furthermore, such is the importance placed on the need for commons approaches to spring 
from the priorities and capacities of the communities themselves, (as evidenced below) that it is 
difficult to imagine how any serious enquiry into the potential of the commons to affect modes 
of governance could be undertaken in isolation from the relevant lived experience of 
communities. Inclusion (in some shape or form) of people’s experience within the fabric of 
commons responses seems vital to the methodological integrity of commons thinking. 
Therefore, throughout the thesis, but particularly in this chapter, the emphases placed on the 
stories of water-poor people, and on commons modes of water governance, do not represent 
two separate foci: Rather, they are intertwined.  
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5.3 Stories from water-poor people – glimpses of the commons 
This section considers some stories of people’s experiences of life where access to sufficient 
water is problematic. These stories have been collected over a number of years, and from a 
variety of places in rural and peri-urban KwaZulu-Natal (in South Africa) and from rural and 
peri-urban locations around the city of Blantyre in Malawi.  Most of the stories come from 
interviews that I have conducted, but some recent empirical work conducted by Sophie 
Hellberg is also used in relation to the development of water governance approaches across 
eThekwini municipality.
795
  
In most of the communities in South Africa that I visited, English was not the primary spoken 
language, although certain interviewees spoke fluent English. Consequently some interviews 
were conducted through an interpreter, and so the extracts used to recount people’s stories, 
where interpretation was necessary, are not verbatim. Rather, the interpreter has rendered 
interviewees’ words spoken in isiZulu, into English. Where extracts from dialogues are 
reproduced, the name of each speaker is indicated using their initials. As the interviewer, my 
initials (NC) appear where necessary for clarity. Although often interviewee’s names are 
anonymised in empirical research, here the decision was made to refer to participants by the 
names they chose to give (either their full names, first name only, or nickname). The first 
reason for this is that there is an extremely rare chance of participants’ identities being 
discovered and recognised by readers, given the relatively isolated location of participants’ 
communities, as well as the academic audience at which this research is directed. The second is 
that referring to participants by name seems appropriate given one of the stated aims of the 
empirical work within the thesis: to allow people to tell their own personal stories.  
 5.3.1 A recap of the content of the right to water  
Since most of the interviews below were conducted in South Africa, where a right of access to 
sufficient water is constitutionally enshrined, the question of what is sufficient water is 
particularly relevant in analysing people’s experiences of access to water in relation to their 
constitutional right. As detailed in Chapters Three and Four, what constitutes ‘sufficient water’ 
is contentious. But, as discussion of the relevance of an internationally acknowledged right to 
water (in Chapter Two) reminds us, considerable effort has been taken to define a minimum 
core requirement for the right to water, which is at least indicative of what constitutes sufficient 
water, in the South African context. Indeed, the Constitution of South Africa requires courts to 
                                                          
795
 See Chapter One at 1.3.1 for more detail on how interviewees were approached, including information 
provided, clarification of expectations, informed consent, and data protection. 
192 
 
consider international law.
796
 This was in evidence in the case of Mazibuko discussed in Chapter 
Four, and particularly visible in the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal judgments. 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment number 15 on 
the right to water
797
 has been discussed at length in Chapter Two. But it is worth reminding 
ourselves of what General Comment 15 (GC 15) states as being the necessary content of the 
right to water. Paragraph 2 describes the human right to water as entitling, ‘everyone to 
sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic 
uses.’798 This provides a yardstick with which to measure how closely people’s experiences of 
access to (in)sufficient water correspond to what has been authoritatively determined as 
everyone’s requisite entitlement.799 Therefore, as people’s stories of water-poverty are shared, 
the level of access they describe, as well as the conditions surrounding access, can be analysed 
in relation to the broad requirements of sufficiency, accessibility and affordability, as stated in 
GC 15 (each of these requirements is defined and analysed in detail in Chapter Two, at 2.3). 
 5.3.2 Stories from rural KwaZulu-Natal 
The Winterton base of Christian development charity ‘Youth With A Mission’ (YWAM) 
facilitated interviews with people in the communities of Okhombe and Woodford. YWAM 
undertakes community development activities in these villages and settlements, which are close 
to the Winterton base. 
  Okhombe 
Okhombe is a large dispersed village at the foot of the Drakensberg Mountains, in eastern 
KwaZulu-Natal, three hours’ drive inland from Durban. The population is around 500 people, 
whose primary language is isiZulu.
800
 Here, Mbali Miya (MM) and Mpume (Mp) share their 
experiences of accessing water:
801
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NC: Where do you get your water? 
MM: Wheelbarrows to fetch from a tap [standpipe]… Sometimes there is a queue it is difficult 
because you want water but there is a queue and you have to wait.  
NC: How long does it take to get the water you need? 
MM: During winter the water is very scarce in this community. You have to queue even to get a 
litre 
NC: Have you ever not been able to get any water out of the tap? 
MM: Usually that tap, the water comes, you do pumping, but sometimes we don’t get any water 
out… Before we vote they said the municipality said they were going to supply everyone. Every 
house is going to have a tap. They started digging for where the pipes to go. Then after voting they 
just stopped [2009 general election]. 
NC: Is the water clean/clear? Does it taste OK? 
MM: Sometimes the water that comes out is not good. These days it’s smelling not good, like 
fish… when it rains I think mud gets pumped in or something. 
NC: Have you ever got ill from the water? 
MM: Yeah, everyone says they do get ill. Runny tummy. I don’t know if it’s the water. 
Mp: Because we don’t have taps we get water from the standpipe. When it rains the water from 
the river comes in around the standpipe and I think it makes it bad. Sometimes it just comes dirty 
water. 
NC: Do you use it? 
Mp: Yeah 
NC: Do you boil it? 
Mp: Yeah no not really, just put jik [bleach] in and leave it overnight and then use it in the 
morning. Because sometimes you want to cook and you want to make things and so you cannot 
wait for a long long time… You cannot boil it as it’s too much, you’re wasting your wood. 
NC: What about the cost? Do you have to pay for the water you use? 
Mp: No it’s for free… as much as you can get. 
Mbali and Mpume’s account reveals that they regularly encounter significant problems relating 
to water access. Sufficiency, relating to the volume of water necessary to meet their personal 
and domestic needs, is one such problem when the flow from the communal standpipe they 
use is slow or stops. Equally, the unpleasant odour and dirty appearance of water at times, as 
well as the anecdotal connections made within their community between water and diarrhoea, 
all draw into question the acceptability and indeed the safety of the water they access. Because 
they fetch water using a wheelbarrow to carry 20 litre plastic buckets or drums, physical 
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accessibility is also a challenge. Even for able-bodied people, collecting enough water to meet 
the daily needs of a family in this way is tiring and time-consuming. For elderly or infirm 
residents such a method of collecting water is prohibitive, as ‘Gremmah’ (Grandma) Mbongwa 
explains: 
‘When it rains we collect the water from the roof. It’s better than carrying it from the river [200 
metres away]. The rainwater can be rusty from the roof, but we put extra Jik [bleach] in it. So 
it’s ok. It doesn’t taste nice when I make tea… 
If it hasn’t rained, I get one of the children to go to the river for us. We still have to put Flash in 
the water, because the cows shit in it. If not, I get the runs.’802 
Indeed, living on the outskirts of Okhombe, and far from a standpipe, Gremmah Mbongwa’s 
access to water is doubly problematic. Not only is her closest source of water (other than rain 
water) too far away for her to carry it, the source – the river - is also not an ‘improved water 
source’. An improved water source is one that, by the nature of its construction and when 
properly used, adequately protects the source from outside contamination, particularly faecal 
matter.
803
 Therefore those in Gremmah Mbongwa’s situation must rely on others to fetch water 
for them, and then must take steps to try to reduce the chances that this water will cause 
diarrhoea.  
Clearly these experiences of access to water fall short of the content of the right to water, as 
clarified by GC 15. Measured against the requirements of GC 15, only the affordability of 
Mbali and Mpume’s water regularly meets the standard set, since they are not charged for the 
water they access. Their account also provides an insight into the potential for people’s access 
to water to become politicised. The election-time promise of improved water service provision 
should have arisen from the municipality’s commitment to progressively realise the 
constitutional right to water, and from an appraisal that resources were available to this end. 
Instead, it seems that Okhombe residents were offered false hope of improvement, in return 
for their vote. Gremmah Mbongwa also recalls that in 1994 the municipality first started to talk 
about piping water to each house. This possibility resurfaced as a local election promise made 
by both the ANC and IFP (Inkata Freedom Party) campaigns during 2008.
804
 Furrows were dug 
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in the run-up to the election, in preparation for pipes to be laid, but were abandoned once 
election time was over.  
  Woodford  
35 kilometres west of Okhombe is the village of Woodford. The community here faces 
significant problems of material and social deprivation. It is estimated that 40% of its population 
of several hundred residents
805
 are ‘economically inactive’.806 I interviewed three residents, 
Nombuso Khaba (NK), and two sisters, Vosile (V) and Elizabeth (E). They shared similar 
experiences to people in Okhombe, regarding the accessibility and quality of their water supply. 
But there was some disagreement about whether the water they accessed was a cause of illness. 
Also Nombuso’s account of the municipality’s decision to stop charging for water provides an 
interesting example of community organisation in relation to water services. Although it was 
unclear whether before this decision people were finding water access unaffordable, or whether 
their principal complaint was that they were being charged for an intermittent supply. 
NC: Where do you get your water from? 
NK: Fetching from the tap [standpipe] 
NC: How much water do you use in a day? 
NK: Maybe eight 20 litres [8 x 20 litre buckets] for 11 [people in the household] 
NC: Have you ever been sick from the water, or do you know anyone else who has had health 
problems from the water? 
NK: Before she [Nombuso’s cousin] was having stomach problem, so when she gone to the 
doctor they said she got a water virus, she doesn’t know if it’s water or what. 
NC: Do you ever have any problems with the supply? 
NK: The water sometimes becomes dirty for a while before they [the municipality] clean them. 
Sometimes they just finish – cut off – without any notice, and sometimes its not tasting good. 
NC: How many times is it cut off in a month? 
NK: Maybe twice a month… It doesn’t taste good because they are using chlorine. 
NC: Do you have to pay for the water? Have you ever had to? 
NK: No for free. Before they were paying for it, but now always for free. After a certain meeting 
they were having the community was complaining about paying for the water so they decided to 
stop paying. From there it’s free. 
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NC: Why did the community not want to pay? 
NK: It’s too much. Many times it’s cut off. 
NC: What year was that? 
NK: Think it was 2004. 
NC: The meeting, was it just community members there or was the municipality there as well? 
NK: They were complaining to the municipality. So it was the community with the municipality. 
NC: And did the community decide not to pay, or did the municipality say you don’t have to 
pay? 
NK: Both. We said we’re not going to pay. Municipality decided that they [the community] 
mustn’t pay.807 
---------- 
NC: How do you carry the water back from the standpipe? 
V: If she’s making the washing she is taking the wheelbarrow. If she doesn’t want to make 
washing, just take the bucket.  
NC: How many buckets to do the washing? 
V: Four buckets [4 x 20 litres]. Once a week. 
NC: What is the water like? Is it clear? Does it taste good? 
E: No it is because we use chlorine. They [the municipality] put it in… It is for free there is no 
limit. 
NC: So you’ve never got ill from the water? 
E: Other people say they come sick, but I don’t understand why, the water is clean. 
NC: Have you ever been promised a water tap here in the house? 
E: No. 
V: No. 
NC: How many people use that pump? How many families? 
V: Maybe if I can count families. It’s for 80 families. Two taps for 80 families. 
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NC: Is there a big queue? 
V: Yes especially on Saturdays. 
NC: Does it ever run dry? 
V: Yes but it is rare. Most days we have enough water.
808
 
Taken together, these narratives emphasise that there are particular challenges to access to 
water in Okhombe and Woodford, relating to sufficiency (the collection of a quantum of water 
commensurate with people’s domestic needs); acceptability (the taste, odour and appearance of 
water); safety (although some interviewees rejected the assertion that the water caused illness); 
and physical accessibility (relating to the proximity of improved water sources, and the logistics 
of transporting the amount of water required). In these rural locations, the financial affordability 
of water did not seem to present a challenge, since water services, where available, were 
provided free of charge, and have been for some time.  
  Verulam 
Closer towards Durban, I interviewed Sewpersadh Kanthelall (SK) who lives on a smallholding 
on the outskirts of the town of Verulam, in eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality, 27 
kilometres from the centre of Durban.
809
 Behind the smallholding, 500 metres away is a small 
settlement called Msunduze, with around ten block and corrugated iron houses and several 
rondavels (round huts made from mud, with thatched grass roofs). Mr Kanthelall told me how 
he and his wife struggle to afford to pay their water bill, as well as how they regularly experience 
intermittent supply, despite having taps and piped water to the house, and despite their location 
within a large metropolitan area.
810
 
NC: Where does the water come from? Is there a tap? 
SK: A tap, yeah. And the water comes from the Hazelmere Dam. We pay for water, a month of 
water… In case we don’t pay, they’ll cut the water off, but I pay every month. My water comes to 
over 700 Rand a month. You see, myself and my wife we are pensioners, I can’t afford to pay 
700 Rand a month, for it to be not working. 
NC: [Looking at their water bill] a total of 797 Rand, that’s for one month? 
SK: One month, yeah. 
NC: And do you always have enough water? Is the supply always there? 
SK: No, sometimes the water is cut.  Containers are kept in case water is cut for a day or two. 
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NC: When the water is cut, do you know beforehand? 
SK: No, when we open the tap, there is no water. 
NC: Do you know why? 
SK: No, we have to wait for the water to come in. It could be one day or two days that water 
doesn’t come. So I’ve got some containers and things to cook, you must have water, without 
water you can do nothing. So I don’t know, it might be cut off today or tomorrow. 
NC: In one month, how often do you get the water cut off? 
SK: About four times in a month. 
NC: So maybe about once a week? 
SK: Yeah. 
NC: What about the quality of the water, is it fine? 
SK: Yeah, it’s fine. 
NC: And the amount that you spend on the water, do you get any free water? 
SK: No, you have to pay for water. In the back [in Msunduze] most of the people get free water, 
we are paying for them, because when those people come to [word indecipherable on 
Dictaphone] business is our business.  
NC: I’m really interested in how you get cut off and whether the government gives you notice. 
SK: No, you just open the tap and there is no water.  
NC: And the 700 rand a month, does that feel like a lot? 
SK: Yeah, it’s big money. I’m earning 1410 Rand a month, I pay 700 Rand for water. What 
about my lights, what about insurance, what about food?  
NC: So you and your wife- 
SK: She pays for power, I pay for water… If the water is cut the government don’t help us. The 
water that comes, comes. You’ve got to pay for it, whether you’ve got water or no water.  You’ve 
got to pay your account, if you don’t pay your account [made a hand gesture of turning off a 
tap].
811
 
 
Conducted in November 2015, this interview took place during South Africa’s second 
consecutive year of drought. The previous month was also the hottest October in recorded 
history.
812
 No doubt some of the interruptions to Mr Kanthelall’s water supply are a result of the 
low water table in the nearby dam, caused by the drought conditions, which compounded 
underlying infrastructural problems with pumps and pipes.
813
 Long-term climate predictions 
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show that there will be even less water in the future, as the country’s interior becomes hotter by 
between three and five degrees centigrade by 2050.
814
   
Mr Kanthelall also shared how the amount they have to pay for water each month is a source of 
anxiety for them, especially as they get older. Consequently, despite the ever-increasing 
problem of water-scarcity, their measures to conserve water (including flushing the toilet only 
sporadically) are driven primarily by financial concerns. Although still able to pay for the water 
they use, such financial concerns, along with intermittent supply, are straining their experience 
of regularly accessing sufficient water (as defined by GC 15, regarding accessibility and 
affordability). However, Mr Kanthelall was quick to acknowledge that the standard of living that 
he and his wife enjoy, is considerably better than that of many residents in neighbouring 
Msunduze, whose relationship with water is more problematic still. 
  Msunduze 
In Msunduze water is accessed from standpipes that have been erected in clearings between 
dwellings. This provision is similar to that in Okhombe and Woodford, described above. But 
here each standpipe serves a single household, and water must be paid for. To facilitate this, 
standpipes are connected to meters. In November 2015, Ndwendwe local municipality was in 
the process of replacing existing meters with prepayment meters, of the type used by Phiri 
residents and at issue in the case of Mazibuko (see above at 4.5.6). I was invited in to the home 
of Thandeka (T) and her family of five children, partner and grandfather, to discuss their 
experiences of access to water. The meter attached to the standpipe Thandeka used was still 
one that produced a monthly bill, but we spoke about what they anticipated the consequences 
of changing to a prepayment meter might be. 
NC: Do you get a certain amount of water every day that is free and then you pay after that? 
T: 8 litres free. 
NC: 8 litres a day? For the whole house? 
T: 64(?) litres a day is free for the whole house. For everybody, it’s not counted as individual. 
NC: How many people live here? 
T: Eight.  
NC: How many houses use this standpipe? 
T: Just this one at the moment. 
NC: So each of the houses here will have their own meters and their own taps?  
T: Yes, we don’t share meters.  
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NC: Do you ever find there’s no water even if you’ve paid? Does the water supply get cut? 
T: If the bill is high they will cut the water. 
NC How do you get it on again? 
T: We go pay. 
NC: Do you have to pay all of it or just some? 
T: They want it all. 
NC: What happens if you can’t pay? 
T: It’s difficult, you don’t have the water, you have to pay then you get the water. 
NC: Does anyone get water from other places, like rainwater?  
T: No, we don’t have rain heavy around here. 
NC: The quality of the water, it’s fine? It’s good quality water? 
T: Yeah. 
NC: Do you ever find that you’ve run out of water?  
T: No.  
NC: Do you know of anybody in this area who doesn’t have enough water? 
T: Yeah, there is a few where they don’t have enough water. 
NC: And that’s because they can’t afford to buy it? 
T: They can’t afford to buy it. 
NC: [Looking at the standpipe] If that broke who would fix it? 
T: It is a municipality, but when it broke a couple of weeks ago, months ago, we just had to do 
it.  
NC: You did it yourself? 
T: Yeah, we just had to do it and the neighbourhood helped. We just put a new pipe, I think 
the pipe is a little bit old now, sometimes it bursts. The government will only kind of be 
involved with what’s happening in the meter. So whatever pipe that’s broke here, they wouldn’t 
be involved, but they’d be involved if the water maybe burst out of the meter, and we call them 
and they will come and fix it, but they will also take their own time. 
NC: But the pipe is your own responsibility and you have to maintain that yourself? 
T: Yeah. 
NC: That must have cost quite a lot of money. 
T: Yeah, it did.  
NC: When the meter changes to a prepayment meter like the electric- 
T: They’re already changing, I don’t know how they’ll do it, because ____.   
NC: Do you think that will be a good thing or a bad thing? 
T: Bad thing… I think it’s because of financial-wise. A lot [of people] are not working, they just 
stay here, in the guardian of the grandpa, and he’s the only one who supports the family. 
NC: The only income is from the grandpa?  
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T: Which is for 8 people. It’s quite a lot, and also regarding water and electricity.  
NC: Do you know how much money it would cost each month to have the water that you need 
on a prepayment? 
T: It’s different. I think most of the time it’s 800 [Rand] a month. 
NC: And that’s for the 8 of you? 
T: Yeah… It is for 8 people, they live here and use water. 
NC: With the 800 a month, if you have to spend that, will you still have enough for food or 
electricity or school? 
T: No, we don’t have enough. If you have to go and pay 800 for water you can struggle to pay 
for food. 
NC: How do you pay for the electricity is that prepayment? 
T: Yeah.  
NC: How much is the electricity? 
T: 10 Rand will last a day. 
NC: Do you go and buy that every day? 
T: No, you have to buy maybe 100 Rand. And when it’s finished on the meter you buy another. 
NC: Where do you buy it from? 
T: Verulam, in the town.  
NC: So you have to go all the way there to buy the electricity and then come back? 
T: Yes. 
NC: Can you walk? 
T: No. Taxi. [Verulam is 23 kilometres away] 
NC: Do you think that will be the same with the water prepayment, when that comes in, will you 
have to go to the same place to buy the water prepayment? 
T: Yeah, it’s exactly the same. 
NC: How much does it cost in the taxi? 
T: 12 Rand each way.
815
 
 
In contrast to the experiences of people in more rural locations like Woodford and Okhombe, 
Thandeka’s story reflects very different challenges facing her family’s efforts to access sufficient 
water. The proximity and physical accessibility of their water source is generally unproblematic 
(when not in need of repair), and the water quality is good. But, recounting the contemporary 
experiences of neighbours, and anticipating the possible consequences of having to use 
prepayment meters, clearly it is the affordability of water and the consequent denial of access to 
water, when it cannot be paid for that is the most difficult challenge.  Furthermore, once 
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prepayment meters are widely installed, if Msunduze residents are actually required to travel to 
the nearest town in order to prepay their water accounts, the additional financial and logistical 
burden that this would entail may compound the relative inaccessibility of sufficient water for 
people in Thandeka’s situation, despite their physical proximity to clean, piped water.    
It is not claimed that these stories of people’s experiences of access to water in specific rural 
and peri-urban locations can automatically be generalised across a municipality, or across the 
nation as a whole. Such qualitative interviews, particularly when conducted on a relatively small 
scale, are intrinsically ill-suited to producing broad empirically supported generalisations.
816
   
But, returning briefly to the statistics considered in Chapter Three regarding people’s level of 
access to water in the country, the stories shared above do provide some context to the bald 
figures (from the General Household Survey 2014) that 86.5% of people living in KwaZulu-
Natal, and 90% nationally, have access to water for domestic use (see 3.2). Undoubtedly such 
statistics fail to acknowledge that varying degrees of access to water exist. They are also unable 
to appreciate the lived consequences variously of inadequate, intermittent, remote, 
contaminated, and unaffordable water supply for those interviewed, and for people living in 
similar material conditions. The statistics on access to water do provide a general picture, which 
confirms that access to water remains problematic for many people. The stories of water-poor 
people shared here, simply add humanity and nuance to what are already established and 
generalized observations, and in so doing, these stories anthropomorphize statistical subjects 
into people with a voice. While it is methodologically prudent to acknowledge the dangers of 
generalizing from specific cases, this must not lead us to marginalize people’s experiences of 
access to (in)sufficient water, particularly if our aim is to identify opportunities for new modes 
of water governance, that may (already) be conceived in response to such experiences. 
 5.3.3 Stories from Durban 
In February 2010 and November 2015 I conducted a series of interviews with water-poor 
residents in the city of Durban. On both occasions staff from YWAM Durban assisted me. 
Durban is a city synonymous with beaches, and home to Africa’s largest port. Water is central 
to the city’s image and identity. But access to water for many of its poorest residents is a 
constant struggle, compounded by moves to commercialize water resources, and to pursue full 
cost recovery. The result is that access to water has emerged as a dividing line between those 
who can successfully navigate a water-as-commodity paradigm, and those who cannot; instead 
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experiencing dislocation from the dominant norm and exclusion from what their Constitution 
states is their right.
817
 As illustrated below, not only can this dividing line be seen between richer 
and poorer areas of the city, but even within the same community. Also, amongst my empirical 
work in South Africa, it is here that examples of commons thinking in action can be glimpsed 
most clearly, in relation to community organisation for water governance.  
 
Burlington 
Burlington is a large settlement on the outskirts of Durban, 20 kilometres inland (south-west) 
from the beachfront.
818
 Part of eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality, it is comprised of a 
combination of permanent dwellings and informal housing.
819
 By 2010 the municipality had 
provided piped water to a number of homes here. But the cost of water from this source 
quickly proved prohibitive for many residents. Those who became indebted eventually had 
their pipes disconnected (see 2.3.1). I first visited Burlington in February 2010. I saw and heard 
how some members of the community, many of whom had had their water supply 
disconnected, had organised themselves into those who were able to collect water from the 
standpipe (both those physically able and those who had time) and those who could not. Those 
not able to use the standpipe (including older residents) were receiving a small amount of 
money from their younger neighbours in order to ensure that their water bills were paid and 
that they could continue to enjoy water piped to their homes; while able bodied residents relied 
again on the standpipe. Community leaders met to decide whom to prioritise in this system, 
and to monitor how it worked.
820
  
Here, the community’s collective response to the specific problem of accessing water after 
disconnection, evinces a corporate, or commons approach towards water access, rather than an 
individualistic one. In this community, at that point in time, accessing sufficient water has been 
framed as a communal endeavour, achievement of which requires a variety of responses from 
people, dependent on their needs and abilities. This is explored further below at 5.4. 
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More recently, in November 2015, I revisited this community, to find that access to sufficient 
water remained a daily challenge for many. But once again this problem has led several 
households to develop innovative responses (although not all of which reflect commons 
thinking).  Standpipes remain the primary means of accessing water for many in this 
community. These are fed by long pipes, dug into shallow troughs, or running along the surface 
of the ground. A number of residents living near these pipes have plumbed into them in order 
to connect a water supply directly to their homes, as one resident, Sanele (S) explains: 
NC: Where do you get your water? 
S: This tap here, but before we applied [installed] it we used to take it from that neighbour [next 
door].  
NC: When did you get that one? 
S: A few months back. 
NC: Who is responsible for it, who put in, was it the municipality? 
S: Yeah, we’ll go in to apply for it and then they put the meter in and connect the pipe from the 
meter to the tap. 
NC: So the municipality puts the meter in and then you have to do the pipe yourself? 
S: Yeah. 
NC: Have you ever had a problem with not having enough water? 
S: No, I’m okay so far.821 
 
 However, in making these individual connections, water pressure for the communal standpipe 
is reduced. Those residents who continue to rely on water from the standpipe experience 
periods where little or no water is accessible. Living directly across the road from Sanele, three 
sisters, Helen (H), Thembeka (T) and Phindile (P), explained how disruptive this low water 
pressure can be: 
‘[It is] a struggle because the water can’t come out because and all of these people are like taking 
water in to their house and no water is coming out the standpipe’. 822  
The stark contrast between the stories of these two households is a poignant reminder of how, 
even on the same street, people’s relative wealth or poverty dictates their experience of access 
to water. Sanele’s household could afford to undertake a self-connection, and to pay their water 
bill, while Helen and her sisters could not. Not only does this mean that Sanele enjoys a water 
tap in her home, but the fact that she now has such a tap actually impairs other people’s access 
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to water from the standpipe. Moreover, unlike in Msunduze, each standpipe in Burlington 
must serve scores of families. Demand for water from the standpipe, combined with low 
pressure, and intermittent flow, results in long queues at busy periods: 
NC: How many buckets for a day do you use? 
H: Six. 
NC: And that’s for how many people? 
H: Eleven.   
NC: How many houses does the standpipe serve? 
T: [laughing] Uncountable right now. 
NC: Right, a lot? Like more than 10? 
T: [laughs again] More than two hundreds! 
NC: More than 200 for one standpipe? So when you go to get water, how long does it take you 
to queue up? 
T: It just depends, like when you come…  
H: She also says because even if you are there in the line, because there’s just a very small 
amount that comes out of the pipe, it actually takes long time, because people have done it 
themselves, taken it in to their own houses.
823
 
Acknowledging that for many South Africans piped water (predominantly accessed from a 
standpipe) is not a reliable source, the government launched the ‘adopt a river’ initiative in 
2010.
824
 This combines education to reduce river pollution with training and equipment to clean 
and maintain rivers for use as sources of water for communities living close to them. Burlington 
is one such area, and in 2013 sixty residents volunteered to clean and maintain their local river. 
Every week volunteers, including Thembeka, continue to maintain their section of the river in 
order to create a safe alternative to using standpipes for those still living without water 
connected to their homes, as my interpreter, Sbo (S) explained:  
S: Ok there is a river down there and that river, they actually try as much as they can to clean it. 
The thing is, those guys put waste in there; they also put chemicals and stuff to fertilize 
everything. These guys (community) even put fish inside the water just to make it more to see if 
there is enough to be alive.  
NC: Oh, so you put fish in to see if the fish are healthy? 
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S: Yes. But also these guys also clean the pipes and the grasses around the area so that to make 
the water clean. They are just volunteering for themselves to be healthy, have good water.
825
 
Both of these stories from Burlington show that in the midst of poverty and hardship, and faced 
with a regression in their level of access to water (for those having experienced forcible 
disconnection), some residents in Burlington chose to engage with the problem of water 
poverty from the perspective of shared needs, rather than focusing on their individual rights, 
and what can be described as commons approaches to water governance are beginning to take 
root in this community. 
Elsewhere in eThekwini 
Recent research undertaken elsewhere in eThekwini Municipality suggests that water-poor 
residents are adopting an approach to water allocation that emphasises a responsibility to each 
other, which is in contrast to the individualistic paradigm reinforced by an unreconstructed 
notion of a right to water
826
. eThekwini Municipality is considered a leader in sustainable water 
services. Initiatives to reduce water wastage and improve water quality have been pioneered by 
the municipality, with considerable success.
827
 Between 1999 and 2009 water was brought to 
over a million people who previously lacked it
828
. Such an approach, driven in large part by 
municipal and state strategic goals, has been assisted in no small part by the prevailing mind-set 
of residents, who fuse a strong ethic of individual responsibility for water use, with an 
understanding of water as a common resource.
829
  
On a larger scale, the Durban Group for Climate Justice,
830
 formed in 2004, has proved to be an 
important practical and intellectual focal point for community organisation and action, 
including in relation to water allocation issues. But perhaps more importantly, this civil-society 
movement has galvanised disparate single issues around a coherent aim of climate justice
831
. 
Echoing previous discussion of the indivisibility of human security from ecological security, and 
of social, from economic, from environmental sustainability, the Durban Group for Climate 
Justice has successfully directed public energy and community involvement around the 
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coherent but multi-dimensional goal of pursuing climate justice at every appropriate scale: 
Promoting a truly common endeavour.
832
 
From the example in Woodford, of concerted community resistance to paying for substandard 
water services, to spontaneous community organisation in Burlington in the face of 
disconnections, and partnerships with local government towards ensuring a clean source of river 
water, each of these stories contains an appreciation of water as a shared resource, accessible to 
everyone. But they also reflect a strong social conscience and community cohesion which may 
prove capable of overcoming the perceived weaknesses famously identified in Garrett Hardin’s 
pessimistic treatise ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, discussed in detail below.833 But, from the 
empirical work I have undertaken, it is in Malawi that the clearest examples of commoning are 
found. 
 5.3.4 Stories from Malawi 
The geographical and jurisdictional focus of this thesis remains South Africa. But there are 
some notable comparisons between the socio-economic rights in the Malawian Constitution, 
and those in South Africa, and particularly between the perceived failures of such rights to 
achieve access to sufficient water for people in both countries. As a result of this, the lacuna left 
by inchoate socio-economic rights realization in Malawi has begun to be filled by innovative 
approaches to water governance (amongst other things), which exemplify community 
organization and commons thinking in action.  Reflecting on these Malawian examples allows 
inspiration to be drawn for greater use of commons approaches to water governance in South 
Africa. To this end some appreciation of the legal and material situation in Malawi regarding 
access to water is necessary, although a thorough study of comparative law in Malawi and South 
Africa is not attempted here.
834
   
Malawi’s history since British colonial rule, then under the one-party authoritarian government 
of Hastings Banda, has left a legacy of ‘widespread, deep and severe’ poverty.835 Economic 
marginalization, which perpetuates the conditions of poverty, is particularly relevant to the task 
                                                          
832
 Climate justice is a popular activistic trope, but suffers from insufficient substantive analysis. Towards a 
rectification of this see U Baxi ‘Towards a climate change justice theory?’ (2016) 7/1 Journal of Human Rights and 
the Environment, 7-31. 
833
 G Hardin ‘The tragedy of the commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243-8. 
834
 See J Ellis ‘General Principles and Comparative Law’ (2011) 22/4 European Journal of International Law 949-
971. 
835
 S Gloppen & FE Kanyongolo ‘Courts and the poor in Malawi: Economic marginalization, vulnerability, and the 
law’ (2007) 5/12 International Journal of Constitutional Law 258-293, 261. 
208 
 
of achieving access to water.
836
 According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Poverty 
Strategy Paper for Malawi,
837
 the water sector faces challenges including: degradation of water 
resources; limited access to potable water; inadequate promotion of hygiene and sanitation; 
inadequate water reservoirs; inadequate capacity of contractors and consultants. Consequently, 
water services are identified as a ‘key priority area’ for poverty reduction.838  
In Malawi 57% of the population live below the national poverty line.
839
 The WHO/UNICEF 
Joint Monitoring Programme Report
840
 estimates that 96% of people in urban areas and 89% in 
rural areas have access to safe water (designated as either water piped on to premises, or water 
from other improved source). But these statistics have been criticized as considerably inflated.
841
 
Water For People–Malawi, a water NGO based in Malawi’s second city, Blantyre, estimates 
that only 38% of people living in the 21 low-income peri-urban areas of the city have access to 
water that meets government standards. In the rural district of Chikhwawa only 42% have access 
to safe drinking water. Access to sanitation in these areas is estimated to be 22% in peri-urban 
Blantyre, and 8% in Chikhwawa using improved sanitation facilities.
842
 WaterAid estimate that 
with a total population of 15 million people, two million lack safe access to water, and 10 
million are without access to adequate sanitation.
843
  
The Republic of Malawi Constitution
844
 and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
845
 
share a common transformative aim. Both countries emerged, almost simultaneously, from 
authoritarian and anti-democratic rule, with a clear desire to transform themselves towards the 
upholding of constitutional values including human dignity, human rights, the achievement of 
equality, constitutional supremacy, and the rule of law.
846
 
847
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Chapter IV of the Malawian Constitution includes socio-economic rights to education,
848
 to 
pursue a livelihood,
849
 and to fair labour practices,
850
 and a right to development
851
 (rarely 
included in national constitutions
852
), alongside civil and political rights to privacy,
853
 to freedom 
of conscience,
854
 freedom of expression,
855
 and freedom of assembly,
856
 amongst others.  
There is no explicit right of access to sufficient water (or other right to water) in the Constitution 
of Malawi. However, consideration of the content and obligations associated with the right to 
development clearly allows a right to water to be implied. Section 30 reads as follows: 
(1) All persons and peoples have a right to development and therefore to the enjoyment of 
economic, social, cultural and political development and women, children and the disabled in 
particular shall be given special consideration in the application of this right. (2) The State shall 
take all necessary measures for the realization of the right to development. Such measures shall 
include, amongst other things, equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, 
education, health services, food, shelter, employment and infrastructure. (3) The State shall take 
measures to introduce reforms aimed at eradicating social injustices and inequalities. (4) The 
State has a responsibility to respect the right to development and to justify its policies in 
accordance with this responsibility.
857
 
The right to development appears in the Constitution as a justiciable right, as opposed to being 
listed only as a principle of national policy.
858
 Consequently, subsections (2), (3), and (4), refer to 
State obligations which are capable of being enforced by the Courts. Second, enjoyment of the 
aspects of the right to development, set out in subsection (1), are contingent upon access to 
basic resources. This is acknowledged in subsection (2), which provides a list of such basic 
resources. It is necessary to interpret this list as being indicative, rather than exhaustive, since a 
lack of access to water (not listed) would impede the right holder’s ability to enjoy the right to 
development as least as much as would a lack of access to the requirements explicitly listed. A 
similar interpretative argument is now well accepted regarding the absence of an explicit right of 
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access to water from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the ICESCR, as 
discussed in Chapter Two.  
Section 211 (1) of the Malawian Constitution obliges the State to abide by international 
agreements once ratified by Parliament, although international provisions must be incorporated 
through an Act of Parliament before they become part of national law. Rights contained in 
international agreements not yet incorporated, cannot be directly enforced in domestic courts. 
While several international treaties relevant to the right to water remain unincorporated, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is now accepted as part of domestic law.
859
 
In 2014 I spent some time with the NGO Water for People, in Blantyre, Malawi, interviewing 
staff as well as residents in some of the communities where Water for People works. Country 
director, Kate Harawa, summarized the effect on the Malawian government of their 
international commitments as follows: 
‘They have committed themselves to certain international agreements in terms of water, so the 
Malawi government is obligated to provide that 27 litres of water per person per capita for the 
people of the low income areas. But it doesn’t always meet that obligation.’860 
In contrast to South Africa, in Malawi it is principally the paucity of litigation on socio-
economic rights, that limits the effectiveness of the country’s socio-economic rights to 
contribute to a ‘transformative, pro-poor jurisprudence.’861 Since the entry into force of the 1994 
Constitution, litigation on civil and political rights has dominated. Where social and economic 
rights have received judicial consideration, they have been limited to the areas of employment 
and education, and related to ‘non-poor’ litigants.862 One reason for this is that very few poor 
people are in a position to pursue cases. Because the legal system is driven by litigation, the 
Courts do not investigate cases on their own initiative, and so the opportunity for pro-poor 
jurisprudence is limited by the absence of relevant litigation. 
The barriers facing the advancement of pro-poor litigation have been broadly categorized as 
practical barriers, and formal barriers.
863
 Practical barriers to litigation in Malawi include a lack 
information on, and understanding of, individual rights. Also language has been identified as a 
barrier, since the official language of the Courts is English, while the overwhelming majority of 
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evidence given in courts is presented in local languages.
864
 Without an adequate grasp of spoken 
and written English, and without access to representation (expanded on below), it is extremely 
difficult to navigate the rules of procedure in order to begin a case, much less to progress it.
865
 
Where cases are progressed in local languages, the need for translation slows the process, 
further straining the Court system and increasing litigation costs.
866
 
In contrast to South Africa, Locus standi requirements are strict, and there is no provision for 
public interest litigation. Potential litigants must show that they have a direct interest in the case, 
reducing the ability of NGOs and other organizations to litigate on behalf of others. This 
effectively prevents test cases, whose transformative potential may be greater than those of 
individuals.
867
 Also, in contrast to other developing-country jurisdictions, Court formality and 
legal bureaucracy remain strict and complex, which further reinforces the practical requirement 
for legal representation, but without steps to make this affordable, for instance, through court-
funded investigation.
868
 As a result many people’s experiences of insufficient access to basic 
resources
869
 are interpreted only as the acute or chronic symptoms of poverty, but not also as 
actionable violations of constitutional rights.  
Even where litigation is pursued, it is not guaranteed to be pro-poor. One case decision (among 
the few available) illustrates the reluctance of the Courts to harness the transformative potential 
of Constitutional rights, even when faced with the opportunity to do so. In Mchima Tea and 
Tung Estates Co. Ltd v. Concerned Persons,
870
 the plaintiff company owned a tea plantation on 
land that had originally been acquired under racially discriminatory land laws, when Malawi was 
a British protectorate. In the early 1990s people from surrounding villages, driven by land 
shortages, occupied parts of the plantation. The plaintiff sued for the eviction of these squatters, 
and was successful, despite the defendants’ argument that they had title to the land, based on 
pre-colonial ancestral title. What is important about this decision is the failure of the High 
Court to consider whether customary land law surrounding ancestral title could affect the 
plaintiff’s ownership rights. In other post-Colonial jurisdictions, similar situations have led to 
the acknowledgment that colonial titles to land did not extinguish traditional, customary titles. 
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As Brennan J stated in the Australian case of Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2]:
871
 
‘It is only the fallacy of equating sovereignty and beneficial ownership of land that gives rise to the 
notion that native title is extinguished by the acquisition of sovereignty.’               
Reticence to pursue a similar line of argument, and thereby, to consider the transformative 
possibilities latent within the right to property,
872
 and the right to development,
873
 amongst others, 
in the Malawian Constitution has limited the efficacy of such rights as transformative, or 
development vehicles. The reasons for such a constrained decision may have included an 
understandable desire not to be seen to give legal legitimacy to ‘land-grabbing’.  But a lack of 
willingness to probe the economic inequalities that have given rise to the present uneven 
distribution of basic resources (like land and water) represents a clear limitation on the 
effectiveness of rights talk in delivering transformative responses to poverty. Arguably here too, 
a judicially managerial approach to the application of Constitutional rights can be identified.
874
 
Faced with the dual reality that many Malawians are water poor, and that socio-economic rights 
currently have limited ability to effect substantial change, some communities have been 
galvanized to create innovative grassroots responses to governance of their water supply, with 
impressive consequences. 
  Blantyre - Water Users’ Associations 
In Malawi, the NGO Water For People has been working for over a decade with local 
communities on the outskirts of Blantyre, to support and develop community-owned Water 
Users Associations (WUAs), in order for people to gain sustainable access to clean, affordable 
water. Water is purified and pumped from a municipal plant to multiple standpipes (called 
water points) in each community. Access to water at each water point is controlled by the local 
WUA. The purpose and scope of this initiative is explained in the following extract from an 
interview I conducted with Andrew (A), a representative from Water for People: 
A: We train the communities to maintain their own laws without having support from 
somewhere but the community within should know how to manage their water points if they 
break down: Management training. 
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NC: So when you say manage, do you include repair or any sort of infrastructure or is it just 
management of who gets the water?  
 
A: Both repair and management of the actual borehole and also how they can contribute funds. 
 
 NC: So communities actually give money towards the management of the borehole? 
 
A: Yes, they give to water point committee, and the water point committee keeps that money to 
buy spares in case there is a need for repair.  
 
NC: And what about access to the water?  Is that regulated by the management committee as 
well, sorry, the water point committee, so if one person wanted to get a certain amount of water, 
does that have to go through the committee? 
 
A: At the moment, all the households will have access to that water point, and access to the 
water point if they pay enough of the tariff, they don’t pay per use, they pay a monthly tariff so 
the water point committee goes around to collect that monthly tariff. For the people that don’t 
have that tariff, an agreement is met, so they can pay in the future. It’s a community based 
management so they understand which people have problems and when they can pay, but they 
agree the amount to be paid per household no matter how much quantity they draw from the 
water point.
 875
 
 
Reflecting on the successes and challenges of one such WUA, in Nkolokott, a peri-urban 
district of Blantyre, Pastor Elias Nowa (WUA Executive chairperson) said the following: 
‘In the first place, the kiosks that were there, were being run by the small committees. But the 
problem was that the people who were selling water by then were using the money for 
themselves. They were not giving the money to the committee. As a result there was a bill to 
Blantyre water board of 1.6 million to pay. Then later on Blantyre water board came in 
partnership with Blantyre city council and water for people, their first goal, which is to form the 
associations like ours. 
 
Now we are functioning very well because of the number of success stories that we have. We 
have managed to build a water tank at __ previously that location had problems with water, 
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there was problems with water supply, but since we built the water tank, the people are okay 
now, they can be provided with water every time. 
 
There are some private water sellers within the community. They are not allowed to sell water 
but they do it on their own. The problem is they sell that water cheaper than from us. Illegal 
connections. That’s one of the challenges. There are a number of them, but regardless of those 
challenges we operate nicely. And maybe to add, one of the success stories is previously people 
experienced water point diseases like cholera, but this time around our people are drinking 
treated water.’876 
 
Andrew’s explanation clearly emphasises that management of water resources in the 
communities where Water for People partners, is community based. Embedding the 
governance of water resources within the very communities being served allows those 
administrating the water point to hear, evaluate and respond to both the needs of community 
members, and to their ability to contribute. Such bespoke administration is illustrated further in 
the following dialogue with Francis, one of the WUA administrators:  
NC: Do you ever have any problems whereby a family, a household, can’t afford to buy water? 
So they may come to a seller and say I need the water but I don’t have the cash. What do you 
do about that? 
 
F: Our water is sold at a cheaper price than those who are privy to other sellers, so we try to 
convince them to at least give something. 
 
NC: So you would take less than the usual amount if you needed to? If somebody came to you 
and said I don’t have twelve, but I have five, would you accept that? 
 
 F: No, we don’t accept that.  
 
NC: So presumably you feel confident that the twelve is the right price, that everyone can afford 
it? 
 
 F: Yes.  
 
 NC: But in cases where households don’t have 12 kwacha, what would you do? 
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F: It could be a widow, could be an old lady, very old lady. We always get our people to at least 
work somewhere in order to get something for the water. We have chiefs in our committees, so 
we always encourage them to go home and communicate with their people.  
 
 NC: If a family said we couldn’t afford it, then the chief would ask them why?  
 
 F: Yes.
877
  
 
As Pastor Nowa recounts, such a governance structure is facilitating affordable, access to 
sufficient safe water, thereby meeting the requirements of GC 15 for those community 
members. Furthermore it represents a degree of collaboration between local government 
(municipality), NGO and community members in order to design, implement, and maintain a 
sustainable and equitable model of water governance on a local scale. 
 5.3.5 Summary 
The foregoing stories recount an array of problems facing people’s regular access to sufficient 
water. These problems can be broadly categorised into two sets: those afflicting rural 
communities, and urban communities respectively. Problems in rural areas tend to include 
poor water quality (visibly dirty and/or contaminated water, linked to ill health), as well as issues 
of proximity and the transportation of water. Urban water access problems revolve most 
obviously around the affordability of accessing a sufficient quantity of water from improved 
sources, as well as intermittent issues of supply. 
In places these stories also reveal instances of commons thinking in relation to water access. 
Summarised here, four distinct examples of commons thinking are discernable, representing an 
increasingly well formed (and formalised) application of commons approaches to water 
governance.  
The first, and most subtle example is from Nombuso Khaba’s account (interview #8) of how 
her municipality changed its policy on charging for water in response to community protest. 
This suggests a change in mind-set among that community of water users, and a shift in the 
dynamic driving their own interpretation of their right to water; from being a right conferred 
upon passive subjects, to one that is there to be claimed, grasped and inhabited by active and 
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engaged citizens. Whether such contestation will herald any deeper direct community 
involvement with water services remains to be seen.  
The second example comes from Burlington, and from the response of residents to forcible 
water disconnections. The decision of people to pool resources, prioritise the most vulnerable, 
and to work together to deliver water where it was most needed represents an inspiring example 
of organic, self-organising, and temporary action that clearly reflects a commons ethos, even if 
its organisational structures are minimal and relatively informal. Also of note is the absence of 
local government or NGO involvement. Rather, this response to water-poverty was generated 
by the community, for the community.   
Staying in Burlington, the third distinct example of commons thinking in action comes from the 
adopt-a-river initiative, recounted by Thembeka and Sbo (interviews #13 and 14). While this 
reflects a similar approach to water access as the previous examples (demonstrating active 
involvement in grasping their right to water), it also represents a degree of collaboration 
between community residents and local government, assisted by a relatively formal structure 
requiring initial training and the provision of equipment. Here the capacity of the community to 
take a commons approach to their water resource has been enhanced by this collaboration. But 
in contrast to the final example, this collaboration has been temporary, and residents have 
quickly been left solely responsible for the on-going implementation of this initiative. Perhaps it 
is more accurate then, to characterise the involvement of local government as acting as a catalyst 
for the community’s own efforts, rather than in any fuller collaboration.  
The fourth, and clearest example of commons thinking in action comes from the WUAs 
around Blantyre in Malawi. As Andrew, Francis, and Pastor Elias recount (interviews #16-18), 
the creation and maintenance of WUAs by community members has been achieved in 
partnership with the NGO Water for People, and in communication with local government. 
Crucially start-up costs, including infrastructure and training have been provided by Water for 
People, and although established WUAs are responsible for their own administration 
(including the paying off of accrued arrears), they remain closely accountable to the NGO as 
part of a stable long-term collaboration, committed to ensuring community managed water 
governance.  
Each of these examples has led to some demonstrable gains in people’s experience of a right of 
access to sufficient water. But some gains are more modest than others. For Nombuso’s 
community, the affordability of water is now one less obstacle to accessing sufficient water 
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(although it is unclear how much of an obstacle it ever was). For Burlington residents plunged 
into crisis, their self-organised efforts offered protection to those most at risk of water poverty. 
Longer term, adopt-a-river has provided an alternative (and perhaps more sustainable) source 
from which to access sufficient water. But the scheme’s longevity must be questioned in relation 
to the lack of on-going support and the considerable ‘buy-in’ required from residents.  Only in 
Blantyre does the work of the various WUAs represent significant and sustained improvements 
in the realisation of the (human and/or constitutional) right to water. Perhaps the correlation 
between the most well developed governance structures and the greatest practical gains should 
not come as a surprise? Certainly such anecdotal evidence as to the success of this form of 
commons approach should be noted in any consideration of how commons modes could be 
expanded (this is briefly addressed at 5.6). 
Following all of these stories, the next section charts the history of the commons as a mode (or 
broad collection of modes) of thinking and action, before theorising on the importance of the 
commons for contemporary water governance. After having glimpsed some more or less 
established examples of commons thinking in action in relation to water governance, it is 
important to ground these examples within a broader and deeper tradition of the commons, in 
order to better understand the (positive and negative) potential that commons approaches to 
water governance may have in helping to realise access to sufficient water for everyone in South 
Africa. 
 
5.4 The commons in theory and in practice  
The commons is a new way to express a very old idea, that some forms of wealth belong to all 
of us, and that these community resources must be actively protected and managed for the 
good of all
878
. In short, the commons means ‘what we share’, so unsurprisingly it has been 
expressed as encompassing a host of assets from clean air, to languages, music, wildlife, judicial 
systems, the internet, and fresh water, amongst many more.
879
 ‘Commons thinking’ can be 
defined as any ideas for the enjoyment of such assets that promote sharing and encourage 
equitable and sustainable use.  Since the impetus of commons thinking is that commons assets 
are for everyone to enjoy, where the commons are finite (natural resources for instance), use 
must necessarily be equitable if everyone is to benefit from them now, and sustainable if 
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everyone will continue to benefit from them into the future.
880
 
As the Biblical quotation at the beginning of this chapter attests to, commons thinking need not 
be limited to intangible assets and natural resources, but at times has also been applied to ‘all 
things’, including personally-owned property and possessions.881 Indeed, the rejection of claims 
to private property in this Biblical story illustrates the dichotomy at the heart of much of the 
scholarship and activism around the commons: that commons thinking and praxis sit in 
confrontation to the concept of private property. The validity or otherwise of this perception, as 
well as the antagonism that it generates will be analysed in more detail below.  
 5.4.1 Historical and contemporary examples of commoning 
The following is not intended to provide a comprehensive history of commoning. Rather its 
purpose is to support the assertion that commons approaches to resource governance have 
existed for a long time, and have taken many diverse forms, and that in light of the long and 
rich tradition of commoning, a serious appraisal of the contemporary potential of commons 
thinking, applied to water governance, is warranted.
882
   
Since pre-history reciprocal altruism and collective action have been essential features of the 
development of agriculture and pastoralism, and consequently, essential to sustaining the 
human species. In the territory of South Africa, around AD 3000 hunter-gatherers acquired 
livestock, and consequently transitioned from hunting to herding duties that necessitated 
sustained co-operation between community members, in the incessant search for grazing land 
and water. Between AD 300 and 1000 crop cultivators moved in to the Transvaal, Kwa-Zulu 
Natal and the Eastern Cape, and by the end of the Late Iron Age (circa. AD 1000) livestock and 
agriculture were important subsistence activities. They also began to form the basis of trading 
networks that extended northwards to modern day Zimbabwe. It is important to note that these 
Iron Age communities were far from egalitarian. They displayed strict gender divisions of 
labour, and ‘a highly patriarchal system of social organisation and authority.’883 As such, these 
early communities would be problematic archetypes of commons thinking in action. However, 
within these communities, the approach taken to governing land and water is instructive, 
offering a ‘proto-commons’ insight into how indigenous peoples have effectively blended 
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cultural norms with ecological imperatives. As discussed in Chapter Three (3.3) African 
customary law forbade private ownership of land or water, instead placing these resources (both 
of which are essential to cattle-grazing and agriculture) under the control of the chief for the 
benefit of the community, in order to avoid the potentially fatal consequences of exhausting 
them.
884
 Governance decisions around land and water were made at the level (or scale) of the 
community, rather than at the level of an individual or a single family. Decisions made at this 
scale were generally able to fulfil the dual requirements of meeting the community’s immediate 
subsistence needs, and of sustaining land and water resources into the future.
885
 Indeed, as the 
archaeological evidence of wide-ranging trading networks shows, not only were material 
subsistence needs met, surplus was also generated, with which to exchange.
886
 
There are numerous historical examples across the world where communities have regulated 
resources in order to avoid their depletion, while maintaining adequate living standards. Indeed 
some authors describe the standard of living in communities where resources have been 
managed on a sustained yield basis, as ‘generally affluent’.887 The Acholi tribe in modern day 
Uganda enforced a system of closed seasons, whereby hunting was restricted and regulated in 
order to ensure the on-going availability of game.
888
  
In Europe there is a long history of managing some grazing lands and forests as common 
property resources, some of which remain.
889
 Conditions for grazing were set between users, for 
example that only grazing during daylight hours was permitted. Where overgrazing became a 
threat, ‘stinting’ was imposed, where common users were assigned quotas of animals they could 
graze.
890
 In England, King John’s signing of the Magna Carta in 1215, and the Charter of the 
Forest, signed by Henry III in 1217 contain a range of legal rights to commoning.
891
  
One historical example of commoning in relation to water resources comes from the Spanish 
system of cooperative irrigation known as huerta.
892
 Dating back to the 15
th
 Century, and 
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beginning in the arid areas around Valencia, huerta regulated the use of irrigation canals to 
provide sufficient water to support agriculture in the region. Each huerta determined their own 
rules regarding water quotas. They also agreed systems for monitoring and punishments for 
users who infringed the community’s rules. Each huerta was overseen by a syndic, who was 
elected from within the huerta, and served a two or three-year term. This system of water 
commoning has influenced similar approaches to water regulation in the Philippines, and in 
California, and remains in use in some areas of rural Spain and Portugal.
893
  
Each of these examples asserts that people can, and do operate cooperatively, sacrificing 
immediate individual gain for the sake of collective interests regarding the governance of 
resources, where there is a social framework to facilitate such a commons approach.
894
 While it 
is also true that humans have the propensity to act selfishly - as utility-maximising individuals – 
the above examples affirm that such propensities are not inevitable, and that other ways of living 
are imaginable and achievable. Indeed Roy’s insight (quoted at the beginning of this chapter) is 
pertinent here. Where the current paradigm is failing (in this case failing to ensure access to 
sufficient water for everyone), it is wise to heed those whose imagination (and experience) is 
outside it.
895
  
  Vernacular law, social norms, and legal theory 
The above historical examples of commons thinking in action also illustrate the importance of 
having a governance structure to establish rules and responsibilities, and to regulate people’s 
behaviour (to greater or lesser degrees).  Specifically in relation to commons modes of resource 
allocation, such regulation has recently been termed ‘vernacular law’896 in order, simultaneously, 
to affirm its philosophical connection to law (as defining rules, practices and norms of 
behaviour), and to distinguish it from ‘State law’ (which describes law that is officially sanctioned 
- emanating from the ‘proper’ law-making institutions, and abiding by formal constitutive 
procedures
897
). But broadly defining law in this way, and identifying ‘law-like’ systems and 
structures, has a longer tradition. Llewellyn distinguishes between (proper) law and that which 
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performs ‘law-jobs’, but that does not qualify as law.898 Fuller describes ‘law’ that has not been 
created by official sanction (i.e. ‘vernacular law’, using Bollier & Weston’s typology), but that 
nevertheless has ‘found direct expression in the conduct of men toward one another’, as 
‘customary law’899 (distinct from customary international law, as a source of international law, but 
similarly reflecting acknowledgement via attitude and action). Such customary law can be seen 
in action in for example trade unions, clubs, churches and universities, wherever ‘miniature 
legal systems’900 are concerned with member’s duties and entitlements. Indeed, Fuller argues 
that not only is customary law ubiquitous, but that understanding it is imperative to an 
understanding of ordinary law (State law).
901
 
Customary law provides us with a ‘language of interaction’, which projects some degree of 
predictability upon otherwise random social interaction and conduct. Understood in this way it 
is apparent that customary law fulfils a similar function to State law: regulating expectations 
about behaviour.
902
Moreover, the behavioural expectations that are regulated are not neutral. 
Rather, the behaviour that is to be expected is that which is deemed acceptable. In other words 
customary law does not just provide predictability to erstwhile random interactions. It also 
‘facilitates interaction on a level more profitable for all concerned’.903   Seen in this way, Fuller’s 
claim that ordinary law can only be understood by an appreciation of customary law becomes 
compelling. It reconnects the purpose of the ‘law’ with its imperative, and in so doing, reminds 
us of the good reasons why such an imperative exists. Where this connection has been severed, 
the imperatives of ordinary law, for instance the crime of murder, can become divorced from 
its interactional origins, wherein refraining from murder was accepted not just as being 
predictable, but profitable (generally!) for all concerned. 
Applied in the context of commons approaches to water resource allocation, reconnecting the 
(State/ordinary and vernacular/customary) law on access to water, to its interactional origins 
generates a powerful moral claim.  At the level of State law, as discussed at length in Chapter 
Four, the currently configured individual right of access to sufficient water, is prone to being 
interpreted in isolation from the complex socio-economic and environmental contexts that 
make access to water a moral claim. Therefore, re-engaging with the social, economic and 
environmental factors that generated the right is essential to its appropriate interpretation and 
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application.  
Regarding vernacular law, which regulates the behaviour of those engaged in commons modes 
of water governance, maintaining a clear bond between the rules governing the actions of a 
WUA in Blantyre for instance, and the profitability or desirability of the interactions that these 
rules facilitate, must help to retain the moral character of such commons endeavours. This 
could protect the application of such ‘law-like’ rules from the same tendency towards 
technocratisation, as evidenced by the interpretation, in Mazibuko, of the right to water in State 
law. Returning briefly to interview #18 above, Francis’ acknowledgement that they will always 
work with people to understand their situation, and to find a solution to their needs, is one 
small illustration of the connection that currently exists between the vernacular law of a WUA 
and its interactional origins: to secure ‘water for everyone, forever’.904  The importance of 
characterising access to sufficient water as a moral claim is elucidated on below at 5.5. 
Practically too, the concept of vernacular law (or perhaps more accurately, the 
acknowledgement of vernacular law in action) is important in evaluating the appropriate role of 
commons approaches to water governance. The ‘State law’ on access to sufficient water is 
simple enough to identify. Yet a central claim of this thesis is that this law is inadequate to the 
task of ensuring access to sufficient water for everyone. But because of its status as ‘State law’, 
despite its perceived inadequacies, it is supported by a formal legal structure of promulgation 
and enforcement. In contrast, what can be described as the vernacular law relevant to commons 
approaches to water governance in Durban or Blantyre for instance, lacks comparable formality 
or enforceability. Such a lack should not be dismissed lightly. But neither should the relative 
absence of formality or enforceability lead to premature conclusions about the (un)suitability of 
commons approaches. Here again the challenge may be to rethink, or reimagine the 
assumptions inherent within the dominant paradigm. The water users associations around 
Blantyre operate within a readily identifiable and agreed framework of regulation, although, 
crucial to the success of these initiatives, there is sufficient flexibility to promote maximal 
enfranchisement and community involvement. Returning to the residents of Burlington, whose 
efforts to respond positively and collectively to their experiences of water poverty have led them 
to engage in various collaborative projects: they are operating without a formal set of externally 
imposed rules and sanctions. Instances of informal arrangements are also sparse. But rather 
than excluding such projects from the picture of water governance in that area, their efforts can 
be identified and affirmed as examples of ‘self-organised governance’ springing from bottom-up 
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responses to a complex system of water governance.
905
 Such a description is in sharp contrast to 
the archetypal top-down ‘command-and-control’ regulation, so familiar in State law.906 This 
contrast illustrates a wider shift from government to governance, explained below. 
  Government to governance  
The steady emergence of new regulatory modes is challenging the State’s historically central 
(indeed, virtually exclusive) role in regulation. Such new modes of regulation prioritise  
‘processes through which collective goals are defined and pursued in which the state (or 
government) is not necessarily the only or most important actor.’ 907 The consequence of this is 
that regulation is changing, from centralised, top-down government, to more disaggregated, 
non-centralised and less hierarchical regulatory forms.
908
  
The shrinking role and importance of government, as a result of the steady move from 
‘government to governance’909 is well documented.910 Kotze & Fuo explain this shift in light of 
the forces of globalisation, and by eight manifestations of globalisation in particular:  
‘significant advances in communication technology and social media that are connecting the 
world; by modes of travel that enable global connectivity; by systems of free trade; by the 
creation of regional and international superstructures of governance such as the European 
Union; by the rise of epistemic networks and non-governmental organizations as well as non-
state, but law-like, rules; by the emergence of treaty regimes and international norm producing 
functional non-state organisations such as the World Bank that enable inter-state cooperation in 
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specific areas; the steady growth of economically dominant and politically influential 
multinational corporations that function in an intermeshed transnational setting; and by the 
emergence of global regulatory problems such as climate change that require multi-stakeholder 
solutions and that are affecting everyone everywhere with scant regard to physical borders or to 
the sanctity of state sovereignty.’911  
Doubtless, there are also other bottom-up factors affecting the government-to-governance shift. 
Catalysed by unequal power relations, animated by a redistributive ethos, and evident across an 
array of subaltern cosmopolitan politics, these factors together form what Santos describes as 
‘counter-hegemonic globalization’.912 
In the context of this thesis, the term ‘governance’ is deliberately used to denote flexible, 
informal and multi-level regulation, which are potentially more appropriate attributes for 
effective regulatory strategies, and more complementary to commons thinking than is 
traditional, hierarchical regulation.
913
  
5.4.2 Critiquing the commons 
Commons thinking seems well placed to critique the limitations and failures of existing 
‘State/Market’914 institutions, and in so doing, to create space to imagine, and to implement new 
forms of provisioning. Given its necessity as a prerequisite for life, water is increasingly being 
understood as one such form of wealth for which commons thinking seems appropriate.
915
 To 
quote Bollier and Weston: 
‘[T]he Commons is not an ideological agenda or an impractical, utopian vision. It is a useful 
new/old framework and vocabulary for building a new societal vision and for imagining 
constructive alternatives to the neoliberal economics and policies that now enclose (commodify 
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and privatise) shared resources…’916 
It is also becoming acknowledged that understandings of water that are limited to discourses of 
water rights and water commodification, perpetuate an unsustainable and unhelpful ‘bifurcation 
between nature and culture’,917 which must be creatively reimagined. 
In contrast to individualised consumption within a rights-based paradigm, a commons strategy 
emphasises shared consumption. This echoes the emphasis on interconnectivity within IWRM, 
and within South Africa’s Second National Water Resource Strategy (see Chapter Three). But 
unlike IWRM, a commons approach would avoid emphasising individual water rights, in 
favour of communal needs. A commons strategy would encourage decisions on water allocation 
to be made at the lowest appropriate level, involving all users to input into collective decisions 
that transcend a compromise of competing interests, in favour of corporately ‘owned’ allocation 
decisions that best serve each community.    
Institutions and modes of organisation based around the concept of the commons have 
positively contributed to natural resource management since ‘economic pre-history’918and 
commons ideas and praxis are resurging. Faced with the increased commodification of 
resources, services and areas of life previously managed as public or social goods and the 
disenfranchising consequences for those excluded as a result, commoning is emerging as a 
radical alternative to the dominant contemporary paradigm.    
  The tragedy of the Commons? 
Written nearly five decades ago, Garrett Hardin’s seminal treaties, ‘The Tragedy of the 
Commons’919 has proved to be extraordinarily influential in dissuading social scientists from 
serious appraisal of the potential of commons thinking.
920
 Based on Malthusian predictions of 
population growth, Hardin asserts that ‘the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly 
generates tragedy.’921 Using the illustration of a common pasture, Hardin explains that it is 
everyone’s propensity to graze as many cattle as possible on this common resource in order to 
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‘maximise his gain’.922 In so doing, each herdsman will continue to add to his or her own stock 
of cattle, judging that adding each new head of cattle will benefit that herdsman alone (since 
when the cattle are sold, the proceeds go to each individual herdsman). Meanwhile, the 
negative effect of one more head of cattle grazing on the commons is shared among all of the 
herdsmen.
923
 The consequence is the eventual ruination of the common pasture, as a result of 
overgrazing, without any effective incentive to avoid this. 
In reaching his conclusion that ‘freedom in a commons brings ruin to all’,924 various 
assumptions are made about the (lack of) relationships and regulations between the herdsmen. 
As the above historical example from European common lands illustrates, the imposition of 
‘stinting’ in order to avoid overgrazing was one regulatory tool that was widely used to avoid 
overgrazing.  
Leaving assumptions about practicalities aside momentarily, Hardin makes a more serious, and 
more troubling assumption about people’s inescapable drive towards individual utility 
maximisation. But despite Hardin’s warnings that the rational actions of private individuals to 
maximize their gain would inevitably lead towards a degeneration of commonly held resources, 
recent work on commons strategies challenge this. Instead, David Harvey questions the 
paradigmatic lens through which Hardin’s common pasture is glimpsed: 
‘The real problem here, it seems to me, is not the commons per se. It is the failure of 
individualized private property rights to fulfil our common interests in the way they are 
supposed to do.’925 
In other words, Hardin’s common pasture, if more effectively governed regarding the rights and 
responsibility of users, is perfectly capable of avoiding his pessimistic predictions. But while 
Bollier and Weston remind us that regarding resource allocation, human attributes of 
cooperation and self-sacrifice do exist, they accept that these attributes are joined by self-
interest.
926
 Therefore it is important not to ignore Hardin’s warnings altogether. The central 
problematic of the commons is described as follows by pioneering commons scholar Elinor 
Ostrom: 
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‘How a group of principals who are in an interdependent situation can organize and govern 
themselves to obtain continuing joint benefits when all face temptation to free-ride, shirk or 
otherwise act opportunistically.’927 
The above examples, from Burlington in particular, illustrate this tension between cooperation 
and self-interest, which any endorsement of commons approaches must acknowledge. In that 
community, the challenge of securing access to sufficient water is being met variously by those 
prioritising sustainable access for the community at large, and by those whose independent 
actions to pipe water to their own homes leaves their neighbours without.   
Perhaps such examples of commoning, or commons thinking, are too ephemeral to formally 
categorize or concretize. Indeed, as noted previously, the community’s attitudes and response 
in Burlington have very little rigid structure with which to ensure that future challenges will be 
met using the same commons approach (although it must be noted that there have been moves 
towards identifying specific members as decision makers). But this lack of rigid structure should 
not lead us to conclude that commons approaches lack resilience, nor that they will necessarily 
be temporary. Rather, it is precisely the relative lack of formalised structure which may allow 
such commons approaches to withstand changing environments and challenges. Ostrom’s 
insights are particularly pertinent here, as she explains that traditionally, advocates of state 
resource allocation and advocates of privatisation have both relied on the assumed superiority 
of top-down institutional design. Institutional change, it is assumed, (including that required to 
give effect to the right to water) must come from outside the community and be imposed on 
those individuals affected
928
. This assumption rests in turn on a further assumption, that there is 
a dichotomous choice to make between these two top-down modes:  State or private control 
must be the correct route. The benefit of commons approaches, manifest in more or less fluid 
form, is that they are well placed to fill the gaps between competing regulatory approaches, 
which almost inevitably appear while the question of (water) resource allocation is being 
inadequately addressed through the complex, overlapping, sometimes competing paradigms of 
rights, development and commodification. Ostrom’s vision here is to see the creation of a ‘rich 
mixture of ‘private-like’ and ‘public-like’ institutions defying classification in a sterile 
dichotomy’929. Such a definition is not out of place in describing the various commons 
approaches observed above. Indeed ‘adopt a river’ initiatives, pioneered in eThekwini, provide 
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useful examples of precisely such a classification-defying hybrid: A mixture of public resources 
catalysing community action. 
Romanticizing community control of resources must be avoided, not least because inequitable 
power relations can exist at small as well as large scale. Therefore there is potential for any 
institutional design and praxis to discriminate and disenfranchise. Also, it must be 
acknowledged that commons endeavours face myriad challenges around resourcing and 
sustainability, as well as the ever-present possibility that people will default to opportunistic 
(in)action. Burlington’s adopt-a-river initiative, described above, began with sixty volunteers. In 
November 2015 there were only ten. 
While we must be mindful of these problems, commons ideas are on the rise
930
. This is driven, 
in part by the failures of litigation on the right to water, and of ‘rights-talk’ more generally, to 
incorporate environmental protection, and even to deliver resources to all individuals 
effectively. Indeed, what the Constitutional Court has identified as a crucial function of litigation 
on social and economic rights
931
 – to provide crucibles within which new socio-economic 
settlements are created and recreated – is also a function that may be ascribed to the commons. 
Indeed, the commons may contain a degree of potential for positive change, which the Court’s 
jurisprudence of reasonableness has so far failed to deliver: 
‘In a commons, ordinary people can deliberate with each other and have their concerns heard… 
to formulate and ratify the rules that will affect their everyday lives.’932 
Commons strategies, if innovatively applied to water allocation, may be able to avoid the 
limitations of the right of access to sufficient water, restating sufficient water as a moral claim, 
made corporately by and for people within their community. Commons solutions, whether 
long-lasting or temporary, have the potential to give form to the erstwhile unheard voices of the 
water poor and to respond appropriately through innovative and inclusive social/institutional 
arrangements.  
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 5.4.3 Property and the right to water 
The various stories shared above testify (in the main) to the fact that neither a human right to 
water (expressed in its current form) nor a constitutional right of access to sufficient water can 
be relied on to provide equitable and sustainable water allocation for everyone: To this end the 
right to water (expressed in international human rights law, and constitutionally, in South 
Africa) remains useful but limited. Where these stories also recount, or even hint at, examples 
of communal, grass-roots responses to water poverty, it is possible to identify and to affirm 
commons thinking in action, governed by vernacular law. 
Together, the limitations of rights-talk, and the green shoots of commons examples should lead 
us to consider alternative approaches to water governance that are embedded more firmly in 
the context of their community (while probably being less formally constituted). To this end, 
and inspired by the motif of ‘reimagination’, attention now turns to the relationship between 
access to sufficient water and the concept of property. Although perhaps not immediately 
apparent, (a particular conception of) property is crucial to understanding and critiquing access 
to water in a water-as-commodity paradigm. Indeed, people’s experience of water-poverty must 
lead us to imagine new conceptualizations of property that are more sensitized to the needs of 
those people currently economically excluded from the ‘right’ to participate in the market for 
water sufficiently to meet their needs, and who instead, have to rely on a favourable 
interpretation of the constitutional right to sufficient water.  
Bromley & Cernea amongst others identify four property paradigms: state property, private 
property, open-access, and common property
933
.  Throughout this discussion, mention of 
‘commons’, ‘commons approaches’, ‘commons thinking’, and ‘commoning’ all refer to the 
fourth paradigm; common property. As defined above, this paradigm embodies the idea that 
some resources belong to everyone, and that these common or community resources must be 
actively protected and managed for the good of all
934
. However, applied to particular resources 
in real-life situations, common property does not mean ‘everyone’s property’935. It must be 
distinguished from an open access or ‘non-property’ paradigm, where no institutional 
arrangements exist regarding a particular resource. Instead, a common property paradigm 
confers ownership and management rights over a resource upon a ‘corporate group’, whose 
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membership and boundaries are defined. Arguably, without these features of exclusion and 
distinction, the concept of property has no meaning in any paradigm.
936
 
In South Africa the current property regime regarding water resources combines the State 
property and private property paradigms to the extent that the State remains heavily involved in 
water infrastructure and delivery. But its involvement is increasingly directed by a ‘private 
sector’ rationale of commercialisation, central to which is the requirement that the costs of 
water services are recovered from users, and preferably, profit is generated beyond this (see 
Chapter Three).
937
 Therefore, since the impetus for this hybrid State/private property regime is 
commercialisation, it can be understood as functionally comparable to Macpherson’s concept 
of industrial revolution private property.
938
 Consequently, the ensuing discussion of a paradigm 
shift involves the current dominant paradigm of individualised ownership and consumption 
(albeit it with State involvement), within which the preceding discussion of ‘rights-talk’ is 
situated, and a commons or common property paradigm. When directed specifically to water 
governance, these paradigms have been articulated as ‘water-as-commodity’, and ‘water-as-
commons’. The former views water as a commodity like any other essential good, responsive to 
customers and shareholders and capable of generating profit
939
.  The commons, in contrast, 
emphasises the characteristics of water that make for a difficult fit within the private property 
paradigm. Not only is water essential for human life and for the health of all ecosystems; it has 
no substitute; it is inextricably linked with the hydrological cycle, which is itself connected with 
the particular geography of countries, regions and communities. Furthermore, water has 
important cultural and spiritual dimensions, which are also connected to the geographical 
location of particular communities (see Chapter One for more detail on this). For each of these 
reasons, it is asserted that collective management of water by communities is not only 
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appropriate, but necessary, if sustainable, appropriate resource management is to be achieved.
940
 
Therefore the potential of a common property paradigm in relation to water must be seriously 
considered.  
 
5.5 Interrogating the inviolate: Property, commodification, and Human Rights 
Together the preceding examination of the commons as a theoretical and practical approach to 
natural resource governance, combined with some examples of commons thinking in action (in 
relation to water governance in particular) provides the impetus to launch the central claim of 
this thesis: Commons approaches to water governance have the potential to create more 
sustainable and more equitable access to sufficient water for those currently experiencing water 
poverty, than does the present rights-based approach.  
While it is my conviction that this is the case, such a claim inevitably challenges certain 
assumptions, which are intrinsic to modern democratic, capitalist cosmology. Chief among 
these is the right to property (and the connected concept of ‘property’), as well as the 
relationship between human rights and property.
941
 Having sought to fracture the water-as-
commodity paradigm, and to find epistemic space beyond the limits of rights talk, it is 
important now to return to the central tenets of that paradigm, and to critique them in light of 
the commons.  
It is well accepted that there is affinity between rights and property. Grear reminds us that ‘the 
very idea of ‘subjective right’ first emerged from the central idea of dominium over property’.942 
But anything other than a superficial analysis of the connection between a right of access to 
sufficient water, and a right to property, reveals a complex set of interlinkages, conceptually and 
practically, internationally, and nationally. We may begin with the difficulty faced in realizing 
the right of access to sufficient water in light of the dominant concept of property that is implicit 
within the international human rights jurisprudence. Taking the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights as a starting point, there is a great tension created for the realization of the social 
agenda within the human rights canon. On the one hand, there are explicit rights to participate 
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in the social and scientific advances in one’s society, and from this a line of rights flow, creating 
rights to the necessary elements of human well-being and dignity, for example, the right to 
healthcare, to housing, to education, and (implicitly) to water (see Chapter Two at 2.2.1). These 
form what could be described as a list soft of rights, because there is another, shorter list of 
hard rights in the human rights canon: the right to own property, including intellectual 
property.
943
  
This ownership right is much stronger than the soft rights, because it links to the question of the 
acceptability of different forms of discrimination. Whereas the canon of human rights law has 
accepted that discrimination on the grounds of race, gender, and increasingly age, is illegitimate, 
economic discrimination is seen as acceptable. Perhaps at the very edges of economic 
exclusion, where there is an appeal to justice in the need to respond to catastrophic natural 
disasters that plunge individuals into immediate and extraordinary poverty, claims are made 
that require a redistribution of economic resources for the well-being of individuals. But in the 
normal daily run of poverty, economic discrimination is perfectly acceptable. Indeed, it is a 
necessary part of our international free market. Our democratic rights that are seen in the 
international (human rights) community as the pinnacle of human social achievement, require 
the ability to discriminate between individuals because of economic difference, and to enjoy the 
fruits of that discrimination. I might have a right to housing or to health care, but it is seen as an 
acceptable realization of that right to enable me to participate in a market and not to be 
excluded for reasons of my race, gender or age for instance. But it is perfectly acceptable, in 
positivist human rights thinking, for an individual to be told you cannot have this health care or 
accommodation because you cannot afford it. This is due to a number of things we have 
forgotten about the conceptualization of property. 
First, ‘property’ is not a synonym for ‘things’. Colloquially, property is about things. Property is 
a label, at one level, for different commodities; ‘property’ relates colloquially to the things that 
are valued in particular societies over time. So, land is a recurring ‘thing’ of property. In 
agrarian, artisan and industrialized societies, different commodities take on different cultural 
and economic importance and value. Today, for example, we speak about ‘the information 
age’,944 and different forms of information are commodified and become part of the owned 
world. Indeed, with the developments in modern biotechnology, even parts of human beings, 
                                                          
943
 N J Cooper, A Swan, & D Townend ‘A Confluence of New Technology and the Right to Water: Experience 
and Potential from South Africa’s Constitution and Commons’ (2014) 16/2 Ethics and Information Technology 
119-134.  
944
 M Castells The Rise of the Network Society: The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture, Volume 1 
(Wiley & Sons, 2011) 8. 
233 
 
animals and plants, have become independent commodities and part of this owned world.
945
 
However, property is not only the ‘thing’. Property is not really the thing at all. Property is a 
description of the relationship of people regarding the ‘thing’. When I say that I have property 
in something, I am referring to a system of rights regarding my relationship to other people in 
relation to that thing. Essentially I say to others, ‘this is mine’. As Beyleveld & Brownsword 
have noted, this is a particular sort of claim. I only have to assert the provenance of my claim - 
that I purchased or made the thing - for the property to ‘bind the world’; the claim to property 
is to a strong, broad and binding right.
946
 Indeed, upon noticing an object we naturally think ‘to 
whom does that belong?’ We do not pause, in today’s society, to ask whether a thing is owned 
because we see it as part of the realm of commodities. We do not pause to think about the 
nature of the property that is or could be claimed. Our only real pause is in thinking how far 
the net is cast over commodities. Concern may be voiced regarding the commodification of 
something hitherto regarded as existing outside the realm of property claims, like clean air, or 
DNA perhaps.
947
 This however, does not mean that we cannot, or should not, also question 
how far a property right extends in other respects.  
Second, ‘property’ is a changing and changeable notion. Macpherson948 reminds us that the 
current paradigm within which we construct the concept of ‘property’ is not the only available 
paradigm that we have used or that we could use. The current paradigm of property, derived 
from the industrial revolution, revolves largely around private property. Fundamental to the way 
in which property is conceptualized within this paradigm are three attributes: First, property is 
easily transferable between individuals; second, property ownership is detached from social 
duties and is seen as part of a citizen’s rights; third, property rights are enforced by the 
machinery of the State, as part of the rule of law.
949
 We can develop a complex layering of 
rights-holdings over particular items of property (usually, the complexity is proportional to the 
perceived economic value of the commodity), but these are essentially created through the 
exchanged parts of the single exclusive right to the property. However, this is not the only way 
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in which we have held property. Macpherson illustrates the existence, and the potential for 
existence, of alternative property paradigms, by considering the feudal system of property that 
preceded private, industrial revolution property. In the feudal system, property rights were 
much more attached to the individual and the individual’s social duties. Property rights were 
not citizenship rights, but were bestowed by the monarch and within the social hierarchy.
950
 
Because of this framework, property was not as easily transferable. Perhaps most significantly, 
property was not as exclusive. Within this system, and for social welfare purposes, common 
ownership (i.e. community rather than exclusively individual ownership) was important. 
Common land became a way of ensuring social security for some members of the community; 
collective access to the benefits of property was as important within the system as private or 
exclusive enjoyment.  
Doubtless there are some similarities between this description and the fundamental facets of 
commons thinking, as discussed above. But this is not to advocate feudal society over modern 
industrial society. Macpherson simply reminds us that the way that we conceptualize property 
today is not necessarily the only way to do so. This resonates with Reich’s idea of ‘new 
property’, which affirms the paradigmatic nature of property: the changeable nature of property 
in response to different socio-economic conditions. We moved from feudal to private property 
due to the changing needs of industrialization and market capitalism. Over a shorter span of 
time, and within one jurisdiction, a similarly symbiotic relationship between the needs of the 
economy and the scope and content of the law (on access to water) has been traced (in Chapter 
Three).  The question today might be “do the new socio-economic needs of our society require 
a change in the conceptualization of property?” However, in seeking a more interconnected 
and less anthropocentric perspective, such a question must also ask how property might be 
reconceptualised in order to respond to the ecological imperatives facing us all. This relates to 
the third observation about ‘property’. 
Third, ‘property’ is a moral issue. Morality is about the appropriateness of different actions of 
individuals towards other individuals.
951
 It is about being able to make a convincing justification 
for making particular choices that influence other people. Modern societies tend perhaps, to 
limit the scope of morality, claiming that it relates to particular sorts of choices rather than 
others, for example, sexual morality rather than morality in international commodities trading 
or hedge fund management. However, morality is simply about justifying human choices and 
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actions. Property is the relationship between individual human beings, about things. It is about 
the claims that individuals make to bind each other about things. This makes ‘property’ a moral 
issue, because the act of claiming the particular relationship to things against other individuals is 
a human action and therefore subject to morality.  
When I say, ‘this is mine’, I am making an appeal to a particular sort of relationship to that 
property that I intend all other people to be bound by. I have to be able to justify that claim in 
terms of its morality. Generally, the underlying social response is to assume that ownership and 
property claims are necessarily moral, but this is questionable. When my property claims have 
implications on others’ well-being, then the requirement to be able to make the moral argument 
for that claim-making is imperative. If I fill my swimming pool, or water my garden
952
 a few 
kilometres away from my neighbour, who cannot afford to buy credit for the prepayment meter 
in order to access water for her family to wash and cook in, I have to be able to justify denying 
her some of my water ‘because it is mine’. Indeed, ‘because it is mine’, or ‘because I bought it’, 
or, implicitly, ‘because I deserve it and you do not’ are hard moral claims to justify in the face 
of my neighbour’s need. Indeed, the requirement to question the morality of claims to property 
is inherent in all acts of property-claiming. In this way, maintaining a simple private, industrial 
revolution property claim over access to water, or the means of supplying water, is a moral 
issue, requiring robust justifications and open to legitimate critique and creative alternatives.
953
 
Water scarcity affects over 20% of the world’s population (those without access to sufficient 
potable water to meet daily needs) and the problem has increased in many regions, while a 
private property paradigm for water continues to be promulgated
954
.  
The demand that property-claiming be subject to rigorous moral justification is not to place an 
unequal, or intolerable burden upon particular governments, municipalities, companies, or 
individuals. Because the concept of property is one that binds the world, it is universal and 
systemic. The requirement to make property a moral issue challenges all property ownership 
since morality is not selective. This leads to the question of how best to conceive of property in 
a morally sensitized way. It also raises the question of whether human rights might have a role 
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in such a reconceptualization of property. While the liberal vision of human rights - as 
individually focused, and increasingly technical and positivistic – is compatible with an industrial 
revolution private property paradigm, there is another vision of human rights, that resists legal 
domestication, and so retains some potential to act as a site and catalyst of critique, which can 
still disrupt positive human rights law itself. Grear describes this potential as: 
‘energy which reaches […] beyond the ‘now’ of law towards the ‘not yet’ of justice as law’s 
endlessly elusive horizon’.955 
Viewed in this way there is no contradiction in asserting the inadequacies of rights talk, and 
specifically of the right of access to sufficient water, while heeding the clarion call to affirm a 
right to water as a prophetic, emancipatory (and unambiguously moral) claim. 
In response to such a call, commons ideas do not deny individual rights. Rather, it is a shift in 
emphasis from individual rights (conferred in isolation from realities of scarcity and imperatives 
of sustainability, and susceptible to legal domestication), towards greater contextualisation and 
contestation of those rights claims.
956
  The themes of interconnectivity and interdependence 
within IWRM are echoed here. But unlike IWRM a commons strategy avoids emphasising 
individual (legal) water rights, in favour of communal needs (this does not detract from the 
continuing articulation of a right to water for everyone, as a moral claim, framed variously in 
individual and communal terms).  
In the South African context, there is potential to give effect to a reconceived notion of property 
in relation to water. Not only does the National Water Act apply the doctrine of public 
trusteeship to water, in a way that eschews private or State-ownership (rather the property title is 
vested in the State as trustee, with the nation - all people - as beneficiary
957
), but, as van der Walt 
argues, such a deliberately novel designation acknowledges that ‘property has a public, civic or 
“proprietary” aspect to it that transcends individual economic interests and that involves 
interdependency and common obligations’.958 (See discussion at Chapter Three at 3.3.2). 
Furthermore, the right to property in Section 25 of the Constitution makes specific provision 
for ‘legislative and other measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress 
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the results of past racial discrimination’,959 paving the way, in theory at least, for a fundamental 
reimagination of water governance in South Africa.   
Such a shift in focus may offer a more effective model of implementing sustainable water 
allocation, while avoiding the pitfalls of rights-talk inherent in the right to water. A commons 
strategy would encourage decisions on water allocation to be made at the lowest appropriate 
level, involving all users to input into collective decisions that transcend a compromise of 
competing interests, in favour of corporately ‘owned’ allocation decisions that best serve each 
community. If innovatively applied to water allocation, a commons strategy may be able to 
transcend the limitations of the right of access to sufficient water, restating sufficient water as a 
moral claim, made corporately by and for people within their community. 
5.6 Challenges and solutions 
Clearly the foregoing critique of the failures of the right to water and the attempts at reimagining 
water governance raises many challenges. Inevitably, questions are raised as to the best shape 
and scope of a right to water (as well as justifying why such a right should even exist), and 
around the Court’s legitimate interpretation of the right to water, requiring that theories of 
constitutionalism, separation of powers, and judicial restraint must be carefully re-examined. 
Zooming out to the international level, questions must be asked about the contingent 
articulation of liberal human rights, and the ways in which they are expressed as being 
congruent with a globalised capitalist economy. Furthermore, introducing and identifying 
commons thinking in action, regarding water governance at the local level, uncovers layers of 
‘law’ or law-like interactions that must also be analysed and theorised; as social norms are 
agreed (sometimes rediscovered), monitored and enforced within structures containing vastly 
different degrees of formality. The purpose of asking each of these questions (as well as the 
many others that this thesis has generated) is to answer how law can best help achieve the goal 
of access to sufficient water for everyone. This section simply acknowledges that the scale of 
that goal is considerable, and points to three practical ‘next steps’ towards solutions.  
First, regarding the constitutional right of access to sufficient water, greater scrutiny should be 
afforded to what resources are available in fulfilment of the right. While the apportioning of 
resources is undoubtedly a political question, a new legal requirement to publish what resources 
have been made available in pursuit of which socio-economic rights, along with explanations, 
could encourage their quicker, progressive realisation. Regarding national water policy, 
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commitment to full cost recovery for water services should be removed. While this would 
undoubtedly impact upon the State’s available resources, it would also, crucially, allow the right 
to water to be pursued from outside a water-as-commodity paradigm, which is essential if 
indigent communities are to experience significant improvements in their access to water. To 
this end the public trusteeship of water should be re-emphasised, including within the operation 
and priorities of State-owned water companies. The relatively minor involvement of foreign 
direct investment in the South African water sector means that such a shift could be undertaken 
without the degree of acrimony witnessed in parts of South America.  
Second, judicial interpretation of the right of access to sufficient water should adopt a more 
pragmatic and flexible approach, resisting the urge towards automatic restraint, which risks 
manifesting itself in a managerialism that masquerades as deference. The Constitutional Court’s 
jurisprudence of reasonableness should not be used to avoid adopting tangible minimum 
standards (core obligations) for socio-economic rights, when the substance of the particular 
right makes it ‘reasonable’ to do so. Regarding the right of access to sufficient water, such a 
minimum core should be decided, and then regularly reviewed in line with the continued 
obligation of progressive fulfilment. Moreover, the quantum decided for such a minimum core 
must accurately reflect both the needs of the (human) water users, and the capacities of their 
environment. This would require moving towards a more contextualised definition of sufficient 
water, which will almost certainly involve the adoption of maximum quotas for water use 
(whether these are imposed by prohibitive law or by prohibitive taxation is another matter).  
Third, serious research (echoing that conducted by Ostrom
960
 and others in various sectors, but 
particular to South Africa and to water governance) should be undertaken to identify where the 
optimum balance lies between community self-organisation and collaboration in partnership 
with government or NGOs. As the experience of the WUAs in Malawi suggests, achieving this 
balance is essential in order to effectively deliver sustainable and equitable water services over 
the long term, in communities where access to water is problematic. Such research must be 
creative enough to consider atypical modes of water governance, while being sensitive to the 
potential and actual weaknesses within commons thinking (and action).  
Doubtless each of these ‘solutions’ would generate their own challenges, not least regarding the 
need for new law and legal regulation, new interpretative approaches, and new ways to affirm, 
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encourage and support existing forms of vernacular law, with the potential to positively 
contribute to the overarching goal of access to water for everyone. 
 
5.7 Chapter summary and concluding comments 
Most ambitiously within this thesis, this chapter has sought to connect the legal shortcomings of 
the constitutional right of access to sufficient water to the reality of living with insufficient water 
for many in the country. A further connection has then been made between the ways in which 
water poor people experience the dominant mode of water governance, and the potential 
(sometimes latent, sometimes manifest) to rethink water governance in more enfranchising, 
more equitable and more sustainable ways. Crucial to this post-water-as-commodity imaginary 
endeavour is a fresh appraisal of the role of community organisation and commons thinking, 
based on empirical observation and theoretical analysis. But in order even to begin such a 
creative reappraisal, space must be found where ideas and examples that fall outside the 
dominant paradigm, are allowed room to flourish or to wilt, without presupposition. Doubtless 
the purity of such a cerebral space is not possible to attain in reality. Our conditioning, 
prejudices and preferences cannot be entirely kept away from the subject of our analysis. But 
even being mindful of this can help alert us to the importance of acknowledging our 
(un)conscious biases, and of compensating for them where we can. To this end, Peter Rollins’ 
notion of ‘suspended spaces’ (or ‘uncolonised spaces’) is a useful conceptual schema, and helps 
justify the decidedly optimistic appraisal of the potential contained within some people’s 
stories.
961
 
Similarly some of the post-modern insights into the interrogatory importance of the ‘other’, as 
well as on the necessary suspicion of epistemological closures, have guided the approach of this 
chapter, including its conclusions.  Sensitive to the eschewal of meta-narratives implicit in the 
postmodern turn, and reflecting on the lived experience of commoning discussed above, I do 
not wish to suggest that commons modes of water governance should necessarily be looked to 
as a replacement for more familiar ‘top down’ models (typified by State/Corporate water 
service) in all circumstances. Neither do I argue that framing questions of water use as issues to 
be addressed communally, necessarily removes the need to conceive of access to water also as a 
personal, individual issue, to which a ‘right of access to sufficient water’ may provide an 
appropriate legal concept and justiciable tool. To deny a place altogether for individuals’ claims 
of a right to water would be to ignore the progress that has been made in improving people’s 
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access to water globally. As part of this endeavour, the articulation and (at least partial) 
recognition of a right to water continues to focus rhetoric and galvanise action (see Chapter 
Two).   
Denial of an individual right to water in order to emphasise the interconnected, shared, 
contextualised and communal aspects of water use, would also betray an ideological 
commitment to the commons as the best approach to water governance, which simply echoes 
the ‘free market’ claim that it is commercialisation that is the only effective mode of resource 
allocation. Therefore I am not proposing a revolutionary replacement of all current water 
services with commons modes of water governance. While I maintain that commons thinking 
promotes a contingent and grounded vision of water use, which is essential for sustainable, 
equitable water governance, this assertion does not reject the possibility that other modes of 
governance can also (perhaps even more effectively) contribute to realising the same goal.
962
 
Indeed, commons thinking must not be allowed to follow the totalising route that modernism 
encourages, and which has helped to deeply embed the commercialisation of natural resources 
as the dominant paradigm. As Usher reminds us, one consequence of accepting that knowledge 
is relative to discourses, and is therefore always partial and perspectival, is that claims to 
atheoretical and value-neutral ‘truth’, even derived from observation, are fantasy.963 Moreover, 
such fantasies are pernicious because they prompt the enclosure and restriction of spaces that 
incubate and encourage perpetual contestation.  Instead, the existence of such spaces for 
contestation becomes even more important when faced with ‘the almost unthinkably complex, 
inter-related and interactive, global system’.964  
Here, epistemic spaces can signify and remind us of the ‘ungraspable’965 nature of this system, 
and therefore also, the futility of any claims to mastery of it. Epistemic spaces are important 
then, not just to encourage contestation, but also humility. Not humility as acquiescence, but as 
the catalyst for active and on-going contestation: reminding us that since a perfect system is 
ungraspable, the task must continue. But while a single, certain solution will always remain 
illusive, we must remember that the problem can be clearly described: many people continue 
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to live without access to sufficient water, while ‘holding’ a right to water that was supposed to 
eradicate this unacceptable status quo. Therefore, where commons approaches to water 
resources can be used to achieve improvements in people’s access to water, they should be 
pursued with gusto. 
Learning from some of the practical examples of commoning, considered above, the 
application of commons thinking to the water resources of any given community will require 
some degree of organisation and administration. While stories from Blantyre and Burlington 
provide examples with more or less formal governance structures, both examples also illustrate 
multilevel governance in action. In both locations, across two different jurisdictions, 
constitutional, national and municipal water law and policy remain unaffected by the operation 
of commons approaches to water allocation at the grass roots. Obligations imposed by 
legislation are unchanged by commons thinking, and, in South Africa, the right of access to 
sufficient water remains operative (albeit within the various constraints of qualification and 
interpretation) for each individual in the community. Therefore, commons approaches can be 
promoted without the need to advocate for the outright replacement of the current system of 
water governance.  
It is to be expected that such interaction between municipal and community governance will be 
reflected, at least to some extent, in municipal governance frameworks. In South Africa, this is 
one of the purposes of creating CMAs (discussed above). In Blantyre, Malawi, municipal 
government regularly communicates with the WUAs, briefing them of changes to water 
pumping and purification capacities, and helping them to ensure dependable water provision. 
On another practical note, several of the commons examples discussed above actually involved 
collaboration with the State (local or municipal government) to greater or lesser degrees. These 
examples are interesting first because they remind us that in pursuing the goal of access to 
sufficient water for all, the resources of the State, though limited, are important nonetheless. 
Second, though these examples reflect commons thinking, they are not entirely commons 
projects, because of their involvement with, and reliance upon State resources. Not only should 
this caution against hubristic claims about the mastery of the commons, it also requires 
acknowledgement of a third mode of water governance, distinct from State allocation (within a 
water-as-commodity paradigm), and water-as-commons, which can be expressed as a hybrid of 
community and State action.  
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It may even be more accurate (despite my aesthetic sensibilities) to add a fourth ‘C’ to the title 
of this thesis, and to acknowledge the role of ‘collaboration’, or the collaborative efforts of 
communities in partnership with local government towards more effective water governance. 
Indeed, such collaboration was what Ostrom has referred to as ‘private-like’ and ‘public-like’ 
institutions that defy classification in a sterile dichotomy. Whether such hybrids represent a 
water governance paradigm that is distinct from both water-as-commodity, and water–as-
commons, is not clear. But mindful not to claim the mastery of any one paradigm, perhaps 
such ambiguity is fitting. 
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6 
Conclusion: Achieving access 
to sufficient water for everyone, 
forever 
 
‘We will talk quite directly about it, because water is quite a fascinating thing… My own feeling is 
that there must be entitlements- the amount of water that any family however rich can use. My 
problem is that unless you have a maximum, you’re not going to solve the problem… You can’t 
say as long as you’re prepared to pay more and more and more, you can have as much water as 
you like. Mad.’  
Author’s interview with Justice Zak Yacoob966 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Throughout this thesis the central problematic has remained ‘how to achieve access to sufficient 
water for everyone in South Africa’. This has been engaged with from the perspectives of 
international law (and more broadly, water governance at the international level); South African 
Constitutional law (and more specifically, socio-economic rights jurisprudence); and community 
organisation (combining commons approaches to water governance in theory and practice).  
That this problematic is timely and important is only too evident from the fact that so many 
South Africans still live without access to sufficient water, and that water resources are under 
increasing pressure from a fusion of adverse climate change, inadequate governance, and 
increasing demand. The focus of this study has been on legal responses to the challenge of 
achieving access to sufficient water, with much attention given to how water, and access to water, 
are regulated using legal tools and legal concepts, including legislation, case decisions, and the 
language of (legal) rights. But throughout this legal enquiry effort has been made to include the 
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experiences of people for whom access to sufficient water is problematic, and whose lives are 
adversely affected by insufficient water and its myriad consequences. People in such situations 
are described as ‘water poor’. The voices of some of these water poor people, and the stories 
they tell, have been afforded a privileged position within the thesis, in deliberate subordination 
of the model of much mainstream scholarship, which (consciously or otherwise) excludes the 
experiences of people on the ‘wrong side’ of the economic/legal/political/ consensus.967 
In brief, the main conclusions of this thesis are threefold: First that the tentative consensus 
around a human right to water in international law is useful in directing attention and catalysing 
action towards improving people’s access to water. The right to water, as a trope, raises 
awareness of the profound global challenge of delivering sustainable access to sufficient water 
for the 650 million people worldwide, who currently live without it, including the 900 children a 
day who die from diarrhoeal disease caused by unsafe water.
968
 Moreover, it informs national 
law regarding the content of a domestic right to water, including concomitant State obligations, 
and it helps to direct development priorities including the Sustainable Development Goals.
969
 
But it falls short of being an effective tool for ensuring access to sufficient water for everyone. 
This is necessarily so, in the absence of an effective international regulatory framework for 
violations and compliance regarding socio-economic rights, and the continued primacy of states 
as the main context within which individuals’ rights are conferred and experienced.  
Second, the right of access to sufficient water in the South African Constitution is not capable of 
ensuring access to sufficient water for everyone in the country (this is referred to as the limits, or 
limitations of rights talk). As it is currently configured and interpreted, the right is 
individualistic, compatible with private property rights, and interpreted in light of a priori 
assumptions about the commerciality of water services. Furthermore, it is subject to progressive 
realisation within the available resources of the State. Together, these conditions and attributes 
position the right to water (and water governance more generally in South Africa) within a 
water-as-commodity paradigm. One consequence of this regarding the task of achieving 
sufficient water for everyone, is that in creating such a conditional legal right, the underlying 
moral claim to sufficient water is diluted, and the right of access to sufficient water is 
transformed into a technical legal problem
970
 This allows for experiences of access to insufficient 
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water to be deemed legally legitimate, thereby allowing the continuation of water poverty, and 
restricting space for political contestation.
971
 
Third, commons approaches to resource allocation (commons thinking in action) are well 
placed to step in to the gap left by the limitations of rights talk. Commons thinking promotes a 
contingent and grounded vision of water use, which is essential for sustainable, equitable water 
governance. Furthermore the emphasis within commons thinking on community priorities can 
encourage decisions on water governance to be mediated by communities, and made at the 
lowest appropriate level. This has the potential to help achieve access to sufficient water for 
everyone, by restating it as a moral claim, and aiding its fulfilment in more sensitised and 
appropriate ways. These attributes of commons thinking, applied to water governance, 
represent a distinct alternative paradigm: water-as-commons.  It is argued that access to 
sufficient water for everyone in South Africa could be more closely realised by reconceiving 
water governance within a water-as-commons paradigm (albeit manifest in different shapes and 
sizes, including being variously combined with State actors and /or NGOs), than by the 
continued pursuit of commercialised water services, and an (over)reliance on top-down 
approaches to water governance, including a constitutional right of access to water. 
By combining the substance of these conclusions with the ways in which they have been 
reached, it is asserted that an original and meaningful contribution to the state of the art on 
water governance in South Africa has been offered here (with some scope for application 
beyond the South African context). These conclusions are considered in more detail below as 
the thesis structure is reviewed. The chapter finishes with some reflections on the limitations of 
the thesis, and some thoughts on directions for future research. 
 6.1.1 Structure 
Entitled ‘Covenants, Constitution, and Commons’, the thesis has sought to engage with the 
question of how to achieve access to sufficient water for everyone in South Africa from the 
perspective of law (broadly defined to include ‘soft law’972, governance, and ‘vernacular law’, 
alongside more traditional ‘hard law’973), by adopting a three-level approach, moving from 
consideration of how access to sufficient water may be pursued through international law, and 
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at the international level; to national (including constitutional) law and policy in South Africa; 
and finally to the level of community organisation and the vernacular law of the commons.  
The pertinence of each level of enquiry to the overarching problematic of the thesis is now 
reviewed, beginning with water governance at the international level. This is the level of the 
Covenants (ICESCR and ICCPR), but also of other relevant international (including regional) 
treaties, UN General Assembly resolutions, and internationally agreed development goals, 
amongst other things. Central to my enquiry at this level was the question: 'How is the goal of 
achieving access to sufficient water understood, facilitated, and implemented at the level of 
international law?’974 
In order to answer this, Chapter Two focused on identifying the nature and scope of an 
internationally acknowledged human right to water, including outlining the law and legal 
instruments relevant to water governance at the international level. The chapter examined and 
critiqued the structural and practical limitations of an international human right to water, and to 
a rights-based approach to water governance, before introducing an alternative/complementary 
conception of water as a development goal. Connections between social, economic and cultural 
rights, civil and political rights, and environmental exigencies began to be made in this chapter, 
in order to frame the question of sustainable access to sufficient water within the challenges and 
limitations not just of economic resources, but also of social and cultural needs, and of 
emerging ecological capacities. The conclusions reached in Chapter Two, around the 
conceptual and material limitations on the ability of an international human right to water to 
address the challenge of access to sufficient water for everyone, propelled the thesis towards the 
next level of enquiry: national water governance in South Africa.  
As the statistics above attest to, access to sufficient water remains a serious challenge for people 
in numerous countries across the world. Therefore, any one of these countries could have been 
chosen as the focus of enquiry on national, or State-bound approaches to water governance. 
But, as detailed in Chapter One, South Africa was chosen for a number of reasons, including 
most notably the novel inclusion of a right of access to sufficient water within the country’s new 
Constitution. This, combined with the significant and persistent problems of water access facing 
many citizens, and my own familiarity with, and affection for, the country, meant that South 
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Africa was an ideal context to continue to interrogate the role and potential of law in helping to 
achieve universal access to sufficient water.  
Three research questions were particularly relevant to analysing water governance in South 
Africa:  How is the right of access to sufficient water understood, facilitated, and implemented 
in South Africa? What impact does relevant international law have on South Africa’s regulatory 
framework for access to water? To what extent can the current international and domestic 
regulatory frameworks achieve access to sufficient water for everyone in South Africa? These 
questions have been addressed across Chapters Three and Four. 
 
Chapter Three begins with an exploration of the country’s unique social, legal, and political 
history, in order to use this as a lens through which past and present water governance can be 
critiqued. This has required a detailed study of the operation of the 1996 Constitution, as well 
as of legislation and policy pertaining to water governance. Deliberately descriptive in parts, in 
order to lay the foundation for the ensuing evaluation of the effectiveness of the right of access 
to water, this chapter also offers a critical reading of the interaction between law and the 
economy, and the determining dynamics of capitalist imperatives upon governance, including 
water governance. Study of the Constitution also reveals the formal connection between 
international law and domestic law. Some of the normative consequences of water governance 
at the international level, on South African jurisprudence are reflected on in Chapter Four. So 
the principal purpose of Chapter Three has been to identify the law and legal instruments that 
relate to, and impact upon, the right of access to sufficient water in South Africa, as well as 
beginning to consider the relevance of international law for South African water governance. 
 
Chapter Four places the right of access to sufficient water within the general context of those 
socio-economic rights within the Bill of Rights, as created by the 1996 Constitution. It is argued 
that in order to understand the scope, application, and transformative potential of the right of 
access to sufficient water, consideration must be given to the ways in which all socio-economic 
rights have been interpreted and adjudicated upon by the courts, and most notably by the 
Constitutional Court. Furthermore, it is asserted that the interpretation of socio-economic rights 
depends, in part at least on the perceived relationship between the judiciary and the other 
branches of the State. Consequently, Chapter Four analyses seminal decisions of the 
Constitutional Court including those specifically regarding socio-economic rights, in order to 
identify a more-or-less coherent jurisprudence, and in so doing, to address the extent to which 
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the constitutional right to water (informed by the international human right to water) helps 
achieve access to sufficient water for everyone in South Africa. 
 
Chapter Four concludes that there are limitations to the Constitutional Court’s ability to pursue 
significant social transformation through adjudication on socio-economic rights, and that many 
of these limitations can be considered legitimate, by recourse to entrenched constitutional 
values (a position labelled ‘judicial restraint’, which taken to its extreme, becomes ‘judicial 
managerialism’975).  But an alternative interpretation of the Court’s interaction with socio-
economic rights is also postulated, emphasising the developmental importance of a dynamic, 
evolutionary understanding of the Court’s role in relation to these rights. Rather than asking 
what is the legitimate role of the Constitutional Court? (a question that expects a static answer), 
instead the question ‘what is currently the legitimate role of the Constitutional Court?’ is asked: 
an idea expressed as ‘liminal constitutionalism’. The usefulness of this concept is considered. 
But it is ultimately concluded that affecting significant transformation through adjudication of 
the right of access to sufficient water (as it is currently configured) has reached its limits. 
Reaching the limits of ‘rights talk’ (particularly regarding achieving access to sufficient water) 
once again propels the thesis, in Chapter Five, to the next regulatory level upon which the task 
of achieving access to sufficient water for everyone is considered: the commons. 
 
Here the central research question has been ‘what role can commons/community organisations 
play in creating effective water governance
976
 to help achieve access to water for everyone?’ In 
order to address this, Chapter Five begins with a detailed analysis of the stories of several 
people for whom access to insufficient water is a regular problem. Measured against the most 
authoritative international standard for sufficient water, these people’s stories reveal the various 
ways in which water access can be so problematic, as well as the consequences of lives lived 
without sufficient water. From this narrative inquiry flows an attempt to reconceive water 
governance from outside the structural and conceptual closures of the dominant paradigm 
(identified above as water-as-commodity) and consequently, to explore the potential for new/old 
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modes of governance that have the capacity to be more sustainable, more equitable, and better 
suited to the communities hit hardest by water poverty. 
Blending contemporary perspectives on vernacular law and multi-level governance with 
postmodern theories on stories and subjectivity, and empirical observation and reflection, a 
fresh contribution is made to the debate on how best to achieve access to sufficient water for 
everyone in South Africa. 
 6.1.2 Reconnecting the local, the national, and the global 
The three-level design that this thesis follows has been useful in order to provide structure, and 
to direct focus towards international, national, and community approaches to water governance, 
in turn. But it must be noted that these levels of governance do not occupy cleanly separated 
strata. Rather, each level interacts with, and responds to, the others. Chapters One and Two 
show how the impetus to adopt an international human right to water, was driven, at least in 
part, by national governmental failures, and by grass-roots activism. Chapters Three and Four 
evidence the influence of relevant international law on national water governance in South 
Africa, and as argued in Chapters Four and Five, recent developments of commons approaches 
to water governance in South Africa and Malawi have been driven by the limitations of top-
down national law and policy. 
While much attention has been given to commons thinking in action, within local communities, 
it is important to remember that the commons is also a global movement. There are many 
historical and contemporary examples of geographically bound commons approaches, applied 
across the world: to water; agriculture; libraries; and grocery shopping, amongst many others. 
But also, empowered in large part by the internet, global commons have developed 
exponentially, and can be seen in relation to open access scholarship; open source software; 
alternative currencies; music; and data sharing.
977
 Indeed, the prevalence of commons 
approaches, alongside their resilience to economic shocks (due to the fact that many commons 
modes are more or less separate from State/market logic and control) has even led at least one 
country to formally consider transitioning towards greater use of commons approaches.
978
 
Similarly, South Africa’s launch of Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs) to improve 
locally-specific water governance,
979
 is an example of adapting governance structures in order to 
                                                          
977
 See for example Open Knowledge International <https://okfn.org/> (Last accessed 27 July 2016). 
978
 In 2014 the Ecuadorian Government commissioned a strategic research initiative by Free Libre Open 
Knowledge (FLOK). Available at: <http://en.wiki.floksociety.org/w/Research_Plan> (Last accessed 27 July 2016).  
979
 <http://www.inkomaticma.co.za> (last accessed 27 July 2016). 
250 
 
attempt to incorporate grassroots organisation and knowledge: ‘empowering stakeholders to 
engage in consensual and adaptive decision making across the […] catchment.’980  
   
6.2 A note on originality 
Reviewing the prevalence of empirical research in legal studies, Epstein and King have noted 
that although much legal scholarship makes use of empirical information – that is quantitative 
data or qualitative information – far too little attention has been paid ‘to the key lessons of the 
revolution in empirical analysis that has been taking place over the last century in other 
disciplines’.981 In particular there remains a conspicuous absence of work that focuses on the 
methodology of empirical analysis in law. The result of this, they claim, is that ‘readers learn 
considerably less accurate information about the empirical world than the studies’ stridently 
stated’.982 
Sensitive to this general weakness in legal research, and influenced by social scientific 
skepticism around epistemological mastery, I have deliberately sought to adopt a 
methodological design that is at once explicit, and is also able to combine legal scholarship with 
narrative inquiry in order to tell a story that is grounded in the empirical world. To the degree 
to which I have succeeded in this endeavour, I believe that this makes a positive contribution to 
genuinely socio-legal research.
983
 
Moreover, the conceptual lens through which the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court has 
been analyzed in Chapter Four, represents an original attempt to break open the binary model 
that frames ‘judicial managerialism’ and ‘transformative constitutionalism’ as competing 
interpretations of the ‘correct’ or most appropriate approach of the Court. Instead of such a 
binary tension, the concept of ‘liminal constitutionalism’ has sought to rephrase questions 
around the optimum approach of the Constitutional Court, as contingent, temporary and fluid: 
What is optimum at one point in time will not necessarily be so at another time. This 
encourages continual contestation of the Court’s role, which has the potential to lead to 
consideration of modes of water governance outside the current configuration of individual 
rights claims, whenever and wherever appropriate (see 4.6.3). 
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Finally, analysis of the relationship between property and the right of access to sufficient water, 
pertinently contributes to the literature on human rights and property rights. Grear has 
described water as ‘the ultimate frontier issue between rights and property paradigms’984 and 
although this nexus has already received some critical theoretical attention, the emphasis on the 
experience of water-poor people in this thesis adds practical dimensions to the theoretical 
debate, applying the theory within the South African legal system, and illustrating people’s ‘felt 
injustice’985 by giving voice to their stories, and by learning from their responses. In so doing, this 
thesis makes a timely contribution to scholarship around the evolutionary direction of socio-
economic rights in South Africa, and across the global South, (where the inclusion of socio-
economic rights within national Constitutions is becoming more popular
986
) and on the potential 
for commons thinking to be used in pursuit of better (water) governance.  
  
6.3 Pre/Post modern hints towards hydro-socio-eco responsibility 
The Commons has been described as ‘a useful new/old framework and vocabulary for building 
a new societal vision.’987 Unsurprisingly then, commons thinking finds echoes of itself in ancient 
traditions, as well as in contemporary culture. Similarly the 1996 Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa attempts to integrate old wisdom with the contemporary language of rights, and 
a fresh commitment to dignity (while clearly renouncing the legacies of discrimination and 
apartheid). One such ancient tradition, which is particularly relevant to any discussion of rights 
and resource governance in South Africa, is Ubuntu. 
6.3.1 Ubuntu, rights and commons 
In the case of S v Makwanyane (considered in Chapter Four in relation to judicial deference), 
in obiter, Langa J called for: 
‘a change in mental attitude from vengeance to an appreciation of the need for understanding, 
from retaliation to reparation and from victimisation to Ubuntu.’988 
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Although referred to in Makwanyane in the context of capital punishment, Ubuntu can also 
claim much broader significance, particularly to the conceptualisation of people’s rights and 
responsibilities. Ubuntu has been described as a world-view prevalent in African societies, 
which predates colonial involvement on the continent, and as a metaphor for group solidarity in 
response to the challenges of survival and of scarce resources.
989
 It is well summarised by the 
phrase ‘Motho ke motho ka batho babang’, ‘a person is only a person because of other 
people’.990 As such it implicitly emphasises personhood, humanity, and humaneness.991  
Langa J describes it as being relevant to contemporary South African jurisprudence because of 
its emphasis on the interdependence of community members, and therefore the importance of 
‘communality’:992 
It recognises a person's status as a human being, entitled to unconditional respect, dignity, value 
and acceptance from the members of the community such person happens to be part of. It also 
entails the converse, however. The person has a corresponding duty to give the same respect, 
dignity, value and acceptance to each member of that community. More importantly, it regulates 
the exercise of rights by the emphasis it lays on sharing and co-responsibility and the mutual 
enjoyment of rights by all.’993 
Applied more specifically to the focus of this thesis, and to the right of access to sufficient water, 
Ubuntu seems to offer an important vantage point from which to review both the constitutional 
right to water, and the commons approaches to water governance identified in the previous 
chapter. The right to water, in its current configuration is contingent upon available resources, 
and subject to progressive, not immediate fulfilment. But Ubuntu raises a further important 
limitation that any one person’s enjoyment of their right must not be at the expense of others’ 
mutual enjoyment.  
In light of this, Justice Yacoob’s comments on imposing maximum quotas for water use (quoted 
at the beginning of this chapter) supports this emphasis on mutual responsibility and mutual 
enjoyment, and hint at the need for a significant transformation of water governance if truly 
sustainable, equitable access to sufficient water for everyone is to be achieved. Ubuntu offers a 
rationale by which the right to access water, that any one individual or family has, can be 
scrutinised (and if necessary, limited) by the context of the needs and resources within their 
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community. To use so much water that your neighbour’s access to water is in jeopardy, would 
be to disregard Ubuntu. 
Within the context of a community where water poverty exists, such an application of Ubuntu 
to water access and the right to water may contribute to the agreement of shared social norms 
and vernacular law around which commons approaches to water governance could be 
regulated. Indeed, the willingness of residents in Burlington to pool finances in order to 
maintain piped water to older people’s homes, implicitly accepts that there is a maximum 
quantum of water beyond which one individual’s water use will impede another’s. If those 
contributing to elderly neighbours’ water bills, decided instead to use that money to buy more 
water for themselves, their neighbour’s access to water would be impinged upon. Whether 
there should be a maximum quota for water use in (State) law is a different question. The 
Constitutional Court’s rejection of a minimum core approach to socio-economic rights may 
suggest that there may also be resistance to imposing maximums. But Yacoob’s comments 
certainly reinforce the argument made in Chapter Five, that a claim to (however much) water 
must be understood as a moral claim, and not simply as a value-neutral market activity: 
‘You can’t say as long as you’re prepared to pay more and more and more, you can have as 
much water as you like. Mad.’994  
 
Ubuntu can be used to affirm an individual’s right of access to sufficient water, because Ubuntu 
affirms the dignity of all people, and sufficient water is necessary for dignified existence. While 
simultaneously, Ubuntu reminds us that it is everyone’s responsibility to ensure that we all enjoy 
that right. Applied to the foregoing analysis of the limits of rights talk, and of commons 
responses to the challenge of water poverty, the individual ‘rights’ element of Ubuntu, is 
protected (albeit incompletely) through legislation, policy, and the work of the courts. While in 
service of the ‘responsibilities’ aspect of Ubuntu, commons thinking (perhaps particularly in 
conjunction with municipal or NGO facilitation) provides a framework within which people’s 
co-responsibility (the responsibility that each member of a community owes to everyone else) 
can be productively expressed. To summarise, attempts to reimagine the application of the 
right of access to sufficient water more fully, and in more sustainable and equitable ways, would 
benefit from meditating on Ubuntu’s central insights around the interdependency of everyone, 
and the consequent interconnection between people’s rights and their responsibilities. 
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6.3.2 Revisiting water governance in the Anthropocene’s dark light 
 
As well as Ubuntu’s pre-modern wisdom, more recent insights from legal scholarship, 
sociological and cultural thought, must also be considered if serious suggestions on the future 
shape of water governance are to be proffered. These insights have been catalysed by 
environmental exigencies that are connected to the geological phenomenon of the 
Anthropocene.  
The Anthropocene was introduced in Chapter Two (see 2.5.1), and its potential impact on 
water governance was briefly noted. The Anthropocene is a proposed new geological epoch, 
defined by the claim that humanity has become a geological agent in much the same way as 
volcanoes and meteors, capable of influencing the Earth and its systems. Regardless of its 
current unconfirmed geological status, the Anthropocene has caught the attention of scholars 
across social and natural scientific disciplines, literature and the arts, and is becoming a popular 
lens through which to consider past, present and future global environmental change, and its 
impact at every level of society.
995
  
The physical effects of the Anthropocene on water are not yet fully understood, although 
driven by climate change, and by excessive human interference with water systems, less 
predictable weather patterns (causing drought and heavy rainfall), pollution and salination are 
all beginning to adversely affect water supplies. This is causing manifold consequences for 
human and non-human life, including food security, sanitation, health and economic 
development, ecosystems degradation and species extinction.
996
 
While such emerging realities compel any efforts to reappraise the design and praxis of water 
governance towards more eco-sensitive directions, it is the social and cultural consequences of 
the Anthropocene that are just as important for the focus of this thesis, and its conclusions. As 
Robinson reminds us, debate around determining the existence of the Anthropocene ‘is a 
scientific one, not a socio-economic or cultural determination, yet its greatest implications may 
lie in the realm of the social sciences’.997 Accordingly, the Anthropocene has already generated a 
trans-disciplinary platform upon which to bridge the prevailing divide between the ‘social world’ 
of philosophy, anthropology, sociology, politics, law and economics, and the ‘material world’ of 
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engineering and natural science.
998
 In so doing, old separations are collapsing, alongside old 
assumptions about the Earth’s stability and resilience.  
Formally, the Holocene Epoch denotes the relatively stable period of the past 10 000 - 12 000 
years that has been characterised by extraordinarily good living conditions enabling the 
development of modern societies in a world of seven billion people.
999
 Every piece of 
documented human thought and experience, in literature, philosophy, history, religious texts, 
and laws, has been written during this epoch,
1000
 and therefore, has arisen from within this 
context of relative stability.  As climate change challenges this stability, and Earth systems reach 
the limits of sustainability, many of the assumptions implicit within human thought (and within 
the operative logic of human institutions) about the constancy and permanence of the natural 
world, are being challenged. In turn, this is challenging the very ways in which humanity can 
behave within the world. This is generating radical reappraisals of how we live (and where we 
live, and even why we live), which are beginning to affect individual and societal values 
regarding trade, travel, consumption, architecture, politics, religion, and much more. As Klein 
succinctly puts it ‘this changes everything’.1001 
The Anthropocene is also pervading legal discourse, particularly at the intersection of 
environmental law and human rights. This is offering new perspectives for lawyers to consider 
the role of law in mediating the human-environment interface.
1002
 Because of the importance 
that law plays in regulating human-to-human behaviour, as well as human’s interactions with the 
non-human world, it is essential that the Anthropocene’s interrogative light be brought to bear 
here. Law ‘is deeply implicated in the systems that have caused the end to the Holocene, and at 
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once is central also to the reforms needed to cope with the emerging Anthropocene’.1003 
Applying this realisation to water governance - and in particular to the question of how law can 
help to achieve access to sufficient water for everyone - should lead us to a deep reappraisal of 
what the role of law (here relating to water governance) should be. This reappraisal must be 
uninhibited by the assumptions of the dominant (water-as-commodity) paradigm. Instead, it 
must break open the prohibitive epistemological closures in the law, and expose legal discourse 
to new/old modes of understanding and action, which are more finely calibrated to mediating 
the profound social and environmental challenges facing socio-eco-responsible water 
governance.  
On a more modest scale, this is precisely the impetus behind my efforts to blend people’s 
stories of insufficient water with commons thinking, and in so doing, to illustrate how atypical 
(non-paradigmatic) approaches to law can be (and are being) applied in order to open up new 
perspectives, and new approaches (in this instance for water governance). In short, 
acknowledgment of the exigencies of the Anthropocene could be the catalyst needed for a vivid 
reimagination of, then a thorough implementation of, modes of water governance that better 
realise sustainable, equitable water access for all. But even such ‘new thinking’1004 must not be 
allowed to ossify, and so become closed to the perpetual need for contestation (see 5.6).  
 
 
6.4 Limitations of this thesis, and future research directions 
 
This thesis has limited itself to an enquiry around legal approaches (albeit broadly defined) to 
achieving the goal of access to water for everyone in South Africa. For this reason there are a 
number of limitations to the thesis that should be noted. First, the positive potential of non-legal 
approaches, including technological innovations, and improved water management for instance, 
have not been considered in detail. Such approaches, which seek to improve the available 
supply and/or quality of water, are already playing important roles in helping to realise access to 
sufficient water for many people. Indeed, some productive research on combining water-
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monitoring technologies with commons approaches to water governance, is being pursued by 
the author, outside this thesis.
1005
  
Second, the particular focus on South Africa has allowed for an in-depth analysis of water 
governance in one jurisdiction, and has produced country-specific conclusions. While 
undoubtedly there are some similarities between South Africa and neighbouring countries, both 
regarding the problems facing people’s access to water, and regarding the status, inspiration and 
application of socio-economic rights, any wholesale application of the conclusions of this thesis 
to questions of water governance in other countries, should be avoided. The inclusion of an 
explicit right of access to sufficient water in the South African Constitution, coupled with the 
prescribed relationship between international law and domestic law in the country, and the 
distinctive jurisprudence on socio-economic rights that the Constitutional Court has developed, 
all emphasise the fact that aspects of water governance in South Africa are unique. But, mindful 
of this, the empirical work in this thesis, conducted in Malawi, suggests that commons thinking 
may have a role to play in water governance wherever water poverty and community 
organisations exist (while conclusions around the limits of rights talk may have less general 
application in certain other jurisdictions).  
Third, methodologically, the use of semi-structured interviews in water-poor communities 
risked reflecting a very narrow, and selective section of experience. This was mitigated 
somewhat by using a variety of rural and urban locations, and in so doing, identifying some 
issues common to similar locations. Also, the data collected has been triangulated by 
considerable additional evidence from other sources. So although selective, it is ‘real’ (as well as 
being at odds with positivist legal theory, that would anticipate that conferral of a right to water 
should solve people’s problems of water access1006). But the fact remains that by targeting 
communities where access to sufficient water is problematic, the interview data used in this 
thesis recounts problems of water access across nearly all participants, despite the fact that in 
the country as a whole, access to sufficient water is not (particularly) problematic for the 
majority of people. Therefore it is important to be clear that a study of how access to sufficient 
water might best be achieved through legal means, will be most directly relevant to the minority 
of people in South Africa who are water poor. However, framing the (human) right to water as 
a moral claim (see 5.5), compounded by the emerging social and ecological realities of the 
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Anthropocene, the question of how to achieve sustainable, equitable access to water should also 
be an operative question for everyone.  It has already been noted that these interviews are not 
intended to be the basis of generalised assumptions. Rather, they illustrate and emphasise 
aspects of what is already acknowledged as being the general inadequacies around access to 
water in the country. Moreover, they turn attention towards the grass roots, from where 
innovative responses to water poverty are emerging.   
For various reasons a more in-depth ethnographic study in the communities visited, was not 
feasible, although hopefully this is something to pursue in the future. To be able to observe and 
reflect upon people’s daily interaction with water and in relation to water over a longer period 
of time, would have allowed for greater understanding variously of the complexities and the 
mundaneness of navigating life with insufficient water. Also, conducting longer (and multiple) 
interviews could have led to deeper insights, which would more easily transcend the surface 
level of giving information.
1007
 Such richer quality interviews would have allowed for more 
conversational analysis of the interactional character of the interviews, and of identification and 
mediation of the power dynamics present in any interview, but only implicitly discernable in 
our relatively short and structured interactions.
1008
 
From the perspective of constitutional theory, the decisions of the Constitutional Court 
regarding socio-economic rights, will continue to be watched with interest, particularly to see 
whether the proposed conceptual schema of Liminal Constitutionalism can continue to provide 
useful analysis. I do not envisage that the Constitutional Court will return to the (perceived) 
expansive judgments made in the early days of the Court’s existence. But the considerable 
problems of poverty and disenfranchisement that many in the country continue to face, may 
compel the Court not to settle into managerialism, but to continue, temporarily at least, to 
pursue some degree of transformational activity. 
 
6.5 Concluding thoughts 
The right of access to sufficient water in South Africa is widely heralded as an exemplar of the 
incorporation of socio-economic rights in domestic constitutional law. This is undoubtedly true, 
but only up to a point. Shaped in part by consensus around an international human right to 
water, as well as by the desire to remedy the profound inequities of apartheid, the right to water 
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(placed in the context of the Bill of Rights) simultaneously provides an overarching moral 
framework (through the elaboration of relevant human rights norms), while remaining 
decidedly remote from the experience of many people. At the international level, although the 
human right to water has the conceptual potential to reach across boundaries, the extent to 
which this has meaningfully occurred remains contentious. In contrast, domestic law is often 
considered as a more effective means of giving effect to developmental priorities, particularly in 
a context such as South Africa, where constitutional rights arguably better represent on-the-
ground social and economic needs than in other countries. But the interpretation and 
application of the domestic, constitutional right of access to sufficient water in South Africa, has 
been constrained and inchoate, illustrating the practical and conceptual limits that ‘rights talk’ is 
facing. The formalism of law – be that international law or domestic constitutional law – can 
never ultimately reflect how the law is perceived and operationalised at the grass-roots level. 
International and constitutional provisions have an important symbolic and catalytic role, but 
one should hesitate before forming the view that such codification will per se engender full and 
complete normative implementation. Clearly, they will not, as the constrained jurisprudence of 
the Constitutional Court, and the experiences of water-poor people, bear testament to.  
 
But the story does not end there. Driven in part at least, by the failures of the right to water (at 
the international and national levels) to translate into access to sufficient water for everyone, 
water-poor communities are beginning to experiment with, and embrace bottom-up commons 
approaches to water allocation (and water governance in its broadest sense), governed by more 
or less identifiable social norms and vernacular law. The shape, scope and longevity of these 
commons exemplars are far from uniform, and the optimum degree of collaboration between 
communities, municipal government and NGOs is also unclear. But their very existence 
suggests that new thinking is being applied to water governance, and with some positive results. 
This should elicit hope, but not surprise: 
 
‘Ex Africa semper aliquid novi’1009 
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Appendices 
List of Interviews 
Complete interview transcripts are available on request. Interviews are listed below in the order that they 
appear in the thesis: 
# 1 Author’s interview with ‘Gremmah’ Mbongwa. 
 Okhombe, Kwa-Zulu Natal. April 2010.   
 
# 2 Author’s interview with Jennifer (Soche Water Users’ Association) and Andrew (Water for 
People). 
Soche, near Blantyre, Malawi. April 2014. 
# 3 Author’s interview with Nombuso Khumalo.  
Burlington, Kwa-Zulu Natal. April 2010. 
# 4 Author’s interview with Siyabonga Mbhele.  
Burlington, Kwa-Zulu Natal. February 2010.  
# 5 Author’s interview with Sanele. 
Burlington, Kwa-Zulu Natal. November 2015.  
# 6 Author’s interview with Justice Zak Yacoobs. 
University of Kwa-Zulu Natal. April 2014. 
# 7 Author’s interview with Mbali Miya and Mpume. 
Okhombe, Kwa-Zulu Natal. April 2010. 
# 8 Author’s interview with Nombuso Khaba.  
Woodford, Kwa-Zulu Natal. February 2010.  
# 9 Author’s interview with Vosile and Elizabeth.  
Woodford, Kwa-Zulu Natal. February 2010.   
# 10 Author’s interview with Sewpersadh Kanthelall.  
Verulam, Kwa-Zulu Natal. November 2015.  
 
# 11 Author’s interview with Thandeka.  
Msunduze, Kwa-Zulu Natal. November 2015.  
 
# 12 Author’s interview with Sanele.  
Burlington, Kwa-Zulu Natal. November 2015.   
 
# 13 Author’s interview with Helen, Thembeka and Phindile.  
Burlington, Kwa-Zulu Natal. November 2015.   
 
# 14 Author’s interview with Sbo. 
Burlington, Kwa-Zulu Natal. November 2015.   
 
# 15 Author’s interview with Kate Harawa (Water for People).  
Blantyre, Malawi. April 2014. 
 
# 16 Author’s interview with Andrew (Water for People).  
Blantyre, Malawi. April 2014. 
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# 17 Author’s interview with Pastor Elias Nowa (WUA Executive Chairperson).   
Nkolokott, near Blantyre, Malawi. April 2014. 
 
# 18 Author’s interview with Francis (WUA Administrator).   
Nkolokott, near Blantyre, Malawi. April 2014. 
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Model information letter  
This letter is for use with township residents who have been approached as potential interviewees. The 
letter will be offered to participants in English and Afrikaans. The same content will appear in both 
versions. 
Access to sufficient water in South Africa. 
 
Dear sir/ madam, 
You are invited to take part in a research project; ‘Access to sufficient water in South Africa’. Before you 
decide whether to take part it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and 
what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others 
if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time 
to decide whether or not you wish to take part.  
The aim of this research is to help us understand how water is accessed for domestic purposes 
(drinking, washing, cooking) by township residents and people living in informal settlements in South 
Africa. We want to ask questions about whether you have a water supply close to your home; whether 
the supply works well; whether the water is expensive; whether you have ever not had enough water to 
meet your needs and how that affected you or your family. 
The aim of asking all these questions is to try to work out how access to sufficient water can best be 
protected for everyone in South Africa.  
You have been asked to take part in this research because you have links with Youth With A Mission, 
South Africa and because you have been involved in the (…) project in (…) township. I used to work for 
Youth With A Mission myself and would really appreciate your help in my research.  
 
Taking part is entirely voluntary. If you would prefer not to take part this will not affect you in any way. 
If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep. You can change your 
mind at any time. You do not have to give a reason. 
 
In order to make interviews easier I would like to record them using a Dictaphone. Once I have 
finished all my interviews, I will write up what we talked about and will then destroy the recording. If you 
would like to take part in an interview, but don’t want to be recorded, you can say so and your interview 
will not be recorded. 
If you do take part in this research, we will arrange a time and place for the interview. Interviews will 
take place in the area that you live, so you will not need to travel. It is expected that the interview will not 
take longer than 30 minutes. You do not need to bring anything with you or prepare anything. But if you 
have water bills, it may be helpful to have a look at these to remind you about the price you pay for 
water. 
I will ask you general questions about your experience accessing water. These will cover the following:  
 How close are you to your water supply? 
 Does it work (all the time, some of the time, does it get shut off?)   
 Do you get all the water you need?  
 How expensive is it? (can you afford to buy all the water you need or do you buy less than you 
need? Do you pay for water at all?)  
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I will listen to what you say and I might ask you for more details or to explain something I don’t 
understand. I will also ask you whether you live in the township or in an attached informal settlement. 
If you do not know answers to the questions that is fine. If you need a little while to think, that too is 
OK. In the interview, if you find that answering any of the questions is upsetting, you are welcome to 
take your time, to pause the interview, or to stop it completely. Any recording will be destroyed if you 
wish. 
You will not receive any payment or reward for taking part in this research. Whilst there are no 
immediate benefits for you taking part in the project, it is hoped that this work will contribute to a better 
understanding of day-to-day challenges regarding water and may help to shape improvements in the 
future. 
 
All the information that we collect about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly 
confidential. If you give your name and agree for it to be used to identify your responses, your name 
may be used in this thesis, and in future related publications. If you do not wish to be identified in any 
reports or publications that come from this research, your contribution will remain anonymous. 
This research will form part of a Doctoral Research Thesis. It may also be used in journal articles, 
books and other published material. However, it is not possible to provide participants with copies of 
any such publications. 
This research project has been approved by the School of Law, Research Ethics Committee at the 
University of Sheffield, England. 
You can contact us for further information using the following details: 
Researcher: Nathan Cooper 
n.cooper@sheffield.ac.uk 
Research Supervisor: Dr Duncan French 
d.french@sheffield.ac.uk 
University of Sheffield, School of Law, Bartolome House, Winter Street, Sheffield, S3 7ND, United 
Kingdom 
Thank you for taking the time to read this.  
Nathan Cooper 
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Framework for semi-structured interviews in water-poor communities (interview 
schedule) 
The following questions, grouped A – E formed the framework for interviews. Questions were 
modified, rephrased or not used, depending on each situation. For instance some respondents 
who expressed satisfaction with the quality of water they used were not asked whether their 
health had been adversely affected by poor quality water. 
A How do you access water (for domestic use)? Eg. Standpipe, tap at home, shared tap, 
bucket? 
 Who provides the water? Local authority/ private company/ charity? 
B Questions based on the definition of sufficient water in General Comment 15 CESCR 
regarding availability, quality and accessibility (physical, economic, non-discriminatory and 
information accessibility). 
 How much water do you use in a day/week? For how many people? 
 What does it taste/ look/ smell like? 
 Is your water source very close? If not, who collects it and how? 
Do you get an amount of water free? How much do you pay per unit? How much do 
you spend a week on water? How much do you earn in a week? 
C If residents/communities have experienced insufficient water (as defined by GC15) 
 How do you make your concerns/complaints known? 
 Is there involvement from your local MP/ council/ NGO/ advocacy group? 
 Are people involved in direct action? Informal reconnection? Activist network? 
D Has your experience of access to sufficient water changed in recent years? What aspects 
of section B? 
E What is the wider impact on your life of problems with access to sufficient water? 
 Health issues? Time/money diverted from...? Education/work-related issues? 
